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Introduction
This PER report concerns an international conference held in Moscow, in September 1992, on problems of ethnic relations in the Russian Federation. It would be difficult to name a more complex or dangerous problem in the catalog of post Cold War flash points than the ethnic conflicts unleashed by the breakup of the former Soviet Union. Civil wars rage in several of the newly independent former Soviet republics and have begun to embroil the Russian Federation itself.
Ethnic rivalry in the Russian Federation could well derail the already extremely fragile process of democratization, with grave implications for regional and international security. Emerging from decades of political manipulation and cultural repression, the non-Russian nationalities, large and small, understandably lay claim to compensatory treatment in an environment of political disintegration and economic catastrophe. Rising ethnic consciousness and competition collide with efforts to build a new civil society where such divisiveness could be mitigated by more complex forms of political and economic interaction. Moreover, there is no obvious or equitable way to apportion power and resources along ethnic lines even if that were a desirable goal. The interpenetration of peoples of the region is the demographic reality.
The Russian situation is only one chapter in the story of ethnic resurgence and conflict that threatens to dominate regional and world politics as the new century approaches. Examining the Russian version of this phenomenon provides an opportunity to look for clues to general patterns of group behavior that now threaten life and limb on almost every continent. For this reason PER gladly accepted the proposal of the Russian Federation State Committee on Nationalities Policy to organize a joint conference that would allow Russian officials and experts, representatives of the nationalities of the Russian Federation, and foreign specialists to exchange and compare information and perspectives. PER brought to the conference a team of leading American and east European experts on comparative ethnic issues and Russian nationalities. In all, some 80 individuals participated. Their names are listed at the end of the report.
In planning the meeting PER joined the Conflict Management Group (CMG) of Cambridge, Massachusetts, which is launching a program on conflict resolution in the Russian Federation with funding by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Since Carnegie provides core support for PER's extensive programs in eastern Europe, it is a double pleasure to acknowledge the collaboration. PER's participation in the Moscow meeting was made possible by a grant from the Star Foundation.
Larry Watts, PER Senior Consultant, prepared this synopsis of the conference. We have tried to be accurate and balanced in summarizing the proceedings, and ask the understanding of participants whose remarks may not have been fully captured within the brief compass of this document, for which PER accepts sole responsibility.
Allen H. Kassof, Director
Livia B. Plaks, Associate Director
Project on Ethnic Relations
February 1993
NATIONALITY POLICY IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
MOSCOW CONFERENCE
September 22-24, 1992
The conference dealt with present and future ethnic relations within the Russian Federation. Attending and making presentations were representatives of federal governmental institutions, officials and researchers from the republics and administrative regions of Russia, and American and eastern European participants.
The opening address was delivered by Valerian Tishkov, Director of the Institute of Ethnography at the Russian Academy of Sciences and Chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee on Nationalities Policy (GOSKOMNATS). Tishkov noted that this conference represented a new and innovative approach, for it brought together not only scientists and administrators but government officials from local, regional, and central levels who have daily responsibility for ethnic relations. Moreover, both the informality of the meeting and the intention to reconvene on a regular basis set it apart from previous efforts. Despite the uniqueness of the Russian case, noted Tishkov, many areas of the world face similar, painful problems, and comparative perspectives provided by specialists from the United States and Eastern Europe are essential.
Throughout the conference, participants debated a number of basic issues that by now are familiar in post-communist societies: whether to adopt a civic versus an ethnic orientation; whether to focus on the individual or the collective; whether to place priority on redressing past injustices against ethnic minorities or on achieving democratic transformation; whether to promote the distinctiveness and cultural renaissance of various ethnic groups within their own territories or to focus on measures to strengthen the Federation.
Underlying the first of these debates--whether to adopt a civic or an ethnic orientation--are two very different approaches with very different implications. The civic orientation emphasizes the danger of current tensions between ethnic groups and the long-term implications of socio-political instability. This approach implicitly defines two priorities for policy makers in the Russian Federation: first, the avoidance of violent and deadly conflicts, and second, the stabilization of social, political, and economic life. Both are seen as prerequisites for a successful transition to democracy. This orientation was emphasized by the Americans, the East Europeans, and a number of Russian Federation participants (primarily those connected with GOSKOMNATS and other state organizations).
The other orientation emphasizes the preservation of ethnic cultures and encompasses pleas for support in recovering traditions and aspects of culture which had been forbidden, obtaining compensation for past repressions, and gaining preferential access to economic resources and state power in the future. Those embracing this orientation generally make demands on the central state authority either for "affirmative" distribution of resources or for broadly defined rights of self determination, including independent statehood. The principal concern of this group is the improvement of their demographic, territorial, and societal status. Underlying this position is a strongly felt sense of entitlement to compensation for gross injustices, in particular the suppression of ethnic culture and forced assimilation under the former Communist regime.
All participants agreed on the inherent value of ethnic identity. David
Hamburg noted that group solidarity, the sense of "my people," played a
crucial role in sustaining peoples' hope and will to live during the darkest
periods of dictatorship. While the ethnic orientation may look to the past,
it is a powerful current force. As Daniel Matuszewski put it, the diverse
ethnic groups which make up the Russian Federation might be considered as
many precious and beautiful stones set in a great crown. The loss of even a
single stone would diminish its value. It is entirely natural, Matuszewski
stated, that the suppression of memory and heritage over the previous
seventy years has now led to the rediscovery and cultivation of ethnicity.
We must, however, consider the context in which this process is occurring,
namely the collapse of the regional political economy. There are at present
very few resources available to these long-suppressed peoples, and feelings
of resentment and abandonment are to be expected.
ETHNOS AND TERRITORY
Another central point of disagreement was the relationship of an ethnic group to a specific territory or "motherland." Many participants from republics of the Russian Federation who represented "titular" or "stock" nations (i.e. the indigenous ethnic groups) called for the concentration of their populations within the "motherland." In the Adygey Republic, for example, where over 70 percent of Adygeys were evicted during the Tsarist and Soviet periods, the titular nation now forms only 22 percent of the population. The call has been sent out to the diaspora (primarily in Turkey, Iraq, and Israel) to return, and over 130 families have done so. In this case, apparently, there were no counterclaims to the territory--an exception that proved the rule.
As Hamburg explained, there has been a tendency to wish to establish separate ethnic territorial structures at a time when it has become imperative both for Russia and for the entire world to understand the necessity to live together harmoniously. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, coupled with extraordinary advances in technology, now present us with the paradox of unparalleled opportunities and unprecedented dangers. Worldwide, there are today over 3,000 peoples but only 180 states. One and one-half billion people would have to be moved to satisfy the goal of "one ethnos, one state," which some participants in the conference were demanding. The brutality involved in such an operation would be unimaginable.
The problem, as outlined by Vojislav Stanovcic, has been exacerbated by the explosion of ethnic identity over the past three decades. Thirty years ago around the globe there were between 800 and 900 politically relevant ethnic groups, compared with today's 3,000. Once compact ethnic groups have tended to spread from their point of origin. Ethnic Russians, for instance, are now present in all neighboring states. Worldwide, this identity explosion has led to more than 600 secessionist movements. Only nine or ten states, representing one-half of one percent of the world's population, are monoethnic. The tendency in eastern Europe and the Russian Federation continues to be to try and achieve what is seen as the ideal--the monoethnic state--regardless of the violence entailed. Yugoslavia's tens of thousands dead and millions of refugees illustrate the disastrous potential of this tendency.
Galina Starovoitova, speaking of Georgia, Abkhazia, and the Northern Caucusus, explained that the situation and its complications cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of contemporary Russian history. The colonies of the Russian empire were contiguous, allowing great ethnic intermingling. Today, some 60 million people live outside the confines of their "home" republics. With the disintegration of the empire and the creation of fifteen independent states, some 25 million Russians have become involuntary "immigrants" outside the Russian Federation. Obviously, the stability of borders to which we had become accustomed after World War II, and which was enshrined in the Helsinki Acts, no longer exists. Helsinki must be rethought and the international legal status of borders must be critically reworked to afford some degree of real security.
In the meantime, however, there are all too many interested parties willing to define new borders. Their lack of prescience is exceeded only by their enthusiasm. Starovoitova suggested that three criteria should be considered as a basis for self-determination. The first is, who previously owned the territory? This criterion, which is most often cited, begs the question of how long a territory has to be held, or have been held, in order to legitimate a claim upon it. Is 600 years enough? A millennium? Does possession have to be continuous or can different periods of possession be added together? Does possession during some periods of history constitute a better claim than possession during others? Does possession during the twentieth century have priority? Do eighteenth and nineteenth century claims have priority over eighth and ninth century claims? If so, why? These are not considerations that proponents of historical claims normally address. A second criterion is current demographic reality. Although this would at first appear to be the most workable and least troublesome criterion, it runs head on into claims based on history. Finally, the expression of the "will of the entire people" through a referendum is often cited as an "incontrovertible" criterion, regardless of whether the voting majority is qualified or entitled to make such a decision. The problem of who defines this "will," moreover, is left unexamined.
The chairman of the nationality committee of the North Ossetian Republic noted that when we talk of national state structure the issue is really one of territory or, more precisely, the "traditional homeland." But this approach, he added, is simply inapplicable. How can we speak today of a "motherland?" How should we choose this elusive defining point in a nation's history when humankind has been migrating throughout history? It is this point that renders Article Six of the Russian Federation law on the rehabilitation of repressed peoples, passed in April 1991, impossible to implement even though it was conceived with the best of intentions. For example, the fatherland of Ossetia, of the Alans, once extended from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea to the River Don. Should that constitute Ossetia today? This would be absurd. Tishkov cited the territorial rehabilitation of the Chechen-Ingush. It is true that at the moment of their deportation the Ingush were located in a region of Ossetia. But twenty years earlier the area was home not to the Ingush but to the Cossacks. And if we go back even earlier in time, we will find another "indigenous" people. Seeking historical rationalizations for expropriating real estate is unacceptable and diverts us from dealing with the real problems at hand.
Tishkov noted the fundamental dilemma, alluded to earlier by Hamburg and Matuszewski, of satisfying the strong desire of various ethnic groups for justice after seventy years of cultural suppression and forced assimilation. This desire was particularly strong on behalf of the twelve ethnic groups declared criminal and deported en masse during Stalinist repressions. According to Tishkov, territory belongs to those who live there; this is the concept accepted by international law. But what of the right to justice?
The difficulties associated with the concept of traditional homelands
prompted a number of participants to recommend a moratorium on territorial
rehabilitations, all the more so since, in some cases, fictional
deportations have been invented in order to obtain property. Starovoitova
described the past and present complicating role of the militaristic
mentality in the difficult case of the Cossacks. Russian President Boris
Yeltsin had proposed the rehabilitation of the Cossacks without consulting
with the nationalities experts. In fact, the Cossacks had been an estate
rather than an ethnic group, and their proletariat had not been purged. The
current measures provided for by Yeltsin's decree make it possible for the
Cossacks to become an unmanageable military force retaining their feudal
structure. Their Atamans or chiefs are not infrequently directed by former
communist leaders, and it is significant that the order of rehabilitation
was also signed by Marshal Yazov.
DEMOGRAPHY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
A number of participants expressed concern that the focus of policy was being misdirected during the present "time of troubles." In view of increasing ethnic tensions and violence, noted Allen Kassof, notwithstanding the undeniable value of preserving cultures, the protection of human lives and fundamental individual rights must take priority in state policy. However, according to Starovoitova, current Russian state authorities are accused of chauvinism for pursuing this very priniciple.
Andrei Musatescu of Romania asserted that ethnocentric approaches to systemic problems, including those of interethnic tensions, carry with them the risk of dangerous, sectarian isolation. One cannot effectively deal with ethnic problems within a purely ethnic framework, contended Musatescu. The current task--and challenge--must be the development of civic society and a market economy. If the extremely difficult problems of such a complex transition are defined solely in ethnic terms, crises that develop may quickly escalate from the local to the national--and even to the global--level.
Mihail Ivanov of Bulgaria described just such a problem in his country. After a period of ethnic calm and rapprochement following the extension of equal rights to Bulgaria's Turkish and Roma (Gypsy) minorities, the government now fears a dangerous situation as economic conflicts take on an ethnic coloration. At present Bulgaria is in deep recession. While high unemployment is a problem for all Bulgarians, it has hit the minority ethnic groups particularly hard; 80 percent of Romanies (Gypsies) and 48 percent of Turks are unemployed, compared with 14 to 15 percent of Bulgarians nationwide. The result has been increasing crime, xenophobia, and racist manifestations, phenomena also experienced in the Russian Federation.
Speaking of his recent visit to the Caucusus (Southern and Northern Ossetia and Ingushetia), Tishkov noted that conflicts become superimposed on one another. Severe economic dislocation and social disorientation create violence, which finally leads to military intervention. Inexperienced military commanders in Southern Ossetia, for example, say that peace keeping cannot achieve its main mission--to disarm paramilitary groups and civilian fighters and to undertake peace-making procedures. They believe that force would not be necessary in the first place if bread, gas, and water were available to the local population. Factionalism among leaders is another complicating factor. In Ossetia and Ingushetia, for instance, conflict in the political leadership has exacerbated economic hardship. The ethnic situation is vulnerable to many outside and seemingly unrelated factors.
Since the allocation of resources and political participation are at the heart of social competition, this scenario of economic collapse and political instability provides fertile ground for ethnic entrepreneurs and political demagogues. Even when we know this, however, there is no easy way to resolve the tension between ethnic and civic cultures. The case of the titular nations in the Buryat Autonomous district of the Ust-Orda-Irkutsk region was characteristic, even if extreme. As the Buryat-Irkutsk participant, Nikolai Bogdanov, explained, there has been a significant absolute and relative diminution of the indigenous populations since 1917; they now constitute only 30 percent of the overall population. While they previously enjoyed a guaranteed number of important positions, those quotas have now been abolished and there is a serious danger that the indigenous populations will no longer even be represented in the republic's legislature. Moreover, assimilation or Russification is inevitable given that there is little prestige in knowing the native language and few resources available to teach or preserve it.
The rehabilitation of the titular nations and their republics, coupled with
demographic trends unfavorable to the indigenous nations, formed the Gordian
Knot of the conference. In Buryatia, 24 percent of the population is Buryat
and 48 percent is Russian. Bashkirs make up 23 percent of Bashkortorstan. In
Khakassia, the stock nation is only 11.5 percent of the population.
Astrakhan and the entire upper Volga region have experienced immigration
ever since the formation of the Soviet Union. Only a small fraction of the
Mordvin population now occupies their historic homeland between the Volga,
Kara, and Sula rivers. Given the opportunity at last to freely express their
cultural identities, these peoples are told that there now are more
important problems facing Russia. The choice between accepting the
leadership of authoritarian political demagogues and corrupt
ethno-politicians in the name of their ethnicity, or of working for the
democratic transition regardless of ethnicity has become a genuine "devil's
alternative."
Voices from within the Federation cautioned that the promises of the
demagogues are ephemeral. As the representative from North Ossetia
explained, the goal of ethnic self-realization should indeed be subordinated
to a more general goal: the creation of conditions for the fulfillment of
individual rights within the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). It is toward individual rights that efforts must
be directed. Unfortunately, the trend is to emphasize group rather
individual rights. We speak exclusively of the rights of nations,
particularly indigenous nations, forgetting that we cannot neatly divide all
people into nationalities. The first priority of GOSKOMNATS, concluded
Teimuraz Kusov, should be to establish practical means of promoting and
protecting human rights.
BLAMING AND DISCRIMINATION
As Hamburg pointed out, it was crucial that all sides rigorously avoid either blaming or competing with one another in the current situation. The goal is joint problem solving. At present one can imagine the Federation as a boat on a river where all the passengers are protesting their perceived second-class status. No one seems to notice that the boat itself is headed towards a dangerous precipice and that common disaster can be avoided only through cooperation.
As Fiona Hill observed, however, it is troubling to see how sometimes even Western social scientists blame the Russians for current ethnic conflicts. For example, when Vadim Remler of Krasnodar complained that the rights of ethnic Russians were being ignored or violated, several of the Americans considered the complaint to reflect Russian chauvinism. Hill noted, however, that the former Soviet constitution stipulated only the obligations and none of the rights of Soviet citizens and did not distinguish ethnic Russians from other nationalities. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, all discussion and attention has been focused on the rights of non-Russian ethnic groups on the territory of the Russian Federation, while less has been said of the rights of ethnic Russians. If such views are common among outsiders, it is no surprise that non-Russian ethnic groups within the Russian Federation are loathe to consider that the Russians also feel vulnerable.
This state of affairs is further complicated by the situation in those republics of the Russian Federation where the stock or titular peoples are in the minority but enjoy preferential treatment--positive discrimination--vis-a-vis the majority ethnic Russians. There is a danger that attempts to redress past injustices against one group will create new injustices for another. Moreover, movements to equalize the social, economic, and political status of all groups will be perceived--accurately or not--as discriminatory unless special attention is paid to how these adjustments are presented and implemented. Under present circumstances, this danger can be minimized only if the effort to achieve equality focuses on the rights of individuals rather than on those of ethnic collectivities.
Ethnic Russians in the titular non-Russian republics have found it difficult to accept preferential treatment for native populations. Not surprisingly, many feel disadvantaged when faced with discriminatory hiring policies in republic organizations, especially during a period of harsh economic stringencies and fierce competition for resources. Moreover, along with their diminished access to political and economic resources, ethnic Russians stand to lose social status as well. In many respects, Russians are exchanging places on the socioeconomic scale with the formerly "second-class" non-Russians. Often the only way for them to retain some semblance of equal status is to adopt the practices and, in some cases the language, of what was formerly considered the "inferior" culture. Having lived their entire lives in positions of privileged status vis-a-vis other nationalities, ethnic Russians have developed certain expectations that, given present trends, are unlikely to be met in the "non-Russian" republics.
As Nailia Malikova of GOSKOMNATS pointed out, the situation is worse for ethnic Russians than it is for non-Russians in 11 out of the 20 republics of the Federation. In the absence of stable mass political parties, regional mafias pursuing property and power are able to use nationalistic slogans to manipulate and mobilize local Russian populations toward questionable ends.
While social scientists and non-Russian ethno-politicians champion the
rights of non-Russian ethnic groups in the Russian Federation, ethnic
Russians can, with some justification, point to a diminution of their rights
and a general lack of concern for their well being. Given the current
intense economic hardship and political instability, arguments about
historic redress hold little sway with Russians who find themselves in the
Federation's various republics. The result is an insecurity and sensitivity
among ethnic Russians that one would more likely expect from an embattled
minority than an overwhelming majority. Indeed, in trying to understand the
various cross cutting sources of tension in the Russian Federation, it may
be useful to think of Russian ethno-politicians as they think of
themselves--as another embattled minority--rather than expecting them to
cheerfully make concessions and accept a culpability they do not think is
equitable. At the same time, the existence of substantial minority Russian
populations in the newly-independent former republics of the Soviet Union
lends the problem an international dimension that has been exploited by
various interested parties who have little genuine concern for ethnic or
minority rights.
FEDERALISM, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND SECESSIONISM
It was evident from the various presentations that ethnic desiderata are often pursued at the expense of everything else, including physical safety, socio-political stability, and economic progress. This single-minded pursuit comes from a deeply-felt and widely-held emotional commitment that overwhelms cost-benefit analysis and rational decision making. The less powerful the countervailing sentiment of loyalty to the overarching state (or, in this case, federation), the easier it is for ethno-politicians to manipulate the population.
Unfortunately, as Stanovcic pointed out, the disintegration of the federations of Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and Yugoslavia that we are now witnessing can largely be attributed to the brand of federalism that had been practiced under communism. This "facade federalism" was characterized by state control of all aspects of civil life that prevented the formation of civil society, as well as by a disregard for human rights that undermined the loyalty of both individual citizens and ethnic groups. Moreover, rulers were accountable to no one; there were no laws by which they were bound. Many laws existed but none limited the power of government. Instead, laws were seen as expressions of the government's will.
Pyotr Bokaev asserted that this had been precisely the experience of his republic, Kalmykia. Had all nations united on equal terms, the union could have been preserved. Unfortunately, the union came into being through force--the destruction of statehoods, the suppression of ethnic identities, and the denial of individual human rights. Although almost four hundred years ago Kalmykia voluntarily joined the territories that later formed the Soviet Union, Kalmyk leaders now consider that to have been a mistake.
The problem now, according to Bronislav Zadornovsky of GOSKOMNATS, is to find a useful and acceptable model of federalism when the very concept has been delegitimized. What is true federalism? From a strictly legal standpoint, there is only one type of federalism. After that one speaks of confederations, unitary states, and the like. In practice, however, there is no precise definition of federalism. In the political world, hybrid creations are the norm. Federalism is never the dichotomous contradiction it is often portrayed to be. The history of federalism in practice shows it to be a dynamic structure, a constant compromise between centralization and decentralization--between the conflicting aspirations of unification and separation. These compromises, which are more properly seen as processes than as final solutions, have been achieved either through agreements or constitutions. For the Russian Federation, a unique type of federalism is required because the question is not one of unifying separate states but separating a formerly unitary state. We therefore need a specific constitutional basis and new contractual forms. Unfortunately, however, we face a "Bermuda Triangle" of problems: federalism, sovereignty, and self-determination. Units of the federation wish to retain their sovereignty. But there can be no sovereignty without the right to secede. And the right of self-determination has been elevated to an absolute point: secession.
The inherently ambiguous nature of terms such as autonomy and self-determination, which can range in meaning from concessions to local self-administration to full sovereignty, has added to the prevailing uncertainty and insecurity. This ambiguity is amplified by the full range of conflicting interpretations currently in use among both central authorities and ethnic groups. Unfortunately, these terms are also regularly used without precision by authorities on ethnic relations. In addition, translation from one language to another often lends these terms unintended nuances. Thus, semantic confusion compounds an already major conceptual problem.
In the case of the Russian Federation, the term self-determination is invoked with two contradictory aims in mind: to strengthen the Federation by providing the sovereignty necessary for a true federalism, and to provide the context for leaving the Federation altogether. Valery Shamshurov, Deputy to Minister Tishkov, using the term in the former sense, spoke of its "misuse," emphasizing the right to self-government at the territorial level and the right of the individual to his or her own cultural identity, as well as the ability to actually exercise these rights. Retaining the right of "self-determination" naturally raises questions of sovereignty, but what, Shamshurov asked, will be the result? A new type of federalism or a variety of nationalisms? Though it is currently popular to assert that within the Federation only Russian ethnicity can be chauvinistic, experience here and elseerwhe has already proven otherwise.
Attila Pok cautioned that independence, autonomy, and self-determination can lead to either democracy or dictatorship. As Pok noted, there have been many references to the false federalism and the true imperialism of the former Soviet Union. But it should also be remembered that the imperial center was required to some extent to develop the same areas it exploited in order to more efficiently exploit them. In other words, the suppression of nationality did not preclude economic development. Conversely, there is no guarantee that the successful achievement of national and ethnic goals today will lead to success in economic development and other areas of public policy.
The problem of secession was the focus of much discussion, with most participants expressing pessimism about the future. As Bokaev explained, though his republic favored continuing the Russian Federation, ethnic Russians were pushing them toward advocating separate statehood because of the Russians' continued domination of non-Russian peoples. This, in turn, has led to fears, expressed by one Russian representative, that ethnic Russians living on the territory of a seceding republic would be discriminated against in their own "motherland." If the titular nation comprises only six to twelve percent of the population in a republic, and the remaining population is mostly Russian, what principle is served by secession? Under such conditions, it is unlikely that secession would be entertained even in principle. The Russian representative criticized as fundamentally flawed the practice of automatically equating unification with genocide, or nationalism with humanitarianism. What is needed instead, he argued, is a means of ensuring that all ethnic groups are protected with equal vigor throughout the Federation.
While Rasma Karklins agreed that secession--and the extent to which it should be allowed--is a thorny issue, she maintained that it was extremely important to retain the possibility symbolically since it appears that the only way to avoid secession is to accept it. At the same time, however, every effort must be made to promote accommodation. The long-term goal of instilling democratic values and political culture can be supplemented with practical measures such as establishing a veto for minority groups to reassure them that no initiatives detrimental to their legitimate interests will be adopted. Such a model, supported by several other participants, would have to be carefully crafted since the opportunities for abuse would be many. There will inevitably be a lag between acceptance of secession as a principle and the ability to provide real, attractive incentives to accommodation within the Federation. The crux of the matter, of course, is to prevent this lag from becoming so great that saving the Federation becomes impossible.
Starovoitova acknowledged that the speed of events, especially after the August 1991 putsch, caught everyone off guard. For a time, the continued presence of the Slavic republics in the CIS had provided some predictability. But now it is clear that the CIS is a process rather than a structure. Today, Starovoitova noted, we are frequently confronted with trends in the former USSR that run directly counter to the integration in Western Europe. Given the disintegration of the USSR, there are reasons to fear for the continued territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. The rapidity with which these developments have overtaken us has been compounded by the woefully underdeveloped nature of international law in this area. Everyone has concentrated on the final act of the Helsinki Declaration, on the inviolability of the post-war frontiers, and on the UN Charter and International Declaration on Civil and Political Rights, especially the right of people to self-determination. Today, however, all that these provisions can guarantee us is more instability and uncertainty. As it now stands, international law provides us with the right to chaos.
It was quite evident that few were prepared for the extent to which different ethnic groups in the non-Russian republics of the Federation would push for complete territorial separation. The deputy chairman of the international relations department of the Republic of Karelia noted that the idea of Karelian separation has been building, in the hope of forming a Karel-Finnish Republic, despite the fact that three-quarters of Karelia's population is Russian, and that two-thirds of Karels and Russians view themselves as belonging to a part of Russia. Such a secession would lead to a disintegration of the Russian Federation.
Likewise, Igor Kosikov of the Institute of Ethnology of the Russian Academy of Sciences explained that a March 1992 referendum on sovereignty in Tartarstan showed 68 percent of the population to be in favor of secession. Consequently, Tatarstan has not signed the Federation Treaty and relations with Russia continue to be conducted on the basis of bilateral agreements. The Russian Parliament maintains that the Tatarstan question does not fall within the domain of international law. There has thus far been no agreement. Tatarstan is neither independent, nor is it an acknowledged member of the Federation. To date its only entrance onto the international stage has been through bilateral agreements with Russia's neighbors.
Donald Horowitz, agreeing with Starovoitova on the dismal state of international law relating to self-determination, pointed out that, where the term is taken to imply the achievement of independent mono-ethnic statehood, a process begins that has no end. Other ethnic groups residing in the area for which self-determination is being debated begin considering self-determination for themselves as well. This is especially true where the majority population of the original, larger state finds itself in a minority in the area for which independent statehood is now being sought. Such a group may have greater cause than others to fear retributional discrimination, but such fears are by no means limited to this group. Indeed, the capacity of newly independent territories to create new minorities and to discriminate against them has no obvious limit. Even if no other ethnic groups were present--a statistical improbability--established ethnic groups can and do divide to form new subgroups.
The representative from Karelia gave a striking example of this latter
process. In preparing a conference of Finnish-Ugric nations of the north, he
quickly discovered that the kin nations--the Karels, the Vepps, and the
Finns--use the term "national revival" very differently, claiming that there
are distinct Karelian, Vepp, and Finnish problems in Karelia. In short,
there is neither unity of opinion nor commonly held concepts even among
ethnic kin. In most of the republics, in fact, a significant number of other
ethnic groups are represented--over 100 in the case of the Khakas and Buryat
Republics. The head of the Astrakhan administration asked, how, when there
are multiple ethnic communities, we are supposed to address even the
relatively straightforward concept of cultural autonomy, much less the much
more treacherous issue of self-determination. Should we institute a national
language for a village? A council? What exactly is the appropriate
breakdown?
RECOMMENDATIONS
The benchmark recommendation of all participants was to increase standards of human rights. Participants agreed with Hamburg and Tishkov on the need during the present institutional breakdown to create healthy institutions for conflict resolution, and agreed with Karklins and Matuszewski on the requirement for similar institutions to manage democratic ethno-politics. Moreover, a consensus formed concerning the appropriate focus of efforts at the local level, where participants agreed that practical efforts must be concentrated. As the old American adage asserts, "all politics is local politics." The demonstration effect of successful efforts would be very great indeed if the media could be enticed to cover them with some degree of objectivity. Assistance from the media, however, was considered unlikely given its partisan tendencies, which were condemned by representatives from many of the republics both inside and outside the Federation: Astrakhan, Chechenya, Georgia, Kabardine, Kalmykia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Tuva, and Udmurtia. Regardless of whether the media can be objective, it is vital, according to Hamburg, that political administrators be so when addressing ethnic issues. While there is still a need for expertise at the top, the success or failure of policies at the local level hinges upon the neutrality and fairness of the local personnel and institutions that implement them. William Ury suggested orchestrating a system of reciprocal steps that each side could take at this level in order to build the minimal trust needed to de-escalate tensions.
The central problem, asserted Kassof, was to place human rights in a workable framework that included not only the right to self-determination but also the right of peoples to live together peacefully. The problem, said Karklins, is how to make it possible for many nations to live together in a single state. Karklins suggested that the creation of a democratic political culture--of norms and values that favor tolerance and accommodation--is critical, as many representatives from the federation republics had acknowledged. Stanovcic explained that what we have at present is an authoritarian culture, when what we need is a democratic and participatory culture. Zvi Gitelman, agreeing with Karklins and Stanovcic, stated that, unless compromise is accepted as a norm of social and political life, the most beautifully crafted democratic institutions quickly founder, as the experience of the Weimar Republic attests. However, while the basis for such a transformation of values will have to be laid now, the objective will be reached only in the long term.
Nancy Lubin questioned the immutability of ethnicity. Individuals, noted Lubin, have many identities. It is not always clear which will become most important and when. Ethnicity is not always the primary source of one's identity, and ethnic groups are not always cohesive. Gitelman agreed, suggesting that other, cross-cutting loyalties, for example patriotism or allegiance to a system, might be emphasized. Pok added that there is often a strong non-ethnic component to national identity. Even as late as the early nineteenth century, for example, Hungarians based their nationalism largely on German culture; there were other, overlapping regional identities as well, such as the "Central European" identity. Perhaps these cross cutting identities might be emphasized once again.
Stanovcic cautioned that it is very difficult to reach any compromise on issues of a group's identity such as name, religion, and language, and that these are best defined by the group itself. Horowitz agreed with Stanovcic, adding that of the three elements at the heart of the problem (symbolic interests, material interests, and political interests) the first, which provides claims to property, collective self-esteem, and confirmation of relative status, is not very tractable, at least not in the short term. Symbol-splitting (or enlargement) as suggested by the notion of redefining group identity is exceedingly difficult. The tendency of individuals and groups, as author Henri Tajfel so strikingly illustrated, is to increase relative differentiation in social status rather than to cooperate with other groups. Citing several cases in Japan and India where such symbol-splitting was eventually successful, Horowitz went on to argue that, although this might be a sound long-term strategy, it was not a particularly useful tactical recommendation.
Similarly, in terms of material interests, the redistribution of resources through such preferential policies as affirmative action could incur costs in both the short and long term that might outweigh any benefits. The hostility of the majority population that results from preferentialism was emphasized by most of the participants from the Russian Federation. There is an ongoing debate in the United States about whether preferentialism creates a long-term dependency that internalizes a sense of inferiority. Moreover, as Stanovcic noted, introducing notions of preferentialism just as elites are trying to introduce the concept of free enterprise adds confusion where clarity is sorely needed.
Stanovcic proposed that, after so many years of living under models of domination, the region needed new models of accommodation such as consociational democracy as practiced in Switzerland. Horowitz cautioned that models such as that of consociationalism are more likely the result of peaceful ethnic relations than their cause. Continuing with this theme, Kassof suggested that we keep our aims as modest as possible; it was unrealistic to expect early resolution of problems that have plagued us throughout this century. Pok related that the Hungarian experience with nationality problems had taught them to aim toward management rather than resolution. While we can provide general traffic rules, we must accept that there will always be bad drivers.
Echoing Kassof, Horowitz agreed that it was imperative to not aim too high. In a severely divided society, Horowitz said, it is futile to devote very much attention to trying to make people love and respect one another. Gitelman agreed, adding that it was wiser to settle for peaceful coexistence than to strive in vain for integration. The immediate goals should be non-violence and equality, even if communities remain separate. Over time, contacts and interaction may lead to healthier relationships, but the short run goal is to avoid violence.
Horowitz argued that one area where specific action might be taken is in the realm of political interest or, more precisely, the interest of politicians. At present, there are very large incentives for politicians to exploit ethnicity and ethnic tensions in order to achieve political gains. This is particularly so where there are very few economic resources available for redistribution. A good deal of ethnic conflict revolves around politics and politicians, and their pursuit of group advantage. We need to create incentives for accommodative behavior. It is important to realize that the manner of introducing such incentives may be as important as their substance. Often, a good idea is dismissed after a failed attempt at implementation not because the idea was unsound, but because the method of implementation was ill-conceived. Such efforts must be both coherent and persistent.
In this connection, many participants agreed that foreign expertise and
joint projects were useful ways of tapping into Western experience. Several
suggested that the West should structure aid so as not to place states and
peoples within the region in competition with one another but to provide
incentives for cooperation among peoples.
Conference Participants
Bulgaria
Mikhail Ivanov, Office of the Presidency
Hungary
Attila Pok, Institute of History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and the Europa Institute
Romania
Andre Musetescu, Department for Social-Political Structures, Government of Romania
Russian Federation
Sergei Aleksandrovich Arutiunov, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences.
Victor Nikolaievich Birin, Committee on Nationality Policy and Inter-Ethnic Relations, Karelian Republic.
Nikolai Borisovich Bogdanov, Committee on the Affairs of Native Peoples of the North, Murmansk Oblast Administration.
Engel'sina Ivanovna Bagadaeva, Head Specialist on Inter-Ethnic Relations, Ust-Ordynsky Autonomous Okrug.
Pyotr Dzorzhievich Bokaev, Department of Inter-Ethnic Relations, Council of Ministers, Kalmyk Republic.
Vladimir Barinovich Bagai-Ool, Advisor to the President of Tuva Republic on Nationality Policy and Domestic Affairs.
Viktor Mikhailovich Viktorin, Department on Nationality Policy, Astrakhan Oblast Administration
Mikhail Nikolaevich Guboglo, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
Rafail Yagofarovich Gabitov, Plenipotentiary on Questions of Inter-Ethnic Relations and Inter-Ethnic Links, Sverdlovsk Oblast Government.
Magomed Salikh-Magomedovich Gusaev, Committee on Nationality Affairs, Dagestan Republic
Anatoly Panteleevich Gabrusenko, Advisor to the Head of the Tomsk Oblast Administration on Nationality Questions.
Leokadiia Mikhailovna Drobizheva, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
Nima-Tseren Chimidovich Dobaev, Department on Inter-Ethnic Relations, Council of Ministers, Buriatia Republic
Eduard Khamidovich Dzhetuganov, Committee on Nationality Policy, Karachaev-Cherkessk Republic
Vsyacheslav Nikolaevich Egorov, Department on Inter-Ethnic Relations, Ul'ianovsk Oblast Administration.
Bronislav Bronislavovich Zadarnovsky, State Committee on Nationality Policy (GOSKOMNATS), Russian Federation
Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Igrunov, GOSKOMNATS
Arkady Stepanovich Istomin, Komi-Perm Autonomous Okrug Administration.
Ludmila Petrovna Ivanova, Head Specialist on Inter-Ethnic Questions, Council of Ministers, Udmurt Republic.
Vladimir Evgen'evich Churov, Inter-Republican Information Group, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Office of the Mayor of St. Petersburg.
Aleksandra Georgievna Ivanova, Deputy Head, Orenburg Oblast Administration
Sergei Vladimirovich Kuleshov, GOSKOMNATS
Igor Georgievich Kosikov, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
Teimuraz El'murzaevich Kusov, Committee on Nationality Affairs, Council of Ministers, North Ossetian Republic.
Aleksei Ivanovich Kazannik, Committee on Nationality Affairs, Religious and Social Groupings, Omsk Oblast Administration.
Vladimir Vladimirovich Kosygin, Advisor on Questions of Inter-Ethnic Relations to the Representative of the Russian Federation in the Koriag Autonomous Okrug.
Viktor Aleksandrovich Kremeniuk, Institute of USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences.
Nailia Ramazanovna Malikova, GOSKOMNATS
Oleg Konstantinovich Malyshev, Head Specialist on Inter-Ethnic Relations, Volgograd Oblast Administration.
Aleksandr Anatolievich Magleev, Department of Inter-Ethnic Relations, Irkutsk Oblast Administration.
Oleg Inokent'evich Osogostok, Plenipotentiary, Evenko Autonomous Okrug.
Vladimir Pavlovich Narezhnyi, Mordovian Republic
VADM Yur'evich Ovchinikov, Department on Nationality Questions, Altay Kray
Eduard Nikolaevich Ozhiganov, Sector of Analysis and Forecasting of Inter-Ethnic Relations, Supreme Soviet, Russian Federation
Nikolai Vasil'evich Pyrkin, Department on Inter-Ethnic Relations, Council of Ministers of the Chuvash Republic.
Evlogii Alekseevich Popov, Department of Nationality Questions and Culture, Council of Ministers of the Komi Republic.
Anatoly Nikolaevich Pshenichnov, Deputy Chairman, Committee on Nationality Policy and Nationality Relations, Adygei Republic.
Vadim Valer'evich Remler, Department of International Relations, Krasnodar Krai Administration
Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Susokolov, GOSKOMNATS and Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation
Stalina Vasil'evna Sergeeva, Head Specialist for Nationality Questions, Perm Oblast Administration.
Viktor Stepanovich Solov'ev, Advisor to the State Secretary of the Marii El Republic for Inter-Ethnic Questions
Dimitrii Alekseevich Sortyiakov, Head Specialist for Inter-Ethnic Relations, Government of the Republic of Altai.
Sergei Nikolaevich Semenov, Sector on Nationality Policy, Council of Ministers of the Bashkorostan Republic.
Irina Vasilievna Terent'eva, Departmant of Inter-Ethnic Relations and Links with Social-Political Groupings, Staff of the President of the Tatarstan Republic.
Galina Alekseevna Troshkina, Council of Ministers of the Khakasia Republic.
Valery Aleksandrovich Tishkov, GOSMKOMNATS and Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences.
Mara Yanovna Ustinova, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
Nikolai Gavrilovich Tsyganash, Laboratory of Analysis of Inter-Ethnic Relations, North Caucasus Scientific Center (Rostov Oblast).
Evgeny Ustinovich Chayauskas, Department of Nationality Policy, Kaliningrad Administrative Oblast.
Valentina Georgievna Chebotareva, GOSKOMNATS
Valery Sergeevich Chibisenkov, GOSKOMNATS
Valery Nikiforovich Shamshurov, GOSKOMNATS
Yuri Khapagovich Shurdumov, Standing Commission on Questions of Development of Inter-Ethnic Relations, Culture, Language, National and International Traditions, Supreme Soviet of the Kabardino-Balkarsk Republic.
Aleksandr Ivanovich Shundulidi, Kemerovosk Oblast Administration
Anatoly Nikolaevich Yamskov, Institute of Ethnography and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
Leonid Valer'evich Chikov, Inter-Regional Department for the Peoples of the North and Nationality Questions, Sakhalin Oblast Administration.
Irina Nikolaevna Prokhorova, Sector of Inter-Ethnic Relations, Saratov Oblast Administration.
Gennady Semenovich Korepanov, Committee on Nationality Affairs, Tiumen Oblast Administration.
Valentin Mikhailovich Molotkov, Council of Peoples' Deputies, Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug.
Sergei Nikolaevich Khariuchi, Yamalo-Nenetsk National Okrug Administration.
Vatanar Saidovich Yag'ia, Office of the Mayor of St. Petersburg.
United States
Graham Allison, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
David Hamburg, Carnegie Corporation of New York
Allen H. Kassof, Project on Ethnic Relations
Livia B. Plaks, Project on Ethnic Relations
William Ury, Conflict Management Group
Fiona Hill, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Zvi Gitelman, University of Michigan
Rasma Karklins, University of Illinois at Chicago.
Bruce Allyn, Conflict Management Group
Daniel C. Matuszewski, International Research and Exchanges Board
Donald Horowitz, Duke University Law School
Nancy Lubin, U.S. Institute of Peace
Larry Watts, Project on Ethnic Relations
Yugoslavia
Vojislav Stanovcic, Belgrade University
Other PER Publications
Romanian-American Symposium on Inter-Ethnic Relations in Romania
The Romanies of East-Central Europe: Illusions and Reality
Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation: Proceedings of the PER Consortium, Budapest, December 1992 (forthcoming)
Ethnic Relations and the Restructuring of Europe: American-Hungarian-Romanian Symposium, Bucharest, February 1993