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© Copyright 1993 by Project on Ethnic Relations
INTRODUCTION
Peace will return to the Balkans only when the Serbs come to terms with their neighbors. This will not happen until the Serbs are at peace with themselves.
The bellicose ultra-nationalism that has turned Serbia into a pariah in the international community has all but drowned out the remaining voices of reason and moderation. Yet it is the moderates who sooner or later will have to restore Serbia's well-being and reclaim its place in the sun. They need recognition and encouragement.
Who are the moderates? What is their agenda? How can they be helped? How can they help Serbia? How can they start to re-build bridges between Serbs and minorities in the new Yugoslavia, to Serbs outside, and to their newly independent neighbors?
These questions were discussed at a meeting organized by the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) at the Carnegie Corporation of New York on September 27-28, 1993. The participants were Serbs from Serbia, Serbs from Croatia, an Albanian from the Kosovo region of Serbia, and experts from America and Europe.
There were no easy answers, and no illusions. If anything, the meeting revealed the unmerciful complexity of the problems and the poor prospects for any early resolution. But it also confirmed the urgency of moving ahead with whatever human resources are at hand.
The discussions were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. The report, which was prepared by Boris Makarenko of the PER staff, has not been reviewed by the participants and is PER's sole responsibility. While every effort was made to reflect accurately all of the contributions, we ask the understanding of participants whose remarks may not have not been fully captured in this brief document.
A note on terminology: There seems to be no completely satisfactory way to name the geopolitical space of what was once Yugoslavia. When we use the name in its past meaning, we preface it by "former" or "ex", as distinct from the current Yugoslavia, that is, the federation of Serbia and Montenegro.
Allen H. Kassof, Director
Livia B. Plaks, Associate Director
Project on Ethnic Relations
December 1993
THE CONTEXT
The meeting brought together Serbian intellectuals, politicians and journalists from different parts of the former Yugoslavia with specialists on the region from the United States and other countries. It was convened on the initiative of the Project on Ethnic Relations to discuss alternatives for the future of the region, as perceived by those who do not equate the nationalistic designs and practices of the current leaderships with the long-term interests of their nation.
PER director Dr. Allen H. Kassof welcomed the participants and invited Dr. David Hamburg, president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, to deliver introductory remarks. Dr. Hamburg suggested that the current crisis in the geopolitical space formerly occupied by Yugoslavia should be seen as a part of an overall collapse of the concepts of the nation-states and nationalism. Although throughout the twentieth century, self-determination has been equated with independent statehood, the recent turmoil and violence accompanying the emergence of new states in eastern and central Europe and the former Soviet Union indicate that the notion of "a state of their own" for each of the three thousand to five thousand ethnic groups in the world no longer appears to be a practical idea.
The crisis in the former multiethnic state of Yugoslavia is a clear illustration of that point. Yugoslavia's breakup has already created two million refugees. The people of its various ethnic groups will continue to suffer hardships as long as ethnic myths and histories, which underlie "ethnonationalism", are being used to serve the selfish interests of certain political leaders. It is becoming clearer and clearer that the proliferation of ethnic conflicts in an age of lethal technology can provide no decent future for humanity. But the international community has yet to find a way to intervene in a prompt and efficient manner or in some other way to deal with the consequences of ethnic disputes. Nowadays, peacemakers from the outside too often take sides in conflicts or pursue their own political interests, rather than offering impartial assistance in stopping bloodshed and violence.
In conclusion, Dr. Hamburg noted that, while general recommendations and insights may be useful for future experiences, many of them may be too late for the former Yugoslavia itself, torn by "ethnic cleansing", hatred, and multiple wars and dominated by nationalistic governments. In all the new post-Yugoslav states, people have yet to find a way to return to a peaceful life, to construct their states, and to reach accommodation with their neighbors.
In response, several participants, including both Serbs and Americans, observed that the prevailing atmosphere had given birth to simplistic perceptions of what is happening in and around the former Yugoslavia, blotting out more nuanced opinions about the cleavages and problems. Consequently, a meeting such as this had become vital. One of the Serbian participants also remarked that the general attitude toward "Serbs" in the international community had become so negative that an invitation to independent Serbian figures extended by an American organization deserved special appreciation on the part of the Serbian invitees.
The participants were asked for their opinions about the prospects for
policies of moderation and accommodation in today's Serbia. Who are the
people who advocate such policies? What can the outside world do to
encourage and support them? Can their voices be amplified within the region
and abroad? Do they need organizational help and support? Do they have, and
can they project, a persuasive alternative program that would be supported
by other Serbs, by the internal minorities, and by newly independent
neighbors?
MODERATES IN CONTEMPORARY SERBIA
In the heat of the ongoing military and political battles, it is not easy to assess the nature of the "transition from Yugoslavia," which, according to one participant, "does not fit any natural perceptions." He argued that the most important evidence of the weakness of the Serbian opposition is that it is simply following the path of the government of president Slobodan Milosevic with programs amounting to nothing more than "cosmetic improvements" on his policies. The challenge for moderate forces is to find a total and coherent alternative to this course.
Moderate, nonchauvinistic forces in Serbia still lack understanding of what the Serbian national identity should be. The process of identity-building may well take years, given the specific configuration and state of Serbian society. The socioeconomic structure of this society today is characterized by the almost complete disappearance of both upper and middle classes, which elsewhere form the core of a civil society. This loss is a result of several interdependent factors: the delay of economic reform, the impoverishment of a considerable part of the population, and the impact of sanctions imposed on Serbia. The delay of privatization and of a transition to the market economy has also helped to preserve ethnic solidarity, which might otherwise have been to a great extent diluted by market relations based on private interests.
There is no immediate likelihood of improvement in these conditions. The narrow stratum of nouveaux riches and war profiteers is no substitute for a middle class; as many historic examples from other countries show, the first generation of entrepreneurs in a transitional economy is apt to consist of "robber barons" indifferent to the public interest. Since there is no economic base for organized opposition activity, no avenues for the manifestation of organized segmental interests are available. Besides, one of the Serbian participants argued, most of the opposition leaders are mediocrities, unable to rally any meaningful popular support.
Another way in which the forces currently in power in Belgrade maintain their predominance in the national political arena is by manipulation of the mass media. Much has been said in the international press about the role of nationalistic propaganda in mobilizing popular support for the government's course, but several insights and explanations given by the Serbian participants were helpful in understanding this manipulation.
Television is by far the most important of the media, because it serves as the principal source of information for 90 per cent of the population of the country. Most people have no money to buy newspapers nor can they afford to spend evenings out, which leaves them face-to-face with their TV sets. The international press is not readily available. The current regime assiduously maintains control over the national radio and television channels, utilizing this monopoly to boast of its successes, even when there are none. Lack of objective information about what is going on seriously undermines the ability of the opposition to reach out to the masses and shakes its self-confidence.
The difficult situation of the media in Serbia was reflected in the discussion about Vreme, the most visible independent Belgrade publication. Many discussants, Serb and American, paid tribute to this publication for its consistent and resolute opposition to nationalist propaganda and for its service in making a channel of communication with the public available to opposition figures and independent liberal intellectuals. The kidnapping of one of Vreme's leading journalists in early September was attributed by a number of participants to the government's coercive agencies which were sending the publication's editors a strong signal that the government would not tolerate such open opposition to its policy. However, in the view of another participant, Vreme also exemplifies the weakness of the opposition and its inability to offer a positive alternative to the regime's policy. According to him, in opposing the government, Vreme goes to the extreme of denying any legitimate Serbian national interest, a position that is seen by many as a "serbophobia" that is unacceptable to the average Serb reader. He believed that the opposition journalists had the courage to openly disagree with the government, but they still have not learned that freedom of expression also involves the author's responsibility for the impact of his writings on the reader.
Summarizing the discussion on the role of the media, one American participant noted that the "'Other Serbia' of which we are talking here has hardly been heard of," due in no small part to the de facto blackout by both domestic and international media.
Though the conditions described above certainly do not provide a friendly environment for the activity of independent Serbian political, intellectual, and cultural figures, this community is by no means nonexistent or inactive. A number of Serb participants described private associations in Belgrade that try to develop a moderate and democratic political agenda. Among these groups are:
The Belgrade Circle of Intellectuals, a social group that holds weekly public discussions. Topics of these discussions have included "The Other Serbia," "Intellectuals and War," and "Nationalism and Racism." Two or three hundred people attend these discussions on a regular basis.
Center for Antiwar Action, a peace movement founded in 1991. The center has launched projects on conflict resolution and confidence-building, supported by the European Community and the Soros Foundation, promoting techniques of reconciliation and aspiring to reach out to Sandjak, Vojvodina, and refugee communities. Programs on human rights undertaken by the Center in collaboration with other Serbian human rights groups) provide a "SOS-line" for people to voice their complaints to lawyers made available by the Center. This association also developed an educational program entitled "Human Rights for Beginners," and conducted research on school textbooks for signs of nationalist, racist or sexist speech. As many as two thousand people have participated in rallies organized by the Center.
Civil Alliance, a small political party, whose members include ethnic Serbs, and people of other ethnic origins, and which is non-nationalistic in its basic positions.
The Forum for Ethnic Relations, which is carrying out a project called "Serbia between the Past and the Future," with assistance from the European Movement/Serbia. The goal of this project is to develop specific proposals on constitutional and legal arrangements that would allow for the peaceful and just resolution of the ethnic problems existing in today's Serbia.
Another activity of the European Movement in Serbia is the sponsorship of a business club with a membership of about a hundred local business persons who urge the view that the prevailing militant nationalism is an obstacle to the development of business ties with the European countries.
Finally, a number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Serbia are
united in a Network on Serbian/Albanian Relations, which was established by
the Soros Foundation and tries to link organizations in Serbia with their
counterparts in Albania and Kosovo. In a broader sense, they are exploring
the integration of the Balkan region in Europe. However, as more than one
participant noted, any explicit declaration by an NGO in Serbia that its
objective is accommodation with the neighboring countries would cause major
obstacles to its work.
AN ALTERNATIVE AGENDA FOR SERBIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS
Though the Serbian participants came from different walks of life, they seemed not to differ on the basic starting point for any positive process in today's Yugoslavia. They agreed that the principal objective of the Serbian opposition is to define the Serbian national interest in a way that would provide for democratic development of Serbian society and accommodation with all its neighbors. As of today, there is no liberal alternative to militant Serbian nationalism.
One of the Serbian participants commented that this nationalism is so overwhelming that a majority of the public, both in Serbia and in the world community may ask whether the "Serbian national question" really exists. He stressed the need to design an alternative to the concept of "Greater Serbia" that would define the Serbian national interest as the building of a democratic Serbian state and the promotion of democracy wherever Serbs live.
Building a "coherent opposition" to the militant nationalistic policy of the government led by Milosevic is the only viable possibility for defeating this course.
Some of the participants were critical of the way in which the Yugoslav federation was dissolved and the former constituent republics attained independent statehood. However, they stressed that, whatever one's attitude to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, this geopolitical entity in its old form was dead and the concept of recreating it had no future. New forms of relations within this multicultural region will have to be worked out, and this process is as yet at the very beginning.
The discussion demonstrated the enormous complications involved in defining concepts of national interests and interstate relations in the region, particularly in the heat of the struggles unleashed by manifestations of extreme nationalism. Rather than providing well formulated answers, the participants tried to elaborate basic principles on which a democratic notion of Serbian national identity and Serbian interests should be built. These principles probably can be applied to the resolution of all ethnic disputes on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. They include:
- Respect for "identities," whatever they may be. Since real and invented histories and arguments for the uniqueness of this or that group of people are being used in political struggles, it would not be productive to raise objections to the foundations for demands made by these groups. The approach rather should be to seek a balance between respect for the human rights of all individuals and accommodation of group rights. Otherwise, the concept of "collective rights," which underlies most ethnically based claims and demands, will, by its intrinsic rigidity, block any road to compromise particularly in societies in which individual human rights have not been assured. Perhaps the only viable solution is the promotion of a non-ethnically based citizenship as a foundation for integration of democratic societies in the new states.
- Power-sharing between the majority and minorities. In different post-Yugoslav states, this principle may require different formulations, ranging from federalism to various patterns of coalition-building embodied in constitutions and statutes. In each case, the objective is to give minorities access to governing their affairs, rather than isolating them from power through majoritarian electoral arrangements.
- Just distribution of control over resources. Ethnic conflicts cannot be entirely reduced to arguments over access to resources and public goods and services. However, many ethnic disputes do involve discrimination or inequality in social and material status. In cases where inequality is salient, socioeconomic arrangements beneficial to minorities sometimes are the only available means of amelioration of conflict.
One of the Serbian participants noted that the principal struggle the "moderates" have to wage is for the "modernization of ethnicity" i.e., for making manifestations of ethnic loyalties compatible with twentieth century ethical and social norms of behavior. Alongside the entirely "internal" norms referred to above, such behavior should provide for a broadly interpreted structure of regional security and for an international "umbrella," or international intervention by political means to guarantee the rights of minorities. In practical terms, such a structure and guarantees could be assured through a series of intersecting bilateral treaties between the ex-Yugoslav states. The common denominator of these treaties would be an assertion of minority rights, but they may also include other areas of economic, political and cultural cooperation on which the parties agree.
Trying to apply these principles to the current situation in Serbia, one participant observed that democratic forces face a dilemma. Should they advocate protection of their co-ethnics who find themselves living in foreign states, or should they join the demands to redefine borders on the basis of the ethnic composition of the population? One guideline is that borders, while not viewed as "carved in stone", should not be changed lightly. However, in this case the guarantees of the human rights of co-ethnics abroad can be attained only by negotiation with the neighboring states. The implicit difficulty is that the major political parties in Yugoslavia are unable to devise a moderate line on ethnic issues, because every attempt to initiate negotiations with other post-Yugoslav states is perceived as treason. The major parties have to follow mainstream definitions of national interests if they wish to enjoy mass support.
Some of the participants attempted to make more specific recommendations for the moderate political forces in Serbia. One of them declared that the collapse of the present ruling coalition between the Socialist party led by Milosevic and Seselj's Radical party was inevitable. He argued this coalition was entirely opportunistic and so could not last. The ensuing crisis might necessitate new elections as early as the beginning of 1994; after these elections, an opportunity will emerge to build another coalition involving the opposition parties.
Another participant propounded the need to unite all political forces opposing the current regime. Building such a coalition would require strengthening the links with Montenegro, where both pro-government and opposition forces are hostile to the ruling coalition in Belgrade. This "moderate alliance" would also need to establish at least a minimum of cooperation with all the moderate forces in the central European and Balkan region, stretching from Austria to Turkey, and to assert the "positive role" of the Slav peoples in the transformation of the region into an integral part of Europe.
Turning to the issue of Kosovo, an ethnically non-Serbian region of the new Yugoslavia, one participant stressed the need to explain the real aspirations of ethnic Albanians to the Serbian public. To that end, he argued, a permanent political dialogue with the moderate forces in Serbia is needed to allow Albanian politicians to become more visible in Serbia.
One of the American participants tried to elaborate a comprehensive concept of state-building on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, one that would bypass the bottlenecks of traditional concepts of statehood. According to him, these concepts are conducive to moderation neither in majority-minority nor in interstate relations. Moderation requires appropriate responses from the other side. In this sense, politics in multiethnic states demands the building of coalitions. The frequent failures of ethnic politics demonstrate clearly the fallacy of the notion of self-determination, which amounts to a demand for a separate state for each ethnic group. Such "monoethnic" states, particularly if they emerge in an environment of hostility or intolerance, might well become legitimized tools of genocide or racism.
The solution he proposed was to separate the concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity which have been inseparable throughout modern history. He put forth a concept of "transparent sovereignty", in which states could perform a number of government functions for communities of their co-ethnics living on the territories of other states. He contended that if a Serbian state provided for the educational or cultural needs of Serbs living in Croatia, it need not be seen as an infringement of Croatian sovereignty. He argued that in Germany, for example, the authorities willingly shifted a number of functions regulating the life of Yugoslav workers there to the Yugoslav consulates. That was a de facto deviation from the "ultimate sovereignty" of Germany on its own territory.
Another participant drew attention to the link between two seemingly distinct questions. What should Serbs' relations with minorities in Serbia be? And what should Serbs expect from other states that have Serbian minorities? According to him, these were two facets of the same problem. Serbian national identity cannot be defined if the Serbs themselves cannot answer both these questions. Similar "majority at home/minority outside" situations exist in Russia and in a number of states in eastern Europe, notably in Hungary. The latter has adopted a "model" law on minorities to have a "moral right" to press Hungary's neighbors to provide to their Hungarian minorities the same legal rights that Hungary promises to its domestic minorities.
Defining national interests is a priority problem for Serbian moderates,
because there is little hope of achieving anything in negotiations with
neighbors if the goals and the limits of compromise in these negotiations
are not clearly defined.
THE INTERNATIONAL FACTOR IN THE "SERBIAN QUESTION"
The crisis of Yugoslavia since its emergence in early 1990s has drawn the attention of the international community. At the same time, it put to a serious test the abilities of external actors to effectively interfere in an ethnically based conflict, and to prevent it from unleashing a major scale civil war. This issue led to a debate on the relevance of the very concept of the "international community," with Serbian participants divided between criticism of the involvement of the West in the crisis and appeals to it to play a positive part by pressuring the warring parties into a more restrained and less violent course of action. American participants found themselves arguing about the limits of the means available to outside actors and about the applicability of essentially Western models of institution-building and the legal protection of minority rights.
Speaking of what he saw as a "hasty blessing" of the situation, shaped by the dissolution of the old Yugoslav federation, one Serbian participant criticized the West for not ensuring respect for minority rights in the newly born states. He argued that the international community should not shrink from pushing for a "constitutional consensus" ensuring the adequate protection of minority rights. The European Community failed to do so in Bosnia and left the issue open in Croatia.
In a more generalized assessment of Western policies toward Serbia, another participant observed that, in the development of a Serbian identity, much depends on how the West treats Serbia. So far, according to him, there is a de facto hierarchy of priorities in the Western support of post-Communist countries: (1) Poland, the former Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; (2) Croatia, and Slovenia (the West treats these first two categories as "belonging" to the Western system); (3) the rest of eastern Europe; and (4) the former Soviet Union. Serbia is somewhere near the bottom of this list; Serbs believe that the West would not welcome Serbia's incorporation into the European community of nations. Psychologically, if integration into the European system is not available, Serbs will inevitably start looking back into the past in search of an identity.
The West must be consistent in the conditions it imposes upon post-Communist transitions, and it should also avoid the application of "collective responsibility," which is the case Serbia.
An American participant remarked that there is no such thing as the "international community." When parties to an ethnic conflict refer to it, they seem to be forgetting that this notion means only specific international organizations or states that choose to get involved in a crisis. These organizations and states are not in a position to be the ultimate arbiters in ethnic disputes or wars.
Seconding that observation, another participant pointed out a factor
confirming the nonexistence of the "international community." He asserted
that on many issues there is no common position among the external actors.
In a case relevant to Serbia, Russia is determined to block any attempt by
Western nations to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. Without arguing whether
or not such a stand was justified, he said that since the permanent members
of the UN Security Council had a right of veto over such decisions, a
dissenting position by even one of these members virtually nullified the
notion of an international community.
THE CONTROVERSIAL IMPACT OF SANCTIONS
One of the issues touched upon by every discussant of the "international framework" of the Yugoslav crisis was the usefulness of the economic sanctions imposed on Serbia by the United Nations. Many participants voiced their concern over the sanctions' impact on Yugoslav politics, though the grounds of their criticism differed. One Serbian participant asserted that liberal circles in Serbia understood the objective of the sanctions to be an attempt to halt Yugoslav aggression. However, the sanctions failed to attain that objective; and meanwhile, their negative consequences were very serious.
A majority of the population interprets the sanctions as a de facto exercise of the principle of "collective responsibility." But many Serbian participants argued that this principle cannot and should not be used in the Western approach to Serbia. The sanctions in their present form contribute to the atmosphere of siege and are being increasingly used by Milosevic to stir up nationalist sentiments. To this end, government propaganda also frequently uses examples of the one-sided approach to Serbia taken by most Western media. The sanctions exacerbate anti-Western sentiments and xenophobia among the public and serve the extremists rather than the moderates.
Another Serbian participant argued that the moderate forces inside Yugoslavia need at least a minimum of understanding and encouragement from the West, in the form of "rewards" through exemptions from the sanctions regime. He cited one example of inflexibility of the current policy of sanctions: The government of prime minister Milan Panic, struggling to win domestic support for its moderate line, appealed to the UN to allow a shipment of oil earmarked for use by hospitals. The UN promised to consider it, but in the end, permission was not granted. Another instance of this inflexibility is that, although medicines and medical supplies do not formally fall under sanctions, the actual procedure in the UN bureaucracy of processing the applications for their import is so long and complicated that it is almost impossible to bring foreign-made medicines into Serbia.
A number of American participants supported the criticism of sanctions. One of them noted that, while the way out of the crisis lies through promotion of democracy, the sanctions against Serbia are not conducive to democracy there. The history of Germany in the 1920s indicates that if extreme poverty is combined with nationalism, the result is fascism. However, the Americans were unanimous in warning the Serbian participants that it was not realistic to expect any relaxation of the sanctions in the foreseeable future.
One of the participants commented on the contradictory attitudes toward the
sanctions in Kosovo. Most Albanian political figures in Kosovo implicitly
supported the sanctions as a way of forcing change in the Yugoslav
government's position on the region's status. Yet Kosovo is the most
isolated part of the country, and so is likely to suffer most from the
effects of the sanctions during the coming winter, when the economic
situation there becomes critical. He suggested that the support of Kosovar
Albanians for the lifting of sanctions may be a subject of negotiation with
the Serbian opposition, if not with the government.
SERBS IN CROATIA AND ALBANIANS IN KOSOVO
No deliberation on the future of Yugoslavia would be possible without taking up the issue of the minority populations in the successor states. Since the current meeting was concentrating on Serbian problems, it was the issue of Serbs outside of Serbia, particularly in Croatia, that most drew the attention of the participants. The situation of the ethnic Albanian population in the Serbian province of Kosovo was also discussed.
One of the participants addressed the problem of the institutional organization of Serbs in Croatia. They are divided both territorially and politically. The intellectual elite, which is predominantly moderate in its political views, lives in urban localities, and it never cared to build links with the rural Serbian population, particularly in Krajina, to lead them and influence their political behavior. He concluded that a political identity for the Serbian community in Croatia has yet to be created, and that that is a precondition for positive cooperation with the democratic opposition forces inside Serbia as well as in the Croatian political arena.
The current situation of the Serbian community in Croatia is worsened, according to another participant, by various forms of discrimination. Not only are there 200,000 Serbian refugees from Croatia, accounting for 40 percent of the Serbian community in that country, but in addition many Croatian Serbs are forced to give up their ethnic identity to preserve their jobs and social status. This change of identity is easy partly because of the similarity of languages; for practical purposes, a Serb has only to discontinue the use of Cyrillic script. Nor need he disclose his affiliation with the Orthodox Church -- no difficulty after several decades of secularization of social life in Yugoslavia. While it may not be realistic to expect any change in this situation in the near future, the long-run solution, as several participants noted, must be the creation of "personal autonomy" for the Serbian citizens of Croatia, i.e., respect for their individual human rights and their participation in the political process in Croatia.
Supporting that idea, another participant expressed moderate optimism about the prospects for positive changes in Croatia. If Serbs can attain a basis for autonomy through recognition of their individual rights, a solution should be negotiated along the following lines: The Serbian community would recognize Croatia as its state, while the state would recognize the Serbs as a distinct community with its own political will. The same participant also asserted that the Serbs in Croatia need to support democratic Serbian forces in Serbia proper and in all the dispersed Serbian communities. The reason is that, if militant nationalism prevails in these communities, they might well impede democratic development anywhere in the former Yugoslavia.
One of the participants mentioned a specific form for the participation of the Serbian minority in the Croatian political process that was suggested as long ago as the end of 1990: a consultative "Serbian Assembly" elected by the Serbian community and attached to the Croatian parliament to advise on policies and legislation in ethnically sensitive fields, such as education, language rights, and culture. If dialogue and cooperation between the state authorities and Serb representatives are assured, it would then become possible to negotiate and implement solutions acceptable to the Serbs in Croatia.
In the context of a discussion of similarities and differences in the situations of the Serbian communities outside of Serbia, one of the participants noted that the "Bosnian model," in which the state is seen as a confederation of ethnically homogeneous units, cannot be applied to the predominantly Serbian region of Krajina in Croatia. Nevertheless, he argued, no solution in Krajina is possible if the overall Bosnian crisis remains unresolved. A solution there should be based on autonomy established through bilateral treaties with international guarantees. Though a full-scale war between Serbia and Croatia is hardly possible, a workable model for autonomy can be built only with active international involvement. One of the Belgrade-based Serbian participants remarked of these proposals that although he realized the need to agree to Serbian autonomy in Croatia, it had to be realized that no party could take such a stand openly in Belgrade, because in the current configuration of political forces that would amount to being marginalized.
Another specific idea suggested by one of the participants was to found a journal, with a title such as A Common Language, which would help to teach Serbs and Croats to talk to each other.
Shifting the discussion from Croatia to Kosovo, one of the participants observed that the "Serbian national question" has become the key issue in the Balkans and was greatly influencing the situation of the Serbs' neighbors, particularly the Albanian Kosovars. The nationalistic policy of the present Belgrade government has made the Kosovo question almost unresolvable. Milosevic's position on Kosovo is one of the factors that allow him to retain political power.
One of the participants argued that Milosevic strives to manipulate the electoral process in Kosovo in order to ensure that ethnic Albanians abstain from it, and the Kosovar Serbian voters give his party all the Kosovo's parliamentary mandates amounting to 20 per cent of the seats in the Yugoslav legislature. This is exactly what happened in 1992 national elections. He explained that most Albanian politicians in Kosovo had concluded at that time that they were not in a position to bring down the Milosevic regime through their participation in the national elections. However, he noted that, by thus isolating themselves from the national political process, these Albanian politicians were pursuing a "dangerous" strategy, because the policies of the Belgrade government, which objectively weaken the state, contribute to their political goal of breaking away from Yugoslavia. But the present government has so far not sufficiently dismantled the centralized structures to allow those politicians openly try to move for secession. Still, most of them continue to advocate the nonparticipation of Kosovar Albanians in any national elections.
Commenting on that, two American participants observed that, in the 1992 elections, Albanians in Kosovo had a voice, but they decided not to use it. Whatever their reasons for such a choice, either one believes in the democratic process as the ultimate way of attaining one's political goals, or one does not. Active involvement in national politics at that time could have given the Albanian leaders a chance to influence the policies of the federal government, and that chance was lost. Other participants noted that it was evident that the Belgrade government could no longer control the situation in Kosovo by force, and so a dialogue would eventually become necessary.
One possible solution of the Kosovo issue, put forth by a Serbian participant, is a "package deal" between the present Yugoslavia and Albania. This deal should provide for measures beneficial to Kosovar Albanians in economic, cultural, and humanitarian fields, while affirming the mutual recognition of existing borders. If Albanians continue to advocate disintegration of the Serbian state, the consequences will be catastrophic. He added that holding local elections in Kosovo might prove helpful, because they would produce legitimate local representation with which the federal authorities would have to deal.
Commenting on the international framework of the Kosovo question, one participant recalled his experience at an international conference organized by the German Social Democratic Party earlier this year. At that conference, most international participants openly advocated the secession of Kosovo from Yugoslavia. He expressed concern over such a position, which was bound to influence the outlook of Albanian politicians. He urged that international political forces dealing with the Albanians take a responsible position on Kosovo.
Another participant argued that Albanians, wherever they live, have not "made things worse," whether in Albania, Kosovo, or Macedonia. He attributed their restraint to "an earnest desire to refrain from open confrontation with neighbors, particularly in Kosovo," but their adversaries, he said, often interpreted this moderation as a sign of Albanian weakness, particularly in military terms.
An American participant warned against the effects of the idea of autonomy
as it is used by political leaders in Kosovo or, for that matter, in other
parts of the former Yugoslavia. Autonomy is an attractive catchword, but it
is open to many different interpretations which can be tailored to suit
varying and even conflicting political interests. It is important that both
the people who use the concept as a political slogan, and international
observers, have a clear understanding of what it means in each particular
case.
FOLLOW-UP TO THE CONFERENCE
As the discussion progressed, several participants expressed the hope that the dialogue started by this meeting would develop into a consultative network of independent Serbian intellectual figures and American experts on the region. Most of the participants welcomed the initiative of the Project on Ethnic Relations, as a private American organization, in offering a neutral base for such a development, and they agreed that this general framework is practical for their future interaction. The participants tentatively named this network the "American-Serbian Working Group."
Several participants sought to elaborate an agenda for this group. The principal objective would be to devise a new approach to the Serbian national question, that would assist Serbia's integration into the world community. This "non-greater Serbia" should be demonstrated to the world, and the world should be able to respond to this new form of Serbian national identity. Toward that end, the group should concentrate the formulation of strategies to be pursued by Serbs in the states where they live; a rationale for Serbia as a multicultural and multiethnic state; and principles for the relations between Serbs and their neighbors.
Obviously, this meeting could be only the beginning of the activity of this group. To build it into a working mechanism, one participant noted, it would be necessary to convene a wider forum, with representation of Serbian figures from Serbia proper, Bosnia, and Croatia, as well as representatives from Kosovo and Montenegro. Such a "Pan-Serb" meeting, he pointed out, has never taken place before. It would be wise to limit this meeting to ethnic Serbs, because if all the minorities were brought in, Serbian public opinion might accuse the organizers of ignoring Serbian national interests. Another important feature of such a meeting would be that, because the Serbs have more neighbors in the region than any other ethnic group, their positive experiences could be of significance to others.
At least two participants were skeptical about the utility of a "Serbian" group arguing instead for the necessity of an all-Balkan perspective on ethnic problems. They insisted that representatives of other ethnic groups be included; otherwise the body could not claim to be addressing the ethnic problems in general. However, most of the other participants seemed to believe that, given the outlined objectives of the group, an entirely Serbian composition could be useful, at least at the initial stage of its work. An American participant, for example, observed that, to be realistic and positive, the Serbian project should be seen as a pilot one, which may eventually broaden out to include other nationalities when appropriate.
Participants tentatively agreed to hold another meeting of Serbs and
Americans within several months in Belgrade. It should concentrate on the
problem of Serbia and should essentially take the form of a dialogue among
Serbian figures, with American participants playing the role of
interlocutors and interested but impartial witnesses.
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Ljubisa Adamovic, Department of Economics, Florida State University
Steven Burg, Politics Department, Brendeis University
Misha Glenny, Author, journalist
Robert Hayden, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of Pittsburgh
Dusan Janjic, Senior Researcher, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade University; Forum for Ethnic Relations, European Movement in Serbia
John Lampe, Director, East European Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars
Skhelzen Maliqi, Vice-President, Social Democratic Party, Pristina, Kosovo
Vesna Pesic, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory President, Civil Alliance of Serbia, Director, Center for Antiwar Action
Milorad Pupovac, Associate Professor, Head of Chair of Applied Linguistics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb; President, Serbian Democratic Forum
Ljubisa Rakic, Professor of Neurosciences, School of Medicine, Belgrade University, Former Federal Minister without Portfolio
Drago Roksandic, Department of History, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb
Alan Ross, Director, Kosovo Project for Doctors of the World-USA; Director, St. Petersburg Children's Project, Children's Health Fund
John Scanlan, Vice-President for Eastern Europe, ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia member, PER's Council for Ethnic Accord
Paul Shoup, Professor, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia
Vojislav Stanovcic, Professor of Political Theory, Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade University; member, PER's Council for Ethnic Accord
PROJECT ON ETHNIC RELATIONS
Allen Kassof, Director
Livia Plaks, Associate Director
Boris Makarenko, Staff Associate
Larry Watts, Senior Consultant
CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK
David Hamburg, President
David Speedie, Program Officer
Patricia Macri, Administrative Assistant