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Bulletins
Moscow
January 20-21, 1995
Preface
In the post-Communist world as in centuries past, ethnonationalism has played an important part in both domestic and international politics. Its role has been evident in the outbreak of violent conflicts, the creation of new states, and the revision and attempted revision of interstate borders. Ethnic doctrines and perceptions have also influenced, and in some cases dominated, political outlooks and have affected decision-making on security and other issues.Specifically, ethnonationalism has fueled the fears and suspicions that currently beset relations between the Russian Federation, the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, and the states of eastern Europe. As a result, ethnonationalism is widely perceived as one of the major threats to security in Europe today.
To address these issues, the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) I organized a discussion in Moscow in January 1995 among high-level East European and Russian policymakers and advisors. Americans and West Europeans, who have an important stake in such a dialogue, also observed and participated. The meeting contained surprises for all the participants regarding the views of the others, and the process encouraged them to take further steps toward creating greater transparency in their relations.
The present report summarizes the conversations and debates that took place in Moscow. PER acknowledges with pleasure the participation of the Center for Political Technologies (CPT), which organized Russian participation in the meeting. Boris Makarenko, PER's Moscow representative and CPT's Deputy Director, worked with PER and CPT on coordinating the agenda, and prepared the basic draft of this report, which was supplemented by contributions from George Schopflin, a participant, and Julie Burkley of PER's staff. PER Senior Editor Robert A. Feldmesser is responsible for the final editing. The report has not been reviewed by the meeting participants, and is the sole responsibility of PER.
Allen H. Kassof, Director
Livia B. Plaks, Associate Director
Princeton, New Jersey
January, 1995
Introduction
Liberated by the revolutions of 1989, the countries of East Central Europe promptly forsook their political, economic, and historical connections with Russia in favor of efforts to restore their ties with the West. Russia, too, began to look westward, often ignoring its former satellites in an attempt to assert its parity with the established democracies. The result was the growth of mutual ignorance among the neighbors in this region, despite their shared recent history and the potential advantages of cooperation in the future.
This gap is very much in evidence in the differing perceptions of the ethnonational currents that are sweeping the region. Many policymakers in Eastern Europe are convinced of the immutability of Russian views and intentions and so assume that Russian behavior will continue as in the past. This assumption has been allowed to persist at least in part because of the failure of the East Europeans to discuss with post-Soviet Russians their actual views or to consider the possibility that history does not necessarily repeat itself. Meanwhile, many Russian policymakers underestimate or are simply unaware of their neighbors' fears (real or imagined) about the possibility of resurgent Russian nationalism. The countries in the region, preoccupied with matters within their own borders, miss important opportunities to grasp the regional security dimensions of interethnic rivalries and to profit from comparing experiences.
Concern over this problem prompted the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) to convene a meeting of prominent decision-makers and political experts from the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe to discuss the dangers of ethnonationalism and to generate recommendations for policies that might avert them. Participants from Bulgaria, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Serbia gathered in Moscow on January 20 and 21, 1995. Western observers also attended (see the list of participants, appended.) Assistance in the conduct of the meeting was provided by the Center for Political Technologies, a Russian nongovernmental policy institute.
The discussion at the meeting was divided into three topics. The first topic was the phenomenon of ethnonationalism generally and the participating countries' experiences with it. To what extent are Russian and East European political leaders conscious of the impact on others of their pronouncements and behavior concerning ethnic and national issues? Do they accurately "read" the domestic politics of other states on these issues? How can communication and understanding be improved? What are the implications of contemporary ethnonationalism for regional development and cooperation?
The second topic was the emergence of Russia in a new role in the international arena and the ways in which this role is influenced by domestic politics. What is the spectrum of views within the Russian political establishment concerning ethnonational issues? Do East Europeans feel threatened by Russian nationalism? What are the grounds for Russia's fears of being excluded from the potential "club" of West and East European nations?
The third topic, taking up the entire second day of the meeting, was the
role of the West. What do post-Communist states expect from the West and can
the West live up to these expectations? What does the West expect in return?
THE CONTEXT
The opening remarks were delivered by PER's director, Dr. Allen Kassof, who said the purpose of the meeting was to provide an opportunity for an honest and unprejudiced discussion of ethnonationalism in the post-Communist world, a discussion designed to address the lack of communication on the issue of ethnonationalism and its implications for the countries of the region on both the national and the regional level.
Ties between the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, Kassof noted, were officially dissolved with the collapse of Communist rule. Since then, the level of political dialogue among these countries has declined as they concentrated on renegotiating their relationships to the rest of the world. This lack of communication has allowed false perceptions and misunderstandings to develop about the intentions of the countries' foreign and domestic policies. In this environment, for instance, Russia is troubled by the pro-western orientations of many of the former Soviet satellites and their desire to join NATO. Meanwhile, East Europeans are suspicious of what they view as traditional imperial behavior in Russia's relations with nearby states. East Europeans also fear that Russia will try to block their integration into Western economic, political, and security institutions.
Kassof stressed that the problems of ethnonationalism and regional security are not merely European problems. The United States has a strong interest in stability in this region of the world. Continuing wars and tensions complicate U.S. domestic politics, particularly when the United States is asked to intervene.
One Western observer stated that he was both pessimistic and optimistic
about these problems. He is a pessimist because of the continuing
hostilities between Serbia and Croatia and the continuing violence in Bosnia
and Chechnya. On the other hand, he is encouraged by the restraint on
ethnonationalistic behavior displayed by Russian and Hungarian political
leaders. Equally important, there is little public support in the countries
of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for settling ethnic disputes
by force. In fact, it is clear that there is a gap between elected leaders
and the masses, a gap seen most recently in attitudes toward the conflict in
Chechnya. However, the lack of public support should not allow us to
underestimate or dismiss the problem of ethnonationalism.
ETHNONATIONALISM AS A REGIONAL PHENOMENON
The participants agreed that the post-Communist world has accumulated a record of "missed opportunities" in failing to identify ethnic tensions at an early stage and to prevent them from erupting in mass violence, as in the former Yugoslavia and in Chechnya.
As several participants noted, the appearance of ethnonationalism since the dismantling of Communism should not have been unexpected. Ethnic feelings and tensions had been long present in this part of the world, although the Communist regimes swept them under the rug. But surprising or not, ethnonationalism is nevertheless troublesome because it threatens the stability that could be achieved in a post--cold-war world.
Some participants did point to recent instances in which leaders had been able to prevent ethnic tensions and nationalistic rhetoric from exacerbating potentially explosive situations. Examples were the "velvet divorce" between the Czech Republic and Slovakia; the lack of interstate violence between Hungary and its neighbors, including those with sizable ethnic Hungarian minorities or long-standing territorial disputes; and the 1994 electoral defeat of a Hungarian government that claimed to represent all ethnic Hungarians living in diaspora. Other positive developments were Poland's improved relations with Germany, the Baltic states, and Russia, and the fact that the military campaign in Chechnya has not given rise to a wave of chauvinistic hysteria. This last development is especially important because it dispelled the notion of a "red-brown" political union of surviving Communists and nationalists.
It was agreed by the participants that the ethnonationalism seen today is a function of a specific stage of European history and therefore must be examined in its specific historical context. Ethnonationalism, as distinguished from other forms of nationalism, promotes the economic, historic, or other interests of a particular ethnic group and is closely linked to geopolitical issues. One participant argued that this linkage can have a positive effect; for example, ethnonationalism can help delineate the geographic, political, and cultural space that a nation sees as its own, so long as that does not encroach upon the geopolitical interests of other states.
Several participants suggested that another way to look at contemporary nationalism in eastern Europe is to view it as the last stage of Communism--i.e., "national Communism." This becomes salient if one explores the historic roots of the phenomenon. Many nationalist leaders in the region are former Communist bosses attempting to defend their past and to salvage their power in the new system. Often, ethnonationalism has been used to block radical economic and social reforms in the post-Communist countries.
Other discussants disagreed with this interpretation, stating that ethnonationalism and communism have overlapping histories, which share certain characteristics. Both were born at almost the same historic moment and both constituted social utopias, though their further development can be seen as historic competition.
One participant, an ethnologist, argued that it is misleading to concentrate too much on the "unique cultural mosaic" of eastern Europe as the reason for the ubiquity of ethnonationalism in the region. A more likely explanation is that eastern Europe is that part of the world where ethnonationalism filled the vacuum of doctrines and forms of collective action that was left by the collapse of Communism. The segmentation of societies along ethnocultural lines superseded other forms of segmentation. In these countries, communism nurtured ethnonationalism. However, under totalitarian rule, ethnic sentiments tended to be reduced to declarative "rights of nations," which had no effect on political life. With the disappearance of Communist governments, ethnicity acquired a new, much more salient role in politics.
One East European participant objected, stating that the notion of a "post-Communist vacuum" did not accurately describe the situation. There was a much stronger vacuum under Communism by virtue of the restrictions on freedom of thought and the absence of democratic rights. Throughout the former Soviet camp and especially in East European countries, there were few true believers in communism. By contrast, the region today is experiencing what could well be described as a "chaos of ideas." While there was widespread agreement that democracy was the only acceptable form of political rule, the actual practices and content of democracy varied and did not necessarily resemble the practices and content of democracy as understood in the West. Until a consensus on the nature of the democratic order was reached, there would continue to be disagreement about political fundamentals, and different interpretations of democracy would be in competition, with potentially destabilizing effects. In this situation, ethnic loyalty could be a source of stability.
This opinion was supported by a Russian participant, who stressed that while the link between ethnonationalism and Communism was obvious, it was more important to understand the function of ethnonationalism in the post-Communist countries. Since 1991, not only the power institutions but the whole structure of Russian society has collapsed. In this condition of fragmentation, there are no institutionalized interest groups, and ethnonationalism serves as a means of consolidating society, of forming relationships between the individual, the community, and political power.
A Western observer emphasized the importance of the distinction between civic and ethnic identity. Ethnonationalism is not limited to the post-Communist nations; it is also a Western phenomenon, as seen in Ireland, Spain, and the extreme right in France. However, in Western countries ethnic identity is balanced with a kind of "civic nationalism," and citizenship rather than ethnicity is the underlying principle of the state. Nowadays, when the West looks at eastern Europe, it perceives the perils of ethnonationalism as the outcome of the policy of "demonizing others." Ethnic groups in eastern Europe will come to terms with one another only if civic identities are developed to counterbalance ethnic delineation. The development of civic identities will come, in turn, with the progress of democratization in these countries.
Indeed, ethnonationalism, many discussants agreed, was not an accurate term. Any form of nationalism can contain an ethnic component. For example, the referendums on the Maastricht agreements revealed nationalistic feelings in a number of West European countries, though they were of a different, predominantly economic character. In eastern Europe, ethnic nationalism serves the general public as a moral compensation for economic backwardness, but political elites use it in power struggles, taking the political notion of "nation" to an extreme in order to secure their power. In other words, they use ethnonationalism as a way of mobilizing support and to establish absolute values of right and wrong, and as a result minorities and minority views are easily marginalized and suppressed. The long-term resolution of the problem of ethnonationalism thus depends on the progress made by East European countries in three related areas: modernization, democratization, and the promotion of civic identities.
In democracies, the legitimization of statehood is much more complicated than in other polities because it requires citizenship rather than ethnicity to act as the unifying force. From this perspective, the Chechnya crisis was an example of the failure to promote civic national identities in the Russian Federation, because the Chechens had not developed a sense of loyalty toward Russia.
One participant argued that a reliance on ethnonational politics could lead either to further ethnic disintegration or to ethnic reintegration, both of which pose dangers to European security. In the former case, minorities in the newly born states could attempt to secede; in the latter case, leaders could pursue policies aimed at the reunification of ethnic groups scattered across several states.
Another participant pointed to the process of disintegration that has been manifested in the Chechnya conflict. This conflict underscores the absence of a unifying ideology of Russian citizenship, which could have maintained the stability and tranquillity of the Russian state. Its absence allowed the Chechen leader, Dzhokar Dudaev, to use ethnonationalism as a rallying cry against an external threat, Russia, when his authority was being challenged inside the republic. This spontaneous mobilization of society on ethnonational grounds helped Dudaev dissolve the parliament and the Supreme Provisional Council, to oust opposition figures in the government, and to establish dictatorial power.
To minimize the dangers brought about by the cognitive association of statehood with ethnicity, another participant added, it would be necessary to use such forms of political leverage as cultural autonomy, the creation of ethnically mixed territorial units, and adjustments in electoral and legislative systems to assure proper political representation of minorities. It would also be important to develop new flexible forms of association between the central government and subsidiary units.
The participants concluded that in struggles for self-determination, the test of the viability of a new entity based upon ethnic mobilization is whether it is able to maintain its stability. This criterion is one of the factors distinguishing Russia from Yugoslavia. In the Russian case, entities like Chechnya would not be stable even if they had successfully seceded.
There was also agreement that the dissolution of Communism in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union marked the beginning of a new phase of history. The world is currently in a state of transition, a time when the principles of the twenty-first century are being shaped. The old principles--Enlightenment rationalism, the market, democracy and the consequent destruction of traditional communities and solidarities --are being reappraised and, with the rise of globalization, they are having an impact throughout the world. Extreme caution is needed in implanting these values, particularly in the third world, for there is a risk that the promotion of these principles might well result in an explosion of new ethnonational conflicts.
The new world has created new challenges, including increased geopolitical competition, the increased saliency of the ethnic dimension, and new tensions in "center-periphery" relations--i.e., the domination of weaker economies by stronger ones and the imposition of alien values by the latter on the former. This inevitably creates resentment, and it can brinng on responses ranging from instability to massive upheaval. The challenge is to find an appropriate counterbalance to ethnonationalism. Hope for the region lies in the pursuit of the ideal of a cultural pluralism that is to be protected and respected by the state. This would require the "de-statization" of ethnicity and the "de-ethnicization" of statehood, or, in other words, decoupling the concept of the state from that of the ethnic community and a corresponding decline of the idea that the end-goal of every ethnic community must be independent statehood. Achievement of this ideal would eliminate fears and obsessions about "divided nations"--i.e., countries (e.g., Romania, Hungary, and Russia) that have ethnically similar populations spread across international borders.
Cultural pluralism would also require a reexamination and redefinition of the term "minorities" as it is applied in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Minorities in this region differ from those in North America, which have their origins in immigration. In contrast, most Europeans ethnic communities are groups of people living in their historical territories. Also, there needs to be a shift away from traditional definitions of the term that focus upon their relatively small proportions in the population. Instead, a country's minorities should be thought of as equal communities or partner groups. No ethnic community should aim for the status of a titular nation or nationality, since this almost invariably leads to other ethnic groups being placed in an inferior position.
Overall, the participants agreed that recent experiences with ethnonational
politics have shown that there is no easy or uniform way to deal with its
perils. Success has most often resulted from a series of trade-offs and
self-restraints. The critical element is a change in political behavior,
such that high-level politicians make decisions consciously aimed at
avoiding worst-case scenarios. As one participant put it, the goal is to
breed "mental antibodies" that would prevent politicians from making
imprudent decisions. Such antibodies might create reflexes that would not
have to depend on politicians' capacity for rational decision making.
RUSSIA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
The discussion at this session focused on the military operation in Chechnya. The participants felt that it was important to determine whether the conflict there should be perceived as an isolated case or represented a more general pattern of dangers posed by ethnonationalism. The moderator of the session, Dr. Alexei Salmin, said that it was impossible to extract universally applicable lessons from the war in Chechnya. Although the operation may give many insights into Russian politics, he added, it is not a defining instance of ethnonational politics, nor does it provide a broad understanding of the nature of the Russian state.
A discussion then began about the Russian state since 1991, in an attempt to evaluate the country's progress on the road to democracy. One Russian participant argued that, unlike the case in other post-Communist countries, nationalism did not play a significant role in the dismantling of Communism in Russia. For the first time in modern history, the Russian state was now neither an imperial state, as the tsarist empire had been, nor a utopian supranational experiment like the Soviet Union. Democratic and nationalist political trends were oriented differently, and Russian nationalists found themselves on the periphery of the emerging political establishment. While many other countries were suffering from excesses of nationalism, Russia did not have it available as a rallying point, and that hampered the process of determining the new state's raison d'etre.
Several Russian participants pointed out that much had been accomplished in the state-building process in the past year, especially with the creation of the 1993 constitution, which proclaimed the "self-determination of the Russian Federation on behalf of its multiethnic population as the possessor of sovereignty and the sole source of power in the state."
However, the Russian participants acknowledged, the situation remains complicated. While centripetal trends tend to override ethnic separatism in most parts of the country, the war in Chechnya demonstrates that centrifugal forces have not been vanquished and can gain strength when national interests and priorities are not well defined.
In Chechnya, Russia began the military operation without a clear vision of the desired outcomes, either short-term or long-term, and without a comprehensive and directed strategy for achieving its goals. According to one Russian participant, politicians in Moscow failed from the outset to recognize the fact that Soviet-style federalism was not a sharing of power between the center and its territorial units, but rather a number of ethnically based entities subordinated to a totalitarian center. In the years following the collapse of the USSR, politicians pursued divergent and incompatible goals. On the one hand, the federal center tried to bargain for equal relations with all members of the federation, Russian and non-Russian alike. On the other hand, the federal government was trying to accommodate the demands of ethnic leaders for greater autonomy from the capital. There is as yet no solution to the problem of federalism in Russia.
To prevent further crises of federalism, other Russian participants noted, certain policy measures may be needed. One requirement is the elaboration of models of relations between Moscow and members of the federation. Within such a framework, special provisions could be made for particular ethnic situations, such as in Tatarstan. Additional mechanisms should be developed for collaboration with Russia's various ethnic groups. For example, associations of ethnic minorities are emerging throughout the country. These associations could become the government's partners in implementing arrangements for cultural autonomy; today, however, the legal status of such associations is not distinguished from that of any other private associations, and that does not allow them to perform such a role.
Several participants agreed that the best guarantee of Russia's non-aggressive character is the completion of state-building on secular democratic principles. The federal treaty signed by the constituent members of the Russian Federation in 1992 signified the beginning of that process. From this perspective, the events in Chechnya should be seen not as an ethnic crisis but as an effort to consolidate Russian statehood, to eliminate the last "black hole"--an illegal entry port and a place where federal laws are disregarded and meaningless. Thus, the military solution to the problem of Chechnya can be interpreted as a sign of the weakness of the Russian state rather than as an illustration of the strength of the Moscow government.
One Russian participant warned that Russia has inherited the images formerly attached to the Soviet Union, such as superpower and leader of a strategic bloc. With the reimposition of such characterizations during the fragile period of state identity-formation, there is the danger that Russia will adopt these as self-definitions. Most dangerous is the belief that strength is of primary importance, since the strong have gained the most from the collapse of the Soviet Union.
There are also several issues that will probably prompt Russia to develop a more assertive policy toward the outside world. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, some twenty-five million ethnic Russians found themselves outside of the Russian Federation. Russia may find it necessary to assist these people either in obtaining Russian citizenship, if desired, or in protecting their human rights in the countries where they live. This problem has to be resolved in bilateral negotiations with the other members of the Confederation of Independent States (CIS). Russian policy will also be affected by the implementation and enforcement of the CIS Convention on Minorities.
There is also the need for Russia to safeguard its boundaries and to gain tighter control over its natural resources. The lack of a proper immigration and customs system has led to illegal exports from Russia. For example, the smuggling of Russian nonferrous metals over the Estonian border has made the latter country one of the world's biggest exporters of such commodities, even though it neither extracts or processes these metals on its territory.
Another Russian participant made a case for the uniqueness of the Russian
experience. Russia was not a state like any other, he said, but a
geopolitical entity, a bridge between nations. It had never conquered
peoples, but it had "collected" them at their own request. Furthermore,
Russia had an inherent cohesiveness that would prevent it from
disintegration. The experience of Russia in dealing with its own
multinational nature would help it in stabilizing central and eastern
Europe.
THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA
Some Russian participants stated that perceptions die hard in Russia, and they continue to affect the decision-making process. It has taken a long time for the idea of public opinion and leadership built upon a consensus to take hold in Russia. Since the late 1980s, the democrats in Russia have tended to associate nationalist movements among minorities with democracy. The taking up of arms by people was perceived to be part of an antitotalitarian struggle for self-determination. Even the negative experiences of Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, where armed populations developed into quasi-regular armies that seized and retained external territories and expelled "ethnic aliens," did not teach Moscow democrats a lesson. They failed to reconsider this perception until the crisis in Chechnya forced them to do so.
One of the Russian participants stressed that the Russian public has made tremendous progress in acquiring Western values in recent years. Western attitudes regarding individualism, respect for private property, and acceptance of new types of occupations are spreading, demonstrating the continued growth of civil society in Russia. Nevertheless, sociologists have recently observed that democratic parties are losing their influence and that many people now believe that democratic values, such as human rights and a free press, are antagonistic to their economic interests, which they associate with a more paternalistic state. One could even argue that anti-Western and antidemocratic sentiments are on the rise. This "backlash" can be understood if one remembers that for a year or so after the abortive coup of 1991, society was euphoric about the ideas of freedom and democracy. Consequent developments, disappointments, and difficulties led to the evaporation of many expectations. Current public opinion and attitudes should be perceived as normal and expected and not as a return to xenophobia and hostility to democracy.
The East European participants expressed a fear that Russia may nevertheless adopt a hard line toward many of its problems. In response, one of the Russian participants noted that public-opinion surveys indicate that the Russian public would not support such a stance. A hard line would require that hard-liners come to power, either by direct interception or by electoral victory, and they might then use the mass media to aggravate the inferiority complexes that are present in transitional societies. Under such circumstances, ethnonationalism could be elevated to the status of a public policy.
However, such an outcome is unlikely, according to the counterargument made by another Russian participant. The threat of another coup is minor, because the operation in Chechnya proved to be a disaster for the "hawks." Also, the behavior of the top government figures at later stages of the crisis indicates that the influence of hard-liners in the Kremlin is declining. As far as elections are concerned, the democratic forces still have eleven months in which to formulate their strategy. Instead, the greatest threats come from (a) the alienation of Russian society and of the independent mass media from the government, and (b) the disagreement between the current regime and its democratic supporters over the Chechnya issue.
Yet another view was put forth by a participant who stated that the crisis in Chechnya involves not only Chechen nationalism but also Russian nationalism. The operation was closely connected with Russia's strategic geopolitical interests--i.e., its external boundaries and challenges to its integrity. There were fears that if Russia embarked on an intervention, a precedent would be set that could be repeated elsewhere. The eruption of the war in Chechnya prompted many outside observers to ask, "Who is giving orders in this young democracy?" The course of the conflict demonstrated the lack of civilian control over the military and the underdevelopment of civil society in Russia.
The war in Chechnya causes concern about the future of democracy in Russia, said one Western observer, because the decision to intervene ran counter to the logic of democratic development on several grounds. First, the intervention did not rely on any sizable public support, signifying that the government chose to pursue an unpopular line of action. Even in a divided democracy, governments normally seek support from at least one large segment of public opinion before undertaking any major political action. Second, the war has proved to be extremely costly, further aggravating economic anxieties--a precarious situation for a government facing upcoming elections. Third, the war will seriously damage Russia's foreign-policy interests in the Middle East and in the Islamic world. Similarly, the conflict will damage relations with East European countries by fortifying their attempts to get into the NATO alliance, something Russia considers to be contrary to its interests. Fourth, the war exacerbated the divisions among the democratic forces in Russia, thus reducing the chances for the maturation of democracy. The question then arises, Why was the decision made to intervene? The push appears to have come from the old guard in the Russian leadership. Whoever convinced President Yeltsin to move troops into Chechnya must have used the arguments of nationalism and patriotism. However, these leaders pressured their commander-in-chief to commit a serious error.
One important question pertaining to Chechnya, raised by a Russian participant, is the proverbial one of who benefits. The military operation in Chechnya coincided with the growth of authoritarian elements in Russian politics. It has led to the strengthening of Russia's "imperial" identity as a tool of state-building, while the needs of economic recovery pull it in the opposite direction, toward a closer rapprochement with the West. Such a tension is not in the Russian democrats' interest and is in fact, harmful to their position inside the country. The potential long-term stabilizing factor in Russia's relationship with the West, as well as with central and eastern Europe, is that Russia is run democratically. Democracy, one participant asserted, is incompatible with imperial ambitions--hence the concern over the implications of Chechnya and the ambiguity of Russia's current policies.
Another Russian participant, in an attempt to assess the impact of the crisis in Chechnya on Russia's ties with the outside world, argued that Chechnya should not be presumed to be a precedent. In contrast to Anglo-Saxon common law, where precedents set rules for the future, the events in Chechnya do not drastically change Russia's relations with her neighbors, even within the CIS. Instead, Chechnya demonstrated that Russian authorities can no longer manipulate society according to an authoritarian model, if only because the governmental institutions are too weak. An East European participant agreed that we should not overestimate the effect Chechnya has had; it is not, after all, a global conflict. However, it can be seen as a test case from which lessons have already emerged. The operation in Chechnya clearly illustrates that Russia will defend its territorial boundaries. Russia even breached the framework of European security arrangements by moving masses of troops unilaterally--i.e., without giving required warnings--in the southern flank of the zone embraced by security regulations. The international community, though critical of the operation's methods, nevertheless supported Russia's right to safeguard its territorial integrity. Thus, Russia successfully tested the limits of the reaction of both domestic and external actors to such an action.
Other participants expressed the belief that, although Russia's involvement in Chechnya may not set a precedent, Russia may nevertheless now find it much easier to intervene throughout the CIS, especially when its proclaimed purpose is to protect ethnic Russians. While Chechnya was the first case in which Russia used military force in a conflict on its own territory, it has already applied it several times in similar situations elsewhere in the former USSR--in Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan. The idea that Chechnya is a special case, as claimed by Moscow politicians and commentators, is misleading, because by such logic, any ethnic conflict or secessionist trend may be interpreted as a special case.
Yet, although the crisis in Chechnya may be protracted, it does not constitute a critical threat to the state-building process in Russia. The effect will be felt most strongly in the efforts to promote integration within the CIS and in Russia's policy of protecting co-ethnics abroad. Unfortunately, an opportunity was lost to use Chechnya as a positive model of closer interaction between Russia and its non-Slavic neighbors. Instead, it may lead to increased ethnonational tensions in other Russian republics of the North Caucasus region and to the emergence of alliances among ethnic entities against the federal center. It is notable, for instance, that Dudaev's regime has established ties with other trouble spots in the former USSR, such as Transdniester and Abkhazia, and with supporters of the ousted Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia. These ties are being developed in opposition to the governments of the respective states of the region and are therefore perceived as a threat to stability and integration. Furthermore, they may contribute to ethnonational tensions when anti-state attitudes correspond to ethnic cleavages in the area.
An East European participant pointed out that the Chechnya case was also important because it reflected the mentality of the Russian military. Its impact on Russian politics would not directly affect relations between Russia and eastern Europe, but it is still relevant because it will affect the East Europeans' perception of Russia.
Overall, the significance of the Chechnya case was far from clear, according to one Western observer. One should remember that during the transition process, Russia is departing not only from a totalitarian model but also from an empire model. Such changes do not take place automatically just by changing the name of the state from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation.
Several Russians stressed that the process of decolonization is not yet complete. The present federation embraces many ethnic areas seized by the Russian empire, areas which are at very different levels of development and which are not equally prepared for moving into a liberal, democratic, free-market society. Models of relations between the former metropolis capital and the region still need to be developed, and that will inevitably involve the legacy of "the white man's burden"--the paternalistic attitudes of yesterday's colonizers.
One Russian observed that the ultimate goal of ethnonationalism, a monoethnic state, is a counterproductive doctrine. The emergence of new states out of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the breakup of Czechoslovakia were based upon this doctrine. In none of these cases have ethnic rivalries been solved. The departure of ethnic Russians from Chechnya after Dudaev's ascent to power only aggravated the situation; Russians in Chechnya used to constitute a considerable portion of the educated stratum and of the middle class, both of which tended to moderate the conflicts among Chechen clans and other groups. Having become more homogeneous, Chechen society was left to deal with these struggles and cleavages without any experience in conflict resolution.
It was noted, incidentally, that the secession of Chechnya from Russia would not resolve the Chechen problem, because about half of all ethnic Chechens would then find themselves "abroad"--i.e., outside their ethnic homeland. In other words, the presence of Russians in Chechnya is paralleled by the Chechens outside it. This is, of course, a widespread problem throughout the former Soviet Union.
Another factor that dims the prospects of a negotiated settlement between
Moscow and Chechnya is the legacy of Soviet values, which fostered
intolerance and encouraged harsh criticism of others and self. A Russian
participant pointed out that one Chechen member of Dudaev's negotiating team
at the talks in Vladikavkaz said scornfully that he was in a "revolutionary
mood, because that's what they taught us to be for seventy years."
RUSSIA, EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE WEST
The final session of the meeting, moderated by Professor George Schopflin of the University of London, concentrated on the relations between the nations of the former Communist bloc and the nations of the West.
One of the major problems in dealing with ethnonationalism in eastern and central Europe, said a Western observer, is that the international community failed to develop appropriate intergovernmental institutions to use as a tool for the amelioration of ethnic tensions. However, the recent transformation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe into a more institutionalized organization indicates the willingness of its more than fifty member states to create an international mechanism for the mediation of conflicts, perhaps including those between ethnic groups.
The crisis in Chechnya signifies the end of the age of new statehoods. Doubts about the universal applicability of the principle of self-determination have grown as the situation in the former Yugoslavia has deteriorated, but the conflict in Chechnya may precipitate a definitive shift in the attitude of the international community toward this issue.
One of the participants argued that Germany's reserved reaction to Russian actions in Chechnya is probably explained by the subconscious remorse that German politicians feel because of their role in leading the West's hasty recognition of Croatian independence. It was that recognition that triggered the subsequent violent conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
The experience of imposing sanctions against Serbia, added another participant, teaches an important lesson: Sanctions tend to be counterproductive, because they play into the hands of the most isolationist, xenophobic, and authoritarian forces inside the country. They also worsen the economic situation in the country, undermining primarily the already weak middle class, which would otherwise exert its influence in the direction of political moderation. The Yugoslav experience has shown us the need to be cautious before we consider punitive measures for Russia's misbehavior in Chechnya.
Several Russian participants stated that it would be a mistake for Western decision-makers to unequivocally identify Russia and President Yeltsin with the policies in Chechnya. It is important to remember that in the balance between democrats and hard-liners, the former are still stronger, though their advantage is diminishing. Isolationist tendencies inside Russia would only be exacerbated by excluding Russia from Europe as "punishment" for its actions in Chechnya. Similarly, it would be unwise to allow displeasure over Chechnya to lead to a breakdown in negotiations for a loan from the International Monetary Fund. The role of the international community should be to advise, to stabilize, and to ask skeptical questions, in the hope of influencing Russian politics.
One participant observed that the readiness of the international community to welcome secessions under the banner of ethnic self-determination has vanished with the growth of a sorrowful record of wars and "ethnic cleansing." This is important for those groups that are struggling for separation from multiethnic states. Instead, they should be helped to find a way to coexist within the borders of their current states. An American observer also warned that when minority ethnic groups turn to the international community for assistance, they should not have unrealistic expectations about the scope and willingness of the West to become involved. Rather, they should rely on their own political resources and skills in negotiation with their neighbors.
While a number of East European countries have explicitly stated their desire to join NATO and Russia has voiced its opposition to the alliance's expansion eastward, both Russian and East European participants noted that there has been little direct exchange on the subject. This lack of communication is significant, especially in light of the conflict in Chechnya, which will strengthen the East Europeans' desire to join NATO.
An East European participant argued that when Russia describes itself as a great power, it should realize that it cannot occupy the same role that the USSR played in the region. At the very least, Russia does not have the economic capacity to do so. Today, most of the political means available to Russia are passive: It can block a process but cannot initiate or promote one. Nor has Russia yet developed a comprehensive concept of its interests in central and eastern Europe. This will become essential once Russia joins the Council of Europe. Russia will need to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the other "club members," who will want to know Russia's aspirations and demands.
A Russian participant defined the security dilemma Europe is now facing: If NATO does not expand, the old divide between East and West will persist, upsetting the East Europeans; yet if several East European countries join NATO, a new divide will emerge, discomfiting Russia, which will perceive NATO as a hostile alliance approaching its borders. There is a real fear in some circles in Russia of a renewed "bloc mentality" and the revival of stereotypes that would exclude Russia from Europe. If this is combined with the pauperization of Russia and the consequent rise of extremism, the outlook would be very grim.
In view of these concerns, it would be important to take a step-by-step approach to the construction of a new system of European security. The first step should allow the expansion of NATO to be counterbalanced by the political integration of Russia into Europe. Otherwise, security problems and concerns will continue to accumulate. The dialogue between Moscow and the central and East Europeans is crucial in this connection. Its absence is a source of concern to the latter because it creates the semblance of the old Warsaw Pact type of relationship.
Another participant reiterated eastern Europe's suspicion about Russian intentions in the region as the motivation for membership in NATO. Yet this alliance is gradually being transformed from a military bloc into a security organization, and in that context compromise should be sought between Russia's concerns and East European membership. Inclusion of new East European members in NATO is an inevitable and positive process, added a western observer, but it must be based on the premise of the inadmissibility of a new division in Europe.
The principal role of NATO is to provide a security umbrella for all its members, but this role should not overshadow the need for complementary arrangements that would promote the economic security that underpins political stability. It should be in the interests of all the prospective NATO members to involve the East European countries in pan-European processes. For example, Hungary, a primary candidate for membership in NATO, should institute parallel security arrangements with Romania, thus helping to bring the latter into the European system of common security.
Other concerns pertaining to the future of NATO were also voiced by a number of participants. The expansion of the alliance will involve various sets of competing and conflicting interests. In terms of security issues, it will require the unification of the weapons systems of the member countries, an issue closely linked to the arms trade. Such issues are of great interest not only to the American military industry, but also to the struggling Russian military-industrial complex. In terms of economics and trade, Russian industrialists will try to retain their traditional East European markets while eastern Europe will orient itself toward Western markets.
A participant from Bulgaria noted that the expansion of NATO provides a
historic chance to build a new, undivided Europe. However, the interests of
all parties should be taken into account. In the Balkan region, changes in
the configuration of European security priorities have led to a massive
deployment of troops and arms, yet this buildup has not been accompanied by
any security guarantees from the actors in the conflict. A dialogue on the
political future of the Balkan sub-region is essential, because any further
shift in the balance of power may precipitate large-scale conflict.
Hypothetically, for example, if Kosovo proclaimed its independence, there
would be repercussions from Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Greece.
THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE
Several East European participants stressed that there needs to be a normal dialogue between themselves and their Russian colleagues. They need to know what Russia wants and, in return, they must recognize that Russia's integration into the West is necessary in order for it to throw off feelings of isolation. Above all, they need to recognize that a strong Russia is better than a weak one.
The differences in historic backgrounds between Russia and eastern Europe complicate the process of the peaceful settlement of disputes and the identification of the interests of each country following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), affirmed one East European. These differences have interfered with the political dialogue among the former member countries of these organizations. In the case of Hungary, for example, the new leaders tended to look westward rather than retain their ties with Russia. However, these relations must be rebuilt on the new foundations of equality and a free-market economy. New meaningful forms of cooperation should be found. While eastern Europe is not inclined toward reintegration with Russia, it would be in the interest of each country to explore possible opportunities of trade and economic cooperation. To utilize these opportunities, Russia and eastern Europe should seriously try to restore a high-level political dialogue. The substantive topics of such a dialogue should include the expansion of NATO and avenues for Russia's rapprochement with Europe.
Most of the participants agreed that the meeting constituted an important step in promoting dialogue between Russia and eastern and central Europe. Frank conversations on outstanding issues would influence official discourse, since the participants will report the discussions to decision-makers in their respective countries. This means that such meetings can have a practical effect on policy-making, rather than being merely occasions for theoretical deliberations or social interaction.
It was suggested that future cooperation should be pursued on a variety of transnational problems. Potential areas include: (a) preservation of the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; (b) environmental issues; (c) strategic arms control; and (d) economic development.
As a means of follow-up to this meeting, a two-tier approach was suggested.
First, the flow of information among the involved parties should be
increased. Second, future meetings should be planned, perhaps with broadened
participation.
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
BULGARIA
Vassil Donchev, Member of Parliament, XXI Century Foundation Center for Strategic Business and Political Studies
Alexander Tomov, Member of Parliament, president, XXI Century Foundation Center for Strategic Business and Political Studies
HUNGARY
Csaba Tabajdi, State Secretary, Prime Minister's Office (Minority Affairs)
Istvan Ijgyarto, Head of Dept of Political Analysis, Government office for Hungarians Abroad
MOLDOVA
Vladimir Solinari, Member of parliament, president, Committee on human rights and national minorities
POLAND
Andrzej Potocki, Member of parliament, chair, Parliamentary caucus of the Freedom Union
ROMANIA
Ioan Mircea Pascu, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defense
Adrian Severin, Vice-Chairman, Democratic Party of Romania, member of parliament
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Khasbikar Bokov, Deputy Minister for Nationalities and Regional Policy
Igor Bunin, General Director, Center for Political Technologies
Valery Chibisenkov, Head of Department of External Relations, Ministry of Nationalities
Leokadia Drobizheva, Head of Department, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
Vladimir Kolosov, Director, Center for European Geopolitical Studies, Institute of Geography
Sergey Mndoyants, General Director, Foundation for Development of Parliamentarism in Russia
Emil Payn, Member of the Presidential Advisory Council, head of group on national relations, Analytic Center under the Presidency of the RF
Alexei Salmin, Member of the Presidential Advisory Council, director of the Russian Public Policy Center
Igor Soudarev, Senior Councellor, Department of International Problems of the Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Valery Tishkov, Director, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
Mark Urnov, Director, Analytic Center under the Presidency of the RF
SLOVAKIA
Milan Zemko, Director, Department for Domestic Affairs, office of the President
UNITED KINGDOM
George Shopflin, Department of Government, University of London
USA
Charles Gati, Senior Vice President, Interinvest, fellow, John Hopkins University - Foreign Policy Institute
Katherine Penchuk, American International Group, Country Representative in Russia
YUGOSLAVIA
Milos Macura, member, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Project on Ethnic Relations
Allen Kassof, Director
Livia Plaks, Associate Director
Boris Makarenko, Representative in Moscow
Larry Watts, Senior Consultant, Representative in Bucharest