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Bulletins
Warsaw, Poland
May 16-18, 1997
Preface
Officials and experts from Western and Central Europe, Russia, and the United States gathered in Warsaw in May 1997 under the auspices of the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) to consider the consequences of prospective NATO expansion for their future relations. Their discussions and debates are summarized here.
As readers of PER's reports are aware, the problems of interethnic relations in the formerly Communist countries have become inextricably intertwined with regional and international security issues. The ongoing reconstruction of Europe's security architecture is therefore a matter of urgent interest to all who are concerned with the peaceful management of ethnic divisions.
The Warsaw meeting was the third in a series organized by PER to bring together decision-makers from across the region and from the United States and Western Europe for discussions of the changing relationships among Russia, newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, and former members of the Warsaw Pact, in the larger context of East-West relations. The first two meetings, which were held in Moscow in 1995 and 1996, were motivated by concern over the nearly total breakdown of communication between Moscow and former Warsaw Pact members as both looked toward the West and ignored one another. Mutual ignorance has been the result, including the loss of opportunities to cooperate on overlapping ethnic issues or to appreciate their full impact on the region as a whole. As the participants noted in all three meetings, it is a measure of the gap that the intervention of a Western non-governmental organization has been required to provide a framework for discussions that should be taking place directly.
Such poor communication is not simply a product of neglect or carelessness but reflects most of all the profound differences between the world views of the Central Europeans and the Russians about their respective roles in Europe's post-communist world and their relations with one another. Although the main theme of the Warsaw discussion was the continuing debate over the probable political and military consequences of NATO enlargement, it could barely conceal the underlying cultural and psychological issues of national self-identification and definition, as readers will see.
All of this suggests that, long after the particulars of NATO enlargement are finally digested by both supporters and opponents, the much older questions of Russia's place and nature, and Russia's relations with its neighbors, will remain on the agenda of ethnonational issues. The emotional tone of some of the exchanges recounted in this report is a reminder of how political outcomes of historic importance are influenced by the ways that nations, rationally or not, perceive themselves and others.
Meanwhile, it is essential for all concerned to continue their quest for some degree of common understanding, especially in the face of what will surely be continuing disagreements.
A list of participants is appended to the report. Although many of them occupy official posts, they attended and spoke in their individual capacities.
We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Ivan Gabal, Boris Makarenko and Thomas Szayna, who prepared the agenda. We also acknowledge with pleasure the assistance rendered by Henryk Szlajfer, Ambassador Janusz Reiter, and Janusz Onyszkiewicz in making practical arrangements for the meeting in Poland.
Thomas Szayna prepared the report. Aleksey Grigor'ev, PER Program Officer, also contributed. PER takes full responsibility for the report, which has not been reviewed by the participants.
Reports on the two earlier meetings in the series are available from PER:
Ethnonationalism: Fears, Dangers, and Policies in the Post Communist World (1995), and Russia and Eastern and Central Europe: Old Divisions and New Bridges (1996).
Allen H. Kassof, President
Livia B. Plaks, Executive Director
Princeton, New Jersey
August 1997
Note on Terminology
In order to keep the discussions both frank and flexible, none of the participants spoke for attribution, and none presented papers, though some made lengthy presentations. The main division emerged between the Russian participants and those from all the Central European countries.
For stylistic clarity in this report, participants from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine are identified simply as Central Europeans (though the identification of Ukraine as a Central European country may not be strictly accurate). The other participants are identified as Russian, U.S., or West European. This terminology of course does not imply that Russia is not located in the eastern part of the European continent. It is worth noting that the Russians and the Central Europeans all emphasized that political labels based on Cold War terminology are no longer accurate or useful.
Regarding NATO's intention to accept new members, Russian participants
favored describing the process as "NATO expansion"; the Central Europeans
tended to refer to the process as "joining NATO" or simply as "NATO
enlargement." The debate on which term to use came up during the initial
session of the workshop. A Russian justified the use of the term "expansion"
by pointing out that it had been used in a recent speech by President
Clinton himself. A Central European pointed out that "expansion" and
"enlargement" are virtually identical terms in English but not in Slavic
languages, where they have different meanings: "expansion" has a distinctly
aggressive connotation. Another Central European suggested the term
"spreading" rather than "expanding." This exchange showed the impact of the
different terms used, and brought out the importance of attention to
terminology and sensitivity to the way words are translated and understood.
This report will use the term "NATO enlargement," which is commonly used in
the U.S. It is not intended to imply a favorable or unfavorable opinion of
the process.
Summary
The meeting was the third in a series initiated by the Project on Ethnic Relations. The purpose of the series is to provide a neutral forum for policy-makers from Russia and Central Europe and their Western counterparts to meet and discuss the state of their relations and its place in the process the of transformation of the European security system. The dialogue also plays an important role in the larger trans-Atlantic framework. The following points emerged as central during the discussion which took place in Warsaw on May 16-18, 1997.
Once again it became clear that even after the signing of the Founding Act between Russia and NATO, the Russians and the Central Europeans still hold opposing views of NATO enlargement. The Central Europeans see NATO as a corner-stone of future security architecture in Europe. They see their membership in NATO as being a natural way of participating in building that architecture. The Russians still see NATO as an anti-Russian military and political bloc and claim that its enlargement is aimed against Russia and that it will eventually keep them away from Europe. While opposing enlargement of NATO, however, Russia does not oppose the enlargement of the European Union.
The Central Europeans presented a variety of arguments in favor of their countries joining the alliance. They argued that their membership in NATO will help to overcome the Cold War divisions in Europe and will help these countries to play a role in upholding security and preventing conflicts and to seek a share in the responsibility for security in Europe. They also pointed out that NATO will assist in easing ethnically-based tensions and moderating ethnonationalism and will speed up the all-European integration process and help their countries to join a value-based community of democracies. Another set of arguments dealt with combating contemporary threats such as organized crime and terrorism. The Central Europeans emphasized that it was not a fear of others that motivated their countries to aspire to join NATO and the EU but the promise of a more harmonious continent and the end of traditional power politics.
Participants from several Central European countries testified that the enlargement process offered them incentives for cooperative behavior and prepared the ground for permanent stability in their bilateral relations. Romania's treaties with Hungary and Ukraine, Slovenia's treaties with Hungary and Italy, and the Polish-German, Slovak-Hungarian, and Polish-Lithuanian treaties were cited as examples. They also noted that a number of problems remained, especially in Slovak-Hungarian relations, and encouraged the sides to move toward resolving their differences.
A number of US and West European participants commented that NATO enlargement is the best available answer to the question of improving the quality of European and trans-Atlantic security.
The arguments of Russian participants centered on the negative consequences of enlargement. According to them, enlargement will lead to the loss of an opportunity to create an alliance that would span the entire northern hemisphere. They argued that the decision had failed to take into account the psychological impact it would have on the Russian elite. It alienated Russia from Western civilization, keeping it outside of the integration process. The Russian participants felt that Russia is a part of Europe and should not be excluded from the all-European integration. The decisions that should have been made by Russia and all Europeans together have been made by US and West Europeans alone. The Russians emphasized that enlargement has been pushed forward for the short-term goals of preserving NATO. They believe that misperceptions and ethnonational biases lie behind some of the Central European aspirations toward NATO. The Russians mentioned possible Moscow countermoves as responding to NATO enlargement. Some saw the improvement in Chinese-Russian relations and the Russian-Belarusian union as clear signs of such countermoves. On the other hand, Russian participants foresaw the development of political, economic, and military relations between Russia and the West after the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Taking enlargement as a given fact, the Russians proposed active cooperation in the Russia-NATO Council and making the Council an influential and real institution. They also suggested continuing to seek solutions to the current security problems outside the NATO framework.
A number of Central European and Western participants pointed out that no policy of isolating Russia exists, that Russia is self-isolating. In this context they mentioned Russia's inclusion into G-7 and the signing of the Founding Act.
Both Russians and Central Europeans felt that the relations between them are not extensive enough. They voiced their support for the improvement of relations following the first wave of enlargement.
Participants devoted special attention to Slovakia and to the Baltic states.
The meeting did not produce a document or an agreement. However, a number of
concrete suggestions were made toward enhancing regional cooperation. It was
also agreed that it would be useful to continue a structured dialogue under
PER auspices.
Introduction
The Project on Ethnic Relations is sponsoring a series of discussions between Central Europeans and Russians on the issues that divide them. The first meeting, which took place in Moscow on January 20-21, 1995, dealt with the dangers of ethnonationalism as potential sources of conflict and tension. Russian military action in Chechnya provided the background and was a source of much controversy during those discussions. The second meeting, in Moscow on March 29-30, 1996, also tackled the larger issues of security, including reasons for the limited ties between Russia and Central Europe, and the differences over NATO enlargement. The third meeting, in Warsaw on May 16-18, 1997 and which is reported here, focused on the main security issue in Europe: the impending eastward enlargement of NATO.
The overall theme of the meeting was the attempt to gain insight and understanding of the future security architecture in Europe. The agenda was set up to allow for elaboration by the participants of the rationale for their countries' foreign policy development since the fall of communism, and to place security policy in that context. Besides the larger security outlooks, moderating ethnonationalism and advancing economic cooperation provided sub-themes. A specific goal of the meeting was to work out practical suggestions and guidelines for policy-makers to ease tensions and to encourage mutually acceptable solutions.
This report groups the discussions analytically along the lines of these
themes. It does not attempt to give a detailed version of the discussions,
but to capture all of the main points. Although the security theme came up
throughout the meeting, other themes -- moderating ethnonationalism and
enhancing economic cooperation--also came up frequently. The impending NATO
summit in Madrid and the expected NATO invitation to several Central
European countries to begin accession negotiations provided a backdrop and a
frame of reference. Discussions on the role of Russia in the future security
architecture in Europe, the pace of NATO enlargement, and the consequences
of enlargement formed the primary focus of the meeting.
Context
At the outset, a U.S. and a Russian participant set the stage for the meeting. The U.S. participant focused on the post-1989 transformation from the communist system throughout Central and Eastern Europe, which has led to fundamental realignments in domestic and foreign policies. The consequences of the realignment include many positive and constructive developments, but they also include the emergence of some new conflicts. Aspirations by Central Europeans to join NATO and the EU demonstrate both consequences. The reintegration of Europe along democratic lines is a welcome development. On the other hand, the unfolding of the process has led to some unhealthy competition, new boundaries, and new areas of tension.
The Russian touched on the themes of continuity and change between the March
1996 meeting and the present one. 1) Last year Russia was involved in and
preoccupied with the war in Chechnya. Now the war is over, allowing a new
foreign policy paradigm for discussions of the relationship of Russia with
NATO and the European Union. 2) Last year the looming presidential elections
in Russia provided for much nervousness and uncertainty on the part of the
Russian participants. Now, after Russia has affirmed its democratic choice,
a new domestic structural framework is in place. 3) Last year a tense
situation over the signing of the Russian-Belarusian treaty prevailed in
Moscow, centering on the last-minute uncertainty regarding the signing of
the document, the nature of the treaty, and international reaction to it.
Now, a new treaty is about to be signed. The envisioned Russian-Belarusian
union amounts to a new development for European security architecture. 4)
Fear of a "red" or at least a "rose" wave of communists or neo-communists
coming to power throughout Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia)
formed a backdrop to last year's discussions. But these fears failed to
materialize in Russia, Bulgaria, or other countries. (However, although the
communists in Russia are not currently in a position to win presidential
elections, they still constitute the largest faction in the Parliament.)
Now, as is evident from the turmoil in the Balkans (Albania, Bulgaria,
Macedonia, Serbia), it is economic and social problems that have brought
about serious political crises. Summing up, the Russian participant felt
that continuity was strong but change was also clear and evident.
NATO Enlargement: The Case For
Central European representatives presented a variety of arguments and
explanations for why their countries wished to join NATO. The arguments
ranged from overcoming the forces that led to past rivalries in Europe, to
playing a role in upholding security and preventing conflicts, to easing
ethnically-based tensions through common integration, to joining a
value-based community of countries. The common thread in the arguments was
that NATO membership and integration into existing European structures were
natural goals for the Central European countries to pursue for their own
sake, rather than because of any perceived threat.
Transcending Power Politics
A Central European placed the aspirations for NATO and EU membership in the context of both overcoming Cold War divisions and learning lessons from the past. In his view, NATO and the EU underlie a new European order based on as little competition as possible between countries. Rather than embracing the narrow views of sovereignty that prevailed before World War II, the new post-communist order, anchored by the two organizations, offers a new beginning for a united continent. Thus, it is not fear of others that motivates his country to aspire to NATO and the EU but the promise of a more harmonious continent. The participant explained that what his country was seeking was a share in the responsibility for security of Europe. From his country's perspective, there is a clear lesson that "one can be a player or a playground." NATO provides a forum for even the medium and smaller countries to be the players in ensuring European security.
This Central European noted that contemporary Germany supports NATO enlargement as a way of affirming the changes since World War II. To Germans, enlargement of the EU and NATO eastward is the best way to prevent Europe from returning to the era of "changing alliances." The participant noted that the first round of post-Cold War NATO enlargement eastward took place some years ago with the integration of the former German Democratic Republic. That was a unique case, but the first true wave of enlargement to be launched at Madrid will finally overcome the old Cold War division of Europe. This first wave will not solve all problems, as the issue of the aspirations of the Baltic states and Romania will remain. But the first wave represents a good clear signal to everyone that the Europe of pre-1989 is gone for good, and that pre-1939 power politics will not return.
Several other Central Europeans developed this theme. One commented that the common thread in the Central European aspirations for NATO and EU membership is the simple issue of joining democratic Euro-Atlantic institutions. NATO is an organization that ensures stability and prosperity, he said. While there is currently no fundamental threat to the security of the Central European countries from without, and none in the foreseeable future, in contemporary Europe there remains a need to be proactive in diminishing the sources of conflict and taking responsibility for collective security. This participant's country has taken part in IFOR (the international implementation force in Bosnia) and suffered casualties, but there was no domestic uproar about the casualties, as the population understood that it was vital to contribute to European security.
NATO is the only effective security organization currently in existence in Europe, another Central European observed, pointing out that a security organization not dominated by one country but operating on the basis of consensus and democratic principles is particularly appealing to countries conditioned by the experience of Nazi Germany and Soviet communist domination.
Another Central European linked the advanced stage of transformation of some of the countries in the region to their readiness for NATO. He pointed out that two of the three front-runners for accession to NATO in the first round--Hungary and Poland--are led by governments consisting primarily of post-communist parties. In addition to exhibiting a high consensus on the issue of NATO enlargement across the political spectrum, these countries have been successful in their transition process. Through association with the EU, these countries already share in European security. But they wish to contribute in a more meaningful sense, in NATO, because they realize the need by all to uphold security.
While agreeing with the basic idea that NATO as an organization has a role in overcoming power politics in Europe, another Central European observed that NATO itself has a basic need to enlarge and to stay open to membership of countries ready and willing to join the alliance. Some Central Europeans felt that the need for the organization to enlarge was even truer for the new post-Cold War NATO, which is an organization dedicated to the consolidation of democracy, dealing with unconventional security threats, and preventing conflicts.
In line with these remarks, a U.S. participant spoke out against seeing NATO
as something frozen in place. The U.S. has led the process to enlarge NATO
because of the larger goals involved, especially the transformation of
European security.
Avoiding Ethnonational Conflict
The enlargement process offers incentives for cooperative behavior and prepares the ground for permanent stability and future security in the region, noted one Central European. He described his country's aspirations to join NATO in the context of what he called the post-1989 "nightmare of nationalism." Although Central and Eastern Europe are currently stable, he said, there remains the potential for nationalistically-inspired conflict. The eastward enlargement of institutions that have provided the basis of security and prosperity in the western part of Europe since the Second World War can diminish nationalistic outbreaks and enhance overall European stability and security, he said. Several Central Europeans echoed these comments.
One mentioned the link between security and democratization noted by Immanuel Kant in his idea of the "democratic peace." Observing that this link holds only between established democracies, he pointed out that in emerging democracies there is a tendency to make nationalist appeals that exacerbate conflict. Once democracy has a chance to develop, ethnonational conflicts become less of a danger. It is in this sense of allowing democracy to grow that NATO can play a crucial role in Central Europe.
NATO enlargement has already diminished ethnonationalism in Central Europe, pointed out a U.S. participant. He cited the Romanian treaties with Ukraine and Hungary and the Slovak-Hungarian treaty as examples. A number of Central Europeans elaborated on this theme, offering specific details of bilateral relations between countries.
One Central European observed that the incentive of NATO membership was not the whole story. In the case of Romanian-Hungarian relations, the election of a new government, the inclusion of the Hungarian minority in the government coalition, and the growth of democracy in Romania were all crucial factors. Still, awareness on both sides that they needed the agreement to be eligible for NATO made a basic treaty between the countries possible.
Another Central European expanded on the benefits of aspirations toward NATO membership. His country has solved problems with neighbors, he said, and signed treaties with them, leading to greater security in the region; it has taken collective security seriously by providing peacekeeping forces in the region; and it has brought minority representatives into influential posts in the government. In the aftermath of the Hungarian-Romanian treaty and the election of a new Romanian government, the Hungarian diaspora, especially in the U.S., supported Romanian aspirations to NATO. Thus, cooperation and favorable relations not only existed at the governmental level but extended to popular perceptions.
Another Central European extended this analysis. He believed that Romania's previous inability to reach an agreement with Hungary was due in part to the opposition in parliament, but that this posture was not so much against the treaty as against then-president Iliescu. The decisive results of the Romanian elections changed the whole situation. The new government in Romania realizes that it would jeopardize the future and its position in European institutions unless it builds a sound relationship with Hungary.
Polish-Lithuanian relations provided another success story. A Central European described the Lithuanian treatment of minorities between 1990 and 1993 as a product of the new Lithuanian state attempting to establish itself. The Polish-Lithuanian treaty of 1994, he said, resolved the problems in bilateral relations.
The treaty between Slovenia and Hungary was also cited as an illustration of
the trend toward accommodation in the region, a trend given impetus by NATO
enlargement.
Voicing Reservations
Amidst the many positive remarks about the benefits of NATO enlargement for Central Europe, a few participants noted continuing problems.
One participant felt that the incentive provided by NATO and EU integration is not always strong enough. He observed that the Hungarian-Slovak treaty was the first and last treaty signed in the context of the Stability Pact, and he felt there is no longer any driving engine in the Stability Pact. (The Stability Pact was a program of the European Union to promote negotiated settlements of interethnic and other disputes in post-communist countries through state treaties and other means.) In the case of Slovakia, he said, the Meciar government did not seem to believe that NATO enlargement would come about and thus failed to settle fully its bilateral issues with Hungary. Another Central European agreed that the treaty is a good one, but there is no political will to implement it, because of Meciar's problems with it.
A third Central European disagreed with this portrayal of Slovak-Hungarian relations. He noted that since the signing of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty, there have been over 70 ministerial or higher-level meetings between the two sides, trade between the two states has increased, and new border crossing points have opened. He felt that the Hungarian side has concentrated exclusively on the minorities issue, to the detriment of overall relations between the two countries. He believed that the problem was between the politicians; in both the Hungarian and Slovak parliaments the previous supporters of the treaty now either oppose it or abstain from voting on issues related to it. This participant felt there are no problems between the two communities in Slovakia. In fact, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia is the only one in the region (out of all the countries with substantial Hungarian minorities) where the Hungarian minority is growing. The problem is structural; there is no problem in a big country with a small minority, but a problem does arise in a small country with a big minority.
A West European also noted that problems between Moldova and Romania remain, and he suggested double citizenship as a solution. This suggestion was dismissed by a Central European, who commented that Moldovans are Romanians, and that Moldova is not an ethnic question. He noted that Romania wanted an enhanced basic treaty with Moldova. The treaty could include a special arrangement for Transdniestria.
Tensions between ethnic minorities and majority populations stem predominantly from economic rather than political or social causes, according to one Central European, who believed that when the economic transformation process is complete, ethnic problems will disappear. For example, when ethnic Hungarians in Romania feel that their opportunities in Romania are as good as the opportunities for them in Hungary, the problem will be solved.
This argument was echoed by several other Central Europeans, one of whom
linked the issue of double citizenship and equal opportunities with an
example from Polish-German relations. The topic of double citizenship came
up before the signing of the Polish-German treaty in 1990. Although Germany
does not allow double citizenship, Poland accepted it for its German
minority, as a temporary solution. The arrangement has worked out, but the
acceptance has led to a paradoxical situation in which some Polish citizens
are already EU citizens. The larger problem is how to gain EU citizenship
for all.
Common Values and Heritage
Some Central Europeans presented their countries' aspirations for NATO and EU membership in the context of common identity with the values of the two institutions.
One participant characterized the issue as one of "belonging" to an area and an organization with which his country wishes to identify. He described NATO as a zone of stability, peace, and common democratic values, and he observed that in his country the issue of NATO membership was put on the agenda because of public pressure. Surveys show that a large majority of the population favors integration into NATO, despite the necessity for higher expenditures on defense. In 1989, when the communist regime fell, his country had four theoretical options for foreign policy alignment: neutrality, self-reliance, Russia, and the West. Only the fourth choice made sense, he said. For his country, NATO membership was a seal of the irreversibility of democracy and market economy.
Several other explanations for aspiring to NATO membership were put forth, including considerations of status and prestige, and the usefulness of the organization in combating contemporary threats such as organized crime and terrorism.
One participant argued that status and prestige are primary motivations for aspiring to NATO membership. He pointed out that the 12 countries that have declared their wish to join NATO have many different motivations, not necessarily related to Russia. He believed that the common denominator is a lack of regional self-esteem, stemming from internal deficiencies such as poverty and social insecurity. He felt that the desire to join NATO is related to the status symbol of belonging to the West. He felt that the EU would be even better but since that was not yet possible, the linking of EU and NATO membership makes belonging to NATO a necessity.
This argument did not gain much approval. According to other Central
Europeans, status considerations, if important at all, were less important
than other reasons for aspiring to NATO membership.
The Big Picture
Several U.S. participants attempted to place the discussions of NATO enlargement within a larger, long-term framework. Their comments built on the argument that NATO enlargement will transcend power politics for an integrated Europe.
The issue is how to build a new, better system of security so as to improve the quality of life on the European continent, said one U.S. participant. The process of NATO enlargement has been launched, but it is still an open question how long the process will continue and which countries will eventually become members. The ongoing effort to develop democracy and free markets throughout Europe offers tremendous new opportunities. He asked the other participants to look beyond their differences regarding the pace and scope of NATO enlargement and to focus instead on their commonality. Compared with a more distant place, such as Asia, the European continent is clearly all "Western," whether east or west, Catholic or Orthodox, developed or emerging market economy. This participant stressed the importance of taking a longer view of the world that is emerging as a result of rapid growth in Asia. The growing power of China, he observed, may become more and more outwardly-focused. Such a development may force us to think more about our common ties.
Regarding the evolution of NATO, another U.S. participant asked, where do we
want to be in 15, 20, or 25 years? He felt that most Central Europeans would
say they want to be normal European countries (not "former communist
countries" or "former Eastern-bloc countries"), sharing in the prosperity
and security that the countries in the western part of the continent now
take for granted. Contemporary European prosperity is identified with the EU
and security with NATO, he said. These two institutions are the means to an
end and two sides of the same coin in the attempt to reintegrate peoples who
share a common European culture. But whereas Russia has not opposed EU
enlargement eastward, NATO enlargement has led to vociferous Russian
opposition over the past three years. This opposition has caused some
tensions in Russian relations with Central European and NATO countries.
The Nature of NATO
NATO is more than just an anti-Soviet military alliance, said another U.S. participant. It is a military alliance like no other in history, underpinned explicitly by a set of values and by such political institutions as the North Atlantic Assembly. Founded as a vehicle to prevent future European wars, it reflects the realization that security cannot be ensured for all when it is defined in strictly national terms. NATO's integrated command structure and shared military assets make it very difficult for anyone to contemplate using the military for national goals. This continues to be especially relevant for Central Europeans, since, as small or medium countries, they tend to be the losers in larger power games, no matter who wins. This U.S. participant observed that the rationale for joining NATO presented by some of the Central European countries is no different from the initial rationale for setting up NATO and for its continuing existence.
NATO and the current NATO enlargement process are not about Russia, he said. NATO was about the Soviet Union, but that country no longer exists and, whereas the USSR could never be a partner for the U.S. (though the U.S. could work with the USSR in certain areas), Russia can be a real partner for the U.S. in the global sense. In fact, NATO and NATO enlargement are about Europe. The U.S. presence in NATO has helped overcome the rivalries of the past and given Germany the chance to play a constructive role on the continent.
For one Central European, the issue truly is about joining the organization,
based on the criteria of the alliance, and determined individually on the
basis of internal readiness of the various Central European countries. By
meeting the criteria, the formerly communist states will be no different in
any major way from existing NATO states, such as Portugal or the
Netherlands. Thus, the process of NATO enlargement serves the cause of
integration by providing incentives to erase the divisions of the Cold War
as quickly as possible.
NATO Enlargement: The Objections
The points in favor of NATO enlargement found little resonance among the
Russian participants. Their arguments centered on the negative consequences
that enlargement will have on Russia and the world as a whole. Also, some of
them saw negative driving forces behind the Central Europeans' aspirations
to NATO membership.
Isolation and Its Effects on Russia
One Russian called the decision to enlarge NATO the most idiotic decision in human history, because it has led to the loss of an opportunity to create an alliance that would span the entire northern hemisphere. The decision to enlarge NATO, he said, failed to take into account the psychological impact it would have on the Russian elite. To the speaker it was a given that Russia is a part of Western civilization and that Russia belongs to the family of Western countries. But as a result of the NATO enlargement decision, he felt, Russia is going to create its own reality, not as part of Western civilization. Enlargement has been pushed forward for the short-term goals of preserving NATO and dealing with the psychological security of the Central Europeans.
Another Russian described NATO enlargement as a "serious mistake." The move solves the issue of psychological security of the Central European countries, he said, but it creates new problems, especially increasing the alienation between Russia and the West.
We all belong to the same [Western] culture, said another Russian, but we should not overlook our differences. Sometimes it is easier to speak to those who are distant, precisely because there are no "family quarrels" involved; civil wars tend to be the most difficult of all wars. Referring to the old phrase about NATO being designed to "keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down," this participant noted that no one now speaks of the need to keep the Germans down. While the need to keep the Americans in still exists, do the Russians still need to be kept out? The fact that many people do not consider Russia a part of Europe underlies many of the current problems in NATO's relations with Russia. Pro-Western democratic politicians in Russia felt defeated (in the domestic political sense), paradoxically, by their Western friends and because of outlooks in the West that do not acknowledge Russia's place in Europe. The participant commented that, even though he understood that NATO enlargement is not directed against Russia, many Russians still remain unconvinced after three years of debate. They see NATO enlargement as a symbol of Russian isolation from Europe, especially in the security realm, since decisions that should have been made together--by Russia and all Europeans--have been made by the United States and West Europeans alone. The participant urged others to understand the special situation that Russia faced after the fall of communism. Russia has had to formulate foreign policy in a situation that never existed before. For the Central Europeans, the solution was easy: they could join NATO. But no such easy solution existed for Ukraine and Russia.
Even though the majority of Russian society is pro-Western, said another Russian, there is very little pro-NATO sentiment in Russia, and even democratic elites fear that NATO enlargement will damage their domestic political position by leading to more difficulty in integrating the country into the democratic community of European states. The existence of psychological stereotypes may be unfortunate but it is undeniable, for history plays a role. In this vein, the participant gave an example of a recent Russian visitor to NATO headquarters, who, after a day of briefings about the alliance, remarked what a good organization, but what a bad name it has.
Most Central and East European states have little experience with democracy,
noted one Russian. He believed that misperceptions and ethnonationalism
underlie some of the Central European aspirations toward NATO. He questioned
the assertions of Central European participants that negative stereotypes of
Russians, based on ethnonational prejudices, played no part in the Central
Europeans' aspirations for NATO membership. He provided a poll revealing
that 68 per cent of people questioned in Lithuania saw Russia as a threat.
The participant felt that in the minds of Central Europeans the Russians
have assumed the role of the threatening "outsiders."
Negative Consequences and Potential Russian Countermoves
Russian views of the likely negative consequences of NATO enlargement centered primarily on the distancing from the West and other international moves that Russia would take, as well as on the potential for a negative domestic backlash.
After the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, Russia will develop relations--political, economic, and military--with a number of major world centers, according to one Russian. He foresaw special relations with Western Europe and the U.S., as well as with the former Soviet republics, and possibly even some "Eastern neighbors." Rejecting the idea of Russia as a part of Western, Eastern, or Southern civilization, he said the country had its own historical role based on an "in-between" nature that provided Russia with a comparative advantage in the world. The rejection of Russia by the West, as represented by NATO enlargement, he felt, reinforced the country's "in-between" character.
The improvement in Chinese-Russian relations and the Russian-Belarusian union were clear responses to NATO enlargement, he said. He foresaw economic and military cooperation between Russia and China. Regarding Belarus, he felt that the treaty would amount only to a symbolic union since, even if the treaty is signed, there are substantial forces opposing further steps. The union certainly represents an effort to protect Russian influence, he said, but it does not represent a move toward resurrecting the former USSR, since most people in Russia do not wish for that to happen. Finally, he foresaw a normalization of relations with some "southern" states as a further response to NATO enlargement.
This participant outlined Russian national strategy as 1) realizing its self-determination not as a part of Europe; 2) promoting its own military and economic interests; 3) ensuring military and political stability; and 4) satisfying its ambition to be a world power (with a voice in any major world decision).
The military implications of NATO enlargement are less important than other consequences of the move, according to another Russian. Enlargement pushes Russia toward China, he said. While Russia was not trying to organize a coalition against a NATO-centered world, if Russia had better relations with NATO it might act a bit differently toward China. Russian-Chinese cooperation in the military realm was not aimed against NATO, and Russian policy-makers realized the dangers of military cooperation with China, but there is no other option, since Russia is being "pushed out of Europe," and military and economic cooperation with traditional partners in "Eastern Europe" is being cut off. Still, this speaker dismissed the idea of China being an alternative to the West for Russia, and he downplayed recent concerns in Western media over the evolution of Russian-Chinese relations and asked that the U.S. and others be less critical of Russian ties with China. He asked the Americans rhetorically how they would feel if the U.S. bordered a united nuclear-armed Latin America with a billion people. Finally, the speaker saw another rationale for keeping good relations with China: separatist sentiments there represent a threat to both countries.
NATO enlargement has nothing to do with the improvement in Russian relations
with China, according to another Russian. He also disagreed with his Russian
colleague's "negative" definition of Russia as having an "in-between"
character. In the 11th century, Prince Vladimir chose the early Russian
kingdom to be an eastern outpost of Christianity in the Western world, not a
western outpost of the eastern world, he noted. But NATO enlargement makes
it difficult for Russia to be a part of the West. He dismissed the widely
touted economic arguments against the Russia-Belarus union (with the union
supposedly amounting to an additional burden on Russia). If such arguments
were true and other issues were not important, then it would make sense for
the mayor of Moscow to get rid of most of Russia and become a modern state
on its own. There are many reasons, some difficult to quantify, for the
union, and it will proceed despite President Lukashenka's authoritarian
style, which is irritating to Russia.
Russian, Central European Exchange
The issues of Russian-Belarusian relations and Chinese-Russian rapprochement led to an exchange with several Central Europeans. One felt that China had tactical short-range motivations in pursuing a rapprochement with Russia, but that certain Russian actions, such as assistance in Chinese weapons modernization, could backfire. He described China as the last colonial country, mentioning Chinese control of Tibet and Xinjiang. Indeed, he felt China was a civilization with huge regional differences, trying to be a country. He urged the Russians to recognize that stability in China was in everyone's interest. His view was that Russia turned to China as a market for its armaments because Russian armaments were no longer "salable" in Central Europe.
On the topic of Belarus, this Central European felt that Belarus would remain an independent state, even if it cooperated closely with Russia, and he felt that its survival as a state was important for stability in Central Europe and for Russia. Another Central European pointed out that the Russian-Belarusian union is proceeding under odd conditions, in that the further Belarus moves away from reform, the closer it becomes an ally for Russia. He wondered just how long Lukashenka could manage to survive without assistance from Russia.
A Russian agreed that Belarus is important for European security as a whole.
Russia is a positive force, encouraging democratizing tendencies in Belarus,
and has tried to prevent Lukashenka from becoming even more authoritarian,
he said. He reminded the others that NATO, too, has lived with authoritarian
countries.
Rising Russian Ethnonationalism
A number of Russians commented on the domestic fallout in Russia from NATO enlargement. One noted that NATO enlargement has become more of a domestic than a foreign policy problem in Russia. Some Russian politicians are openly saying that the issue should be used to help establish Russian identity. Another Russian said that if there is no attempt to integrate Russia into the Western world, and NATO enlargement proceeds, then the negative consequences will continue, and Russian ethnonationalism is sure to rise. Although he personally disliked such a turn of events, he was certain it would occur. Another Russian noted that Russia is entering a period similar to that following the Crimean War--recovery from a major defeat. Paraphrasing Gorbachev, he said that Russia is not angry but it is concentrating on finding its own advantages.
Another Russian commented that, in politics, perception is reality. He noted
that politicians in Russia will think about NATO enlargement from the angle
of how to use the issue for their own advantage in domestic politics, and
politicians do not think in long strategic terms, but only in three or
four-year terms relating to the next election. The NATO enlargement debates
have intensified the domestic political struggle in Russia over what an
independent Russia is about, in what direction it should proceed, and what
partners it should have. Countries such as Iran are begging Russia for
"partnership," he pointed out.
The Rejoinder
Central Europeans were not persuaded by the Russian arguments. One of them
explicitly noted his disappointment that the Russian position toward NATO
enlargement had not changed much since last year's meeting. This participant
had expected a new Russian attitude after the NATO-Russia agreement. Many
Central Europeans found the Russian fears to be misplaced or unfounded,
though a few also felt that some of the fears were understandable. One
Central European expressed understanding for Russia's need to disentangle
itself from a post-colonial situation. In his view, the British and the
French had empires, but Russia was an empire. Russians could not just sail
back to the homeland, as the French and the British had done.
Russia's Special Interests
Several Central Europeans disputed the notion that Russian interests or sensitivities deserve special treatment. One said that Russian security interests are no better than other countries' security interests. Another claimed that one Russian was asking a dozen or more countries in Central Europe to subordinate their national security policies to Russian psychological concerns.
Another Central European felt that Russia had some special rights, in the sense of having global security concerns and a privileged position in a dialogue with the U.S. Unlike Russia, the Central European countries can only contribute in a minor way to global security issues. But that is the whole extent of Russian "special" rights. Russia's demands for additional "special" privileges and rights is neither constructive nor warranted.
Another Central European felt that the Russian formulation of the issue
dealt more with the psychological realm of perceptions than with interests
defined in a geopolitical sense. Indeed, on the level of interests, greater
stability and prosperity in Central Europe was in the Russian interest. In
fact, Russian businessmen who engage in market-based business with Central
Europeans are in favor of NATO and EU enlargement, he pointed out.
Isolation or Self-Isolation?
A West European accused the Russian side of not offering a viable alternative to NATO enlargement and expressed the opinion that the isolation that the Russian speakers decried is self-inflicted. A Central European pointed out that the "West" has made a much greater effort than Russia herself to bring Russia into the West. He noted that the West has made many offers to Russia, such as NATO's Partnership for Peace program.
A Central European expressed his discomfort over the whole notion that Russia is being excluded from participating in European issues because of NATO enlargement. He argued that Russia as a world power, soon to be a member of the Summit of the Eight, is not on the same level as the medium and small countries of Central Europe. Whereas Russia is a world player, even a fairly large European country such as Poland has no way to become a member of the G-7. This participant stressed that Russia has to accept the same rules as other countries, and that means acceptance of democratic choice of international affiliation. Regarding the issue of Russia's "isolation," a U.S. participant added that, since Russia comprises nearly one-sixth of the world's territory, it would be impossible to isolate it and foolish to try.
One Central European participant noted that the Russian objections have no
legal foundation, since a variety of international treaties such as the
Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter affirmed the rights of countries to
associate with any organization they choose. He pointed out that, if Russia
had really believed that NATO was a threat, Russian policy-makers should
have applied to join the organization as soon as it became possible to do
so.
Russian Ethnonationalism
Several Central Europeans expressed unease about Russian predictions of a wave of ethnonationalism. One was disappointed that even liberal Russians use the symbolism of Russia as some kind of "caged beast" in order to blackmail other countries into granting special treatment. The speaker also noted that, if the Russians themselves warn that Russia can be a danger to the world, then others have a historical obligation to be prepared for such a contingency.
Warnings of a Russian domestic backlash did not produce any change of heart among the Central Europeans. One stated bluntly that the Russian elites should prepare themselves for a big NATO enlargement.
Many Central Europeans and some U.S. discussants commented on the fact that public opinion surveys show most Russians do not care about the NATO enlargement issue. Domestic social and economic problems are of much more importance to them. One U.S. participant noted that views on NATO enlargement are not all that different among the Central European and Russian populations, as most Russians either do not oppose or are indifferent to NATO enlargement. A Central European pointed out that opinion surveys indicate Russians overwhelmingly are not opposed to some Central European countries, such as Poland, joining NATO. Indeed, millions of Russians visit Central European countries and do not view Central Europeans as adversaries.
One Central European pointed out a contradiction in Russian objections to NATO enlargement. Since NATO was established to counter Soviet imperialist power, Russian democrats only undermine their own position when they object to enlargement, since doing so means admitting to a direct link between current Russian state interests and Soviet power. It is this contradiction, rather than the fact of NATO enlargement, that creates problems for the Russian elite.
A U.S. participant agreed with the existence of major differences between
the views of Central Europeans and Russian elites about NATO. These
perceptions were summarized recently by an influential Russian MP, who
called on the U.S. and NATO to ask Russia to join NATO as a way of changing
the discourse in Russia about the issue of enlargement. The MP felt that
Russia would not want to join the organization, but that the invitation
would have a profound domestic political impact. Such attitudes contrast
with the aspirations of Central Europeans, for most Central Europeans would
welcome an invitation to join NATO and assuredly accept it. This participant
asked whether an understanding of these different attitudes could be
accepted without precluding other, mutually beneficial, relations.
Anti-Russian Motivations?
Many Central Europeans disagreed with the Russian suggestion that
anti-Russian motivations underlie Central European aspirations to NATO
membership. One said that his country wished to join NATO not because it was
"against something," but because it was "for something"-namely a sphere of
peace and prosperity in Europe. No one is forcing us to join NATO, said
another, we want to. One observed that his country did not feel Russia was a
threat, but that its instability and unpredictability were worrisome.
Another noted that there might indeed be reason to fear Russia, a country
where the military has not been paid for months.
Stratification and New Lines of Division
A U.S. participant observed that the use of NATO as the primary vehicle for integration of Europe has led to some negative consequences, such as new lines of division. A new stratification is now in place in Europe: old NATO members, soon-to-be NATO members, maybe NATO members, and never NATO members. These consequences of the enlargement process have long-term implications that have not been adequately examined, he said. The easiest cases--Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary-have been dealt with, but what of the more difficult cases? Where do the Balkans, Russia, and the CIS fit into this scheme? Moreover, the troubles in the Balkans show no signs of going away. A Russian agreed that a stratified post-Madrid Europe will in fact exist. But the point sparked many objections by Central Europeans.
A number either rejected the whole premise of stratification or saw its effects as minor. One, who saw no such stratification, emphasized that, even if his country were not to enter NATO in the first round (and it was not among the three "front-runners"), it would still welcome the enlargement process, and its interest in joining NATO would remain.
Another Central European observed that the process of NATO enlargement entails new responsibilities for the countries accepted in the first round. It adds an incentive for close relations with countries that may not be in the first round. Rather than leading to deterioration in relations, this situation may in fact improve bilateral ties in the region. A number of Central Europeans agreed. In the words of one, good relations between the countries in the first round and those not in the first round are precisely the contribution the first wave members will bring.
A U.S. participant questioned the extent of stratification that NATO enlargement will cause, since the varying rates of economic transformation and the comparative advantages of certain countries have already led to much differentiation among Central European countries in the new environment. The main goal in contemporary Europe is to erase the Cold War division line, and NATO enlargement advances the process by breaking down residual barriers.
These observations were echoed by many Central Europeans. One remarked that NATO enlargement will bring about partnership among equals for an ever-increasing group of Europeans. Another remarked that, whatever differences emerge in the region as a result of NATO enlargement, they are relatively minor, and the continuing process of integration will soon erase them. In any event, he said, It is better to be stratified than polarized.
One Central European agreed partially with the idea that enlargement has produced some unforeseen problems. He noted that the debate on the enlargement had become "overheated" in his country. And he pointed out that the impending issuing of invitations in Madrid led to some problems in Czech-Slovak relations, since the Czech Republic was seen as likely to be invited and Slovakia had dropped out of serious consideration for the first round.
One Central European felt the discussion of stratification overemphasized
negative aspects. He noted a number of positive developments: 1) trilateral
talks between Russia, Ukraine, and NATO; 2) the Russian president's first
visit to Kiev after many postponements, and the signing of the
Russia-Ukraine treaty; 3) steps toward solving the problem of Transdniestria
in Moldova; 4) Polish-Ukrainian relations, which have been good and are
developing toward even better ties. Although potential problems still were
plentiful, at the sub-regional level the most dangerous aspects were
developing in a positive manner. He did note that NATO enlargement poses a
problem for such countries as Ukraine, where there is some opposition to it.
In such countries the process raises domestic problems, because public
opinion on the issue is sharply divided by region and political affiliation.
This participant also pointed out that the states left out of the first
round of enlargement are increasingly squeezed between the nuclear powers of
NATO and Russia. He spoke in favor of advancing the process of
de-nuclearization of both sides.
Slovakia
The participants devoted special attention to Slovakia. One Central European wondered what had gone wrong. Two years ago the country was widely seen as a contender for the first round of NATO enlargement; now its chances for the first round seem virtually nil. A U.S. discussant observed that, if Slovakia is not a NATO member, its exclusion poses problems for neighboring countries, too.
One Central European felt that the primary issue Slovakia faced was whether there would be a second round of enlargement. Although he felt that Slovakia was compatible with the first round NATO enlargement front-runners--Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary--he cited as the main failing in Slovakia the lack of political will to carry out the agenda necessary to enter NATO. Officially, the country continues to aspire to membership in both the EU and NATO. And even though it was not in the first round of NATO enlargement, Slovakia will become a de facto member of NATO because of the impending membership of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Nevertheless, the participant hoped that the lack of political will on the part of the current leadership in Slovakia does not mean the end of Slovak chances for membership in NATO.
Another Central European felt that Slovakia's policy of seeking membership in the organization would not change, and it would do its best to be in the second wave of enlargement. However, he noted there is bound to be disappointment, especially since he assumed that the upcoming referendum would show that the population supports entry into NATO. [Editorial note: The referendum, which took place after the meeting, was marred by extremely low turnout and legal problems concerning the number of questions on the ballot; it was declared invalid].
This participant also pointed out what he felt was unfair treatment and a double standard in international media analyses of Slovak foreign relations. He cited as examples the recent Slovak trade agreement with Russia and Slovakia's purchase of arms from Russia. The treaty, he said, was virtually identical to the Polish-Russian trade agreement, but, unlike the Polish-Russian agreement, the Slovak-Russian agreement was perceived by commentators as somehow leading to a Slovak pro-Russian drift and away from the EU. In any event, 70 per cent of Slovak trade is now with OECD countries, and suggestions of some kind of a Slovak move away from integration with the EU miss the mark. Similarly, when Hungary bought armaments from Russia in exchange for old Soviet debt, the deals were seen as normal, but when Slovakia did the same, it was treated as a sign of a further Slovak drift toward Russia. The participant felt that Slovakia fell behind the front-runners for NATO membership because of this kind of unfair treatment. Slovakia, he said, simply wants good relations with all countries, and, as a new state, is trying to establish its own identity.
According to another Central European, the current Slovak government has not adhered to standards of democratic behavior as commonly understood in most of Europe. Its foreign policy has been Western-oriented, but its internal policy diverges from commonly accepted Western norms of behavior.
A U.S. participant observed that Slovakia is a new state with a substantial
ethnic Hungarian minority (much higher in proportion than in the former
Czechoslovakia), and the reaction of the Slovak government to any criticism
or advice from the West on the minority issue has been quite hostile. But
the EU and NATO advice stems from the principle that "if you want to be a
member of our club, you have to play by the same rules." Another U.S.
participant noted that questions about the quality of democracy in Slovakia
have been raised in an open fashion and in bilateral U.S.-Slovak talks.
Raising such questions does not mean a rejection of Slovakia by NATO.
Enlargement is a process, and the Madrid summit is only the first step in
this process.
The Baltic States
The situation of the Baltic states as a result of NATO enlargement also received some attention. A Central European commented that something "special" needed to be done regarding the Baltic states. They may not enter NATO in the first round, but they will need to be treated uniquely by NATO. He felt there is a need to overcome the psychological barrier of treating the Central European states that were annexed by the USSR (rather than just subjugated) as different from other Central European countries. That type of stratification, he said, is most pernicious. Like any other Central European states, the Baltic states must be free to associate with any organization they choose.
A U.S. participant rejected the notion that certain countries need to be
treated uniquely, for every country is "special." However, he noted that the
U.S. has not rejected any country that is interested in joining NATO, and
the Baltic states are in that category.
Coping with the New Situation
A Russian asked that the participants pay more attention to practical issues. We have entered a new period, he said, in which NATO has enlarged. How do we create new military and security relationships? With the Russia-NATO treaty in place, Russia has become reconciled to the new reality. This means a "boring period" in NATO-Russian relations, not marked by ideology but by technical discussions of how to integrate Russia into the "Western" world. The stakes are considerable, for they concern the basic question of whether Russia will be Western-oriented. But rather than talk about cultural issues, the participant suggested discussing specific steps to advance cooperation in economic, political, and military arenas.
This speaker felt that the task at hand is how to smooth the situation in the post-enlargement world. He felt the best way would be to create an umbrella trans-Atlantic or European organization for North Americans, West Europeans, Central Europeans, East Europeans, and Russians. The new institution should take into account "Russian specificity." Such an organization would provide for a secure northern hemisphere and serve as a basis for a world-wide security network.
Another Russian felt that two things were essential to avoid aggravating the situation further. 1) The new NATO should do as little as possible in terms of infrastructure on the territory of new member states. 2) The costs of NATO enlargement to Russia should be minimized by leaving the NATO-Russia paradigm behind. Instead, the G-7 should include Russia and be transformed into the G-8. Russian relations with EU should improve, and OSCE should be developed further. Eventually, the goal should be to construct a new system of security along the lines of NATO-Russia-China-Japan. This participant emphasized that the future shape of NATO and the pace of enlargement must include Russian input.
A Russian expressed concern that, after the first wave, there will be constant discussions of the second wave. It is unfortunate, he felt, that a tendency now exists in Europe to focus on security issues strictly in terms of NATO enlargement. He urged the participants to avoid immediate discussions of a second wave, for he felt that would continue to irritate Russia's relations with NATO countries and force Russia into a corner. In any event, he said, NATO enlargement does not mean an end to seeking solutions to security problems. He suggested that dealing with security at a sub-regional level could be useful, especially in relation to the Baltic states. In order to de-emphasize the impact of NATO enlargement and to give discussions of a second wave of enlargement less prominence, he suggested that the OSCE--the only security body where Russia is represented- be given greater weight. More economic interaction with the developed countries of the West would be useful, as the Russian economy is still in decline. Global stability is crucial, he noted, and a "strategic bridge" between Moscow and Brussels is an essential element of such stability.
The other participants largely agreed that the primary policy issue at the present time is how to reduce tension between an enlarged NATO and Russia. Both a U.S. and a West European discussant observed that there is no perception of a military threat from Russia toward an enlarged NATO. In any event, any specific military problems connected to NATO enlargement could be handled through CFE, START, and a host of other arms control measures, the U.S. participant pointed out. The West European added that more imagination with the CFE on both sides and ratification of START on the Russian side would be useful.
This West European said that the problem on the Russian side is primarily
psychological, as the Russians feel excluded. Whereas Central Europeans are
seen as "Europeans" and are being invited into European institutions, Russia
is not a candidate for either the EU or NATO. But is there any Russian
interest in joining NATO? If Russia fulfills the criteria for membership, as
outlined in the NATO enlargement study, then Russia would be eligible. This
is a serious question, in view of the changed character of the alliance and
ongoing Russian cooperation (as in IFOR/SFOR). The possibility of Russian
membership, besides ensuring that Russia could be a player in Europe, would
break the vicious cycle of NATO-Russia tensions. Even if Russia did not want
to join, the mere fact of having the chance would be important. Both sides
should make the most of the NATO-Russia charter, making it legally binding.
This participant felt that NATO and Russia should engage in much more
intensive cooperation "on the ground." He said the IFOR/SFOR example
provided a good foundation for building on which further cooperation.
Russian military presence at Mons could be expanded, and cooperation in
armament technology could be developed, including the sharing of technology
in certain areas, such as theater ballistic missile defense.
NATO-Russia Council
Several Russians emphasized the important role that the newly established NATO-Russia Council could play in alleviating tensions and involving Russia in European security. One Russian remarked that the Council should have a role in consultations in all vital areas of security. Any security issue, whether European or global in scope, should be discussed in the Council. Another Russian urged that any positive achievements of the NATO-Russia Council be publicized widely on the Russian side. He said that the Council might provide better ways out of the current uneasy state of relations, replacing the pointless discussion of Russian membership in NATO, which will not happen.
A U.S. participant observed that the Russia-NATO Founding Act and the resulting cooperation with Russia could become the vehicle to integrate Russia into cooperative action in dealing with such issues as unrest in the Balkans. But another U.S. participant remarked that cooperation in the Council will require good will from both sides to make it work. There is goodwill on the U.S. side, which wishes to see the body emerge as a useful and meaningful forum, he said, but is there such goodwill on the Russian side? Citing the example of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), he noted that when it was first proposed, PfP was a genuine attempt to engage Russia with the U.S. and NATO in a military and security sense. But Russian interest in PfP disappeared quickly. Will the same happen to the Council?
A Russian affirmed that willingness to make the Council work does exist on the Russian side, and that Russia is prepared to give the body real substance. It is crucial, he said, that the Founding Act and establishment of the Council lead quickly to mutual trust. Otherwise, Russian opposition to NATO enlargement will intensify, and the ratification process after the Madrid summit could be very touchy. The U.S. side should understand the difficult Russian position and take the lead in making the body meaningful. The participant noted that integration of Russia into international institutions is beneficial for all. The Council of Europe decided to admit Russia to help the democratic forces in Russia and to assist in improving human rights standards there. There is nothing like it yet in the field of security. But the example of integration and cooperation should be followed.
A Central European expressed concern about the use of the Council by Russia
and wondered whether it would be used by Russia to fight NATO enlargement.
If so, he said, the Council would not have positive consequences for
European security. The Council should concentrate on a mix of activities
designed to bring a Russian voice into European security issues in a
constructive manner.
Russian Sensitivities
Several Russians urged that NATO pay more attention to the impact its actions and statements have in Russia. One Russian recommended that NATO use prudence in integrating the new members and warned against arousing any suspicions in Russia that NATO is "moving east" against it. He gave two specific examples of recent NATO military moves which were not well thought out in terms of their impact on Russia: PfP maneuvers in Lithuania, simulating irregular warfare in urban terrain, and a PfP exercise in Ukraine's Crimean peninsula, simulating action against a separatist revolt. While the scenarios that were offensive to the Russians were later changed, the initial lack of foresight still had a negative impact. The discussant put it bluntly: Russia feels humiliated at this time and needs more help. A U.S. participant agreed that those exercises had been a mistake.
The Russian also expressed unhappiness with President Clinton's recent remarks that "Russia has nothing to fear from NATO enlargement as long as it remains a democracy." He felt that the comment was threatening and that others had no right to rate Russia and its level of democracy. Another Russian put the issue even more bluntly, remarking with some anger that others should not assume an attitude of considering themselves more democratic and civilized than Russians when assessing the situation in Russia. Different national experiences matter, and sometimes different opinions stem merely from different backgrounds.
A major difference between Russia today and 10 years ago is its openness to the West, noted one Russian. Every year 10 million Russians cross the western Russian border and travel abroad, so there is a good deal of awareness in Russia about the world. He hoped for recognition that Russia has changed, resulting in a more prudent attitude toward Russia, rather than arrogance and superiority.
Two Russians aimed their remarks specifically at the U.S. One noted that the
U.S. still does not treat Russia as a democracy. The Jackson-Vanik amendment
remains in force, even though there is no longer any question about Russian
citizens' rights of free exit. Another Russian expressed concern that
growing U.S. involvement in Transcaucasus will lead to U.S.-Russian
tensions.
Compensation?
Few issues provoked more heated debate than the allusion by several Russians to the idea that Russia should be "compensated" for going along with NATO enlargement. The only actual use of the term "compensation" by a Russian was in a humorous reply to a Central European who asked what it would take to compensate Russia for a second wave of NATO enlargement. The Russian replied that the question reminded him of an allegory about a man wrongly decapitated being asked what kind of compensation he wanted. But Central European, West European, and U.S. participants had strong words about any allusion to "compensation" for Russia.
A Central European observed that his country had not been compensated for anything since 1938, despite several invasions and lengthy occupation and subjugation by foreign powers. He suggested that we need to learn some lessons from Cold War thinking, and that negotiation and bargaining rather than "compensation" are the order of the day.
A U.S. participant felt that, since the NATO enlargement process has been going on honestly and transparently for some time, no apologies to Russia are necessary.
Russia is already obtaining many things that it wants, such as enlargement
of G-7 to G-8 and increased ties with the EU, observed a Western
participant. Bluntly, this participant commented that Russia does not even
deserve what it is getting. For example, Russia is going to be a member of
G-8, but the sad shape of its economy does not warrant such a position.
Similarly, assistance from the EU to Russia has been massive and is set to
continue. Harking back to the experience of the United Kingdom, which also
went from an empire to a middle-rank power, he advised the Russians: "Work
on your democracy, and get your economy straight."
The Role of the EU
The role of the European Union, the other major international institution in Europe, was a topic that came up throughout the discussions. Many Central European and some U.S. participants criticised the institution and its allegedly weak role in the integration process.
An often-heard line of reasoning is that NATO enlargement amounts to the U.S. making up for the failure of the West Europeans and the EU to deal with post-Cold War Europe, said one U.S. participant. But NATO enlargement has let the EU off the hook by allowing the EU to evade the issue further. It seems odd that a military alliance, led by a country from another continent, is serving as a vehicle for European integration. What does this say about the EU? And what about the South Balkans and the countries not in the first round of NATO enlargement? The EU is especially guilty of ignoring those countries and their problems. Another U.S. speaker posed a question to the participants about the fact that NATO enlargement is proceeding before the EU's: Is security what the Central and East Europeans need most, or is it economics?
Many Central Europeans addressed these questions. The majority recognized the mutually reinforcing role of NATO and the EU, but also expressed gratitude to NATO for taking the lead with enlargement. One Central European remarked that enlargement of both NATO and the EU are parts of the same process. Another Central European said that each institution--EU and NATO--adds something, but both are important. Another Central European described his country as having a full-level integration strategy and pointed out that the current focus on NATO is due to the fact that it is now open to new members, while the EU is not.
NATO membership has become the leading aspiration of the Central Europeans because the organization has a record of being effective, observed one Central European. In addition, few in his country believe that it will be able to fulfill EU membership criteria any time soon, but NATO membership seems within their grasp. Finally, he recognized the importance of the U.S. role in NATO and the need for a U.S. presence in Europe. In a blunt comment, another Central European said, Europe is not mature enough yet without the U.S. and NATO provides a vehicle for a U.S. role on the continent. Without the U.S. the German problem would be bigger, and the old danger of playing the "changing alliances" game would be reactivated.
A number of Central Europeans remarked that the EU was slow to reform and could not adjust easily to the new post-Cold War situation and the need for reintegration in Europe. Several said there was a lack of vision and will in the EU about what to do about the rapidly changing situation in Europe.
But a number of commentators also pointed out that the security-economics dichotomy in the NATO-EU question amounted to a false choice. The EU has security aspects to it, and NATO certainly has an economic side to it, too. One Central European remarked that the EU was set up in the 1950s with security considerations in mind. It has come to be identified with prosperity and economic interaction, but it has always been much more than that. The integration that the EU has led to, he said, makes it a "peace community." A West European suggested that in the future the EU may become just as important in the security realm as NATO.
The West European also countered some of the negative comments regarding the
EU and remarked that it is going to enlarge and it will include countries
that will not become NATO members in the near future. Through its CFSP
(Common Foreign and Security Policy), the EU is especially well suited to
tackle problems of European security. Indeed, CFSP may be a better home for
Russia than NATO, especially regarding the Balkans and countries such as
Belarus. CFSP is still evolving, but it needs a preventive diplomacy
function. We are still in the uneven process of the building of new
institutional arrangements to deal with the post-Cold War problems, he said.
There are many institutions in place, and there is no lack either of
interest or mechanisms.
Relations Between Russia and Central Europe after the Madrid Summit
Opinions about the future course of relations between Central European countries and Russia differed. Though ties may increase in some areas, indications are that they may decline.
A Central European pointed out that thinking of countries such as Poland in politically-defined terms of "Central and Eastern Europe" will be inaccurate in the post-Madrid era. When it becomes a member of NATO, will a country such as Poland still be grouped under the same rubric as Lithuania? The label will be obsolete, since the countries in the first round of enlargement will have become a part of the "West." A Russian observed that discussions like the current one are increasingly difficult because of the changing situation. Rather than being one group of countries, the countries of Central Europe are already quite different from one another.
Russian policy toward the Central European states that will soon enter NATO will depend on their behavior toward Russia in the alliance, observed a Russian. Will the new NATO countries adopt anti-Russian positions or will they act "prudently"? A U.S. discussant responded that it would be foolish for Poles, Czechs, or others to use NATO in any way against Russia, for they most of all have a stake in good relations with Russia. Expectations of anti-Russian behavior by the new members seem unfounded. More combative, one Central European questioned whether the Russian meant to allude to a possibility of economic sanctions on the Central European countries when they join NATO. He referred to the recent comments of the Russian ambassador to Prague, who threatened unspecified economic actions by Russia against the Czech Republic when and if that country joined NATO. Another Central European cautioned the Russian side that language is important in not arousing tensions in Central Europe. Use of the word "corridor" to describe a proposed transit route from Belarus to Kaliningrad provokes negative images and is not constructive.
A Russian observed that the importance to Russia of what used to be known as "Eastern Europe" will decline. But in the immediate future, after the initial wave of enlargement, Central Europe will become fragmented into different groups of states, and Russian relations with the Central Europeans will differ accordingly. Russia will increasingly tend to appeal directly to Brussels rather than to individual Central European countries. A Central European felt that, on the contrary, the importance of the Central European states to Russia will increase as a result of their integration into NATO. He believed that NATO membership is likely to facilitate Central European contacts with Russia and put the countries on a more equal footing. He advised the Russian side that going to Brussels rather than Warsaw to talk about Russian-Polish relations was not a good idea. The Russian participant remained unconvinced, remarking that some countries in NATO are more equal than others.
Some participants noted that now an opportunity exists for the establishment of relations based on mutual respect and recognition of sovereignty among the Central European states and Russia. One Central European noted that this is the first time in many years that Central Europe is not controlled by either Germany or Russia. When Germany abandoned its ambition of controlling the region, it paved the way for close and healthy ties between Germany and the Central European countries. The same could apply to Russia. Abandonment of Russian ambitions toward the region could lead to new kinds of relations between the Central European states and Russia. The decision by the Central Europeans to seek NATO membership is not motivated by the desire to replace one "big brother" with another. The goal is to play a genuine role in upholding security on the continent that was alluring. Central European aspirations for NATO are not a betrayal of former allies, he added. Those aspirations stem from seeing a great chance for everyone in Europe to leave the old power politics behind and move on to a better stage of relations on the continent. These ideas were echoed by a number of Central Europeans.
Several issues worth monitoring in the near future in connection with the new entries into NATO were proposed by one Central European. One is how the newly "Western" countries will deal with those not in the first round of enlargement. Another issue is Kaliningrad, which is likely to require regional cooperation between neighbors that belong to diverse organizations. Still another is the Russian/Belarusian union. Should that entity be treated as a regional problem or a European problem? Finally, how will Russian attitudes toward the Central European countries change after the Madrid summit? The participant anticipated stages in the Russian attitude: first, viewing each of the new NATO countries as a "treacherous bride" who wants another groom; then she will ignore him; and finally, resentfully accept that they have escaped from the Russian paw. What will be the next stage? Will Russia see Central Europe as little more than a playground in the strategic balance between NATO and Russia? Will Russia refrain from exploiting the differences among the countries in the region, especially those that are in the first round and those that are not?
Elaborating on the "treacherous bride" analogy, a Russian described NATO
enlargement and Russian attitudes toward the Central European states as
"post-divorce syndrome." Another Russian gave the divorce analogy a slightly
different twist: after the initial resentment stage, he said, sometimes one
really begins to appreciate one's ex-spouse, and he said the same may yet
happen in Central European views toward Russia. Continuing, the Russian
described two kinds of former "wives": the Central European countries and
the former Soviet republics. The two areas had faced different situations.
But he reminded the other participants that in both cases it was the Soviet
Union, not Russia, that made the decision to withdraw from those areas.
Assuming Russian ambitions to "regain" these areas misses that fundamental
point.
Growing Distance?
Some new problems are developing in Central European relations with Russia and other CIS countries as a result of EU enlargement, some Central Europeans observed. Greater distance between the Central European countries and Russia is likely to come about not as a result of NATO enlargement but of EU enlargement. Some Central Europeans felt there was insufficient understanding of this issue in Russia.
One Central European pointed out that the Schengen Treaty, which waived all visa requirements within the EU and is a reality, is restrictive to free movement. Visa restrictions may create a wall on Poland's eastern border. The Polish government wants to have an open border with the CIS states, but the EU does not, and it has asked the Polish government to "control" its eastern border. That would greatly diminish Polish contacts with Russia and other CIS states. The participant noted an urgent need for Polish-Russian discussions on this issue. The economic sphere is the primary area for cooperation between Central Europe and Russia, and Central Europeans support Russian (and Ukrainian) integration into bodies such as the World Trade Organization.
Another Central European mentioned that, if the experience of recent entrants such as Sweden, Finland and Austria into the EU has been any indication, trade between Russia and the Central European countries entering the EU will decline. The net effect of the trend would be to further reduce Central European-Russian contacts.
A Russian observed that the Central Europeans and Russians are talking past
each other, seemingly not really interested in understanding each other,
especially when it comes to security questions. Perhaps a respite in
contacts is what is needed. This would allow market-based trade and mutually
beneficial contacts to develop, thus laying the groundwork for closer ties
in the future. A Central European challenged these remarks. He felt that
Central Europeans have lost political interest in Russia, though their
economic interest remains; but he felt that Russia has not lost its interest
in the region. A Russian expressed the opinion that mistakes have been made
in Russian foreign policy, that Moscow forgot about Central and Eastern
Europe. He felt that the Kremlin is more concerned with Brussels and
Washington than with Prague and Budapest. Foreign Minister Primakov and the
Duma have tried to draw attention to this issue in Russian foreign policy
but have made no progress.
Russian Relations with the Baltic States
Tensions remain in relations between Russia and the Baltic states, and neither the impending NATO enlargement nor the possibility of EU membership for the Baltic states has had much of an impact on the bilateral ties. A sharp exchange between a Central European and several Russians concerned the Russian minority in Estonia and the controversy about the citizenship problems of Russians living in Estonia.
The basic way to acquire citizenship in Estonia is by birth to Estonian citizens, noted the Central European. Otherwise, residency and a language test are required for Estonian citizenship. Contrary to some reports, 90 per cent of those taking the Estonian language exam pass, and the Estonian government has allotted substantial funds to Estonian language education. Some 36 per cent of the people residing in Estonia are not ethnic Estonians; of these, ethnic Russians constitute by far the largest group, about 29 per cent of the total population. But 90,000 ethnic Russians have received citizenship since Estonian independence in 1991. No constraints exist on obtaining Estonian citizenship, since it is an open process, said the Central European. He rejected any suggestion that the cultural rights of ethnic Russians are being violated.
Unconvinced, one Russian discussant commented that in both Estonia and Latvia many young Russians who are qualified for citizenship do not apply because they do not wish to be humiliated by state officials. The Russian felt that recommendations issued by Max van der Stoel (the High Commissioner for National Minorities of the OSCE) and his Office have not been implemented in the two countries. Finally, the problem of military pensioners in the two Baltic states remains unsolved.
Another Russian commented that at least some progress on the minority issue is being made in Estonia. But Latvia remains problematic (and Lithuania is not a significant issue as far as the Russian minority is concerned). The real problem, according to the Russian, was the impact of legislation during the first few years of independence of Estonia and Latvia, when ethnic Russians were not allowed to have a say in the legislatures of these countries.
This Russian's remarks led another Central European participant to caution the Russian side not to attempt to use the Russian minority in Lithuania as a tool of Russian state policy. He felt such a policy would not be beneficial either to Russia or to the Russian minority.
A West European suggested that a role by the EU might be useful in
ameliorating the tensions between Russia and Latvia and Estonia. Perhaps
double citizenship might be a solution? He wondered whether the
Hungarian-Romanian treaty could serve as a model for settling the disputes
between Russia and some of the Baltic states, but his comments failed to
elicit much interest on either the Central European or Russian side.
Why Must a U.S. NGO Be Involved?
There is very little contact between Central Europeans and Russians, pointed out a U.S. participant, noting that it took a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization to sponsor the meeting and to bring the Central Europeans and Russians together. He asked why it is so difficult to have such a dialogue without external sponsorship.
A Russian put some of the blame for such limited bilateral contacts on the Central Europeans. He felt that most people in the Central European countries see Russia as an imperial power. Forced into, and now released from, the Warsaw Pact, the Central Europeans have a psychological block against dealing with Russia. And whereas Western policy gave incentives to the Central Europeans to talk to NATO, no motivation exists for Central Europeans to talk to one another or to the Russians.
Such comments were contested in lengthy and sometimes bitter comments by several Central Europeans. One noted that two official bilateral Polish-Russian meetings have been held so far, one in Warsaw and one in Moscow, but he felt that the composition of the Russian side was inadequate. Another Central European added that, in addition to the two official meetings, there have been many recent Polish-Russian NGO-sponsored bilateral meetings, but those meetings only indicate that Russia did not begin to treat Poland seriously until it dawned on them that Poland would soon be in NATO. For several years, there was no response from Moscow to the numerous invitations from the Polish side for discussions.
The Central European commented that bilateral contacts between Russians and Central Europeans do go on, but they depend almost entirely on Russian willingness to cooperate. The speaker recounted the words of a Russian representative at a bilateral Polish-Russian meeting in 1996: "We decided to come to Warsaw this time, even though we know you need to convince NATO that you are talking to us." This Russian attitude, refusing to treat discussions with Central Europeans as beneficial and useful in their own right but rather as a sideshow in their relations with the U.S. and West Europeans, is an obstacle to improved contacts, said the Central European. He noted that the good relations his country has been able to achieve with Germany in the post-Cold War period have been the result of greater confidence in his country and of being treated as a real partner by Germany. He thought that the same might be possible vis-ˆ-vis Russia if the Russian attitude changes.
Another Central European felt that Russia does not consider any Central European country other than Poland to have any importance. Russian representatives were reluctant to come to his country for consultations, he said, and when they did come, they refused to engage in any meaningful dialogue, exhibiting only an attitude of "This is our position: take it or leave it."
Still another Central European put the blame for lack of contacts between his country and Russia squarely on the Russian side. He said that despite numerous invitations to Russia since 1996 to hold bilateral discussions, they never even responded until two weeks ago.
One Central European observed that limited contacts are a problem not only in relations between Central European countries and Russia, but also among Central European countries themselves. He noted that several NGO- sponsored trilateral Polish-Ukrainian-Belarusian roundtables have taken place, though an attempt to hold one this year failed. And there is virtually no Polish-Slovak contact, even at the NGO level. Only Czech-Polish contacts have been frequent.
The U.S. side has qualms about assuming responsibility for continuing the
Central European-Russian dialogue, said a U.S. participant. He suggested
that the Russians take a more active role and engage in more frequent
bilateral consultations with the Central Europeans. Perhaps short (even
one-page) summaries of the meetings, distributed to participants from other
countries, might be beneficial. A joint PER-sponsored annual meeting might
then simply be a catalyst to further discussions on themes that might have
already come up.
Conclusions and Next Steps
The meeting showed the different perceptions of the process of NATO enlargement on the part of the Central Europeans, West Europeans, and Americans on the one side and the Russians on the other. But it was also evident that the Russians saw NATO enlargement as inevitable and that they therefore needed to make the best of it. NATO enlargement does not mean the end of security negotiations on the continent, nor does it necessarily lead to exclusion and isolation of Russia. The steps taken after Madrid will determine what will happen.
The Central Europeans seemed more confident about their own security as a
result of NATO enlargement. While dismissing some of the Russian concerns
about the effects of the process, they hoped for improved relations with
Russia in the future. Indeed, many Central Europeans saw NATO enlargement as
a basis on which more "normal" relations with Russia can be established.
List of Participants
Czech Republic
Ivan Gabal, former Head, Department of Political Analysis, Office of the President
Karel Stindl, Ambassador to Poland
Estonia
Peeter Restsinski, Ambassador to Poland
uropean Union
Thomas Grunert, Senior Official, European Parliament
Hungary
Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, Leader of Parliamentary Caucus, Alliance of Free Democrats
Latvia
Uvis Blums, Second Secretary, Embassy in Poland
Lithuania
Kestutis Jankauskas, Deputy Head, Multilateral Relations Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO
Andrew Dolan, National Expert, NATO and the European Commission
Poland
Bronislaw Geremek, Member of Parliament; Member, PER Council for Ethnic Accord
Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Member of Parliament, former Defense Minister; Chairman, Euro-Atlantic Council
Janusz Reiter, former Ambassador to Germany; Chairman, Center on International Affairs
Piotr Switalski, former Senior Diplomatic Advisor to the OSCE Secretary General and Director of the OSCE Department for Chairman-in Office Support, Department of the System of the United Nations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Henryk Szlajfer, Director, Department of Studies and Analysis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Romania
Constantin Dudu Ionescu, Secretary of State and Chief of Defense Policy and International Relations, Ministry of Defense
Dorin Marian, Counselor for National Security, Office of the Presidency
Russia
Vladimir Averchev, Member, State Duma
Boris Makarenko, Deputy Director, Center for Political Technologies; Consultant, Project on Ethnic Relations
Alexei Salmin, Member, Presidential Advisory Council; President, Russian Public Policy Center
Mark Urnov, Presidential Advisor
Slovakia
Juraj Migas, Director General, Political Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Miroslav Wlachovsky, Director, Research Center, Slovak Foreign Policy Association
Slovenia
Anton Bebler, Ambassador to the UN Offices in Geneva
Ukraine
Yevhen Marchuk, Member of Parliament, former Prime Minister
USA
Marshall Adair, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State
Stephen Mull, Political Officer, US Embassy in Poland
Cameron Munter, Chief of Staff, NATO Enlargement Ratification Office, Department of State
Thomas Szayna, Analyst, International Studies Group, RAND
PER
Allen Kassof, President
Livia Plaks, Executive Director
Aleksey Grigor'ev, Program Officer
Observer
Aleksandra Jasinska, Professor, Sociology Institute, Warsaw University
Andrzej Mirga, Chairman, PER Romani Advisory Council