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Foreword
The collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe has unleashed numerous ethnic and national conflicts. While international attention is riveted on the widespread killing and destruction in former Yugoslavia, a festering issue threatens a series of social explosions in several countries: the fate of the Roma, or Gypsies.
At the request of, and in cooperation with, the governments of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic and of the Czech and Slovak Republics as well as several European Romani organizations, the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) organized a joint meeting in Stupava, Slovakia (near Bratislava) from April 30 to May 2, 1992 under the title: The Romanies in Central and Eastern Europe: Illusions and Reality. This meeting brought together, for the first time, leaders of Romani communities in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, government officials from the region who are responsible for social and minority policies in those countries, and academic specialists on Romani life and on interethnic relations from the United States and Europe. This report summarizes the principal discussions that took place at the Stupava meeting.
It is a sign of the keen interest in this question that a meeting originally planned to involve 30 participants had to be repeatedly expanded to accommodate the number of requests to attend. Some 125 people finally participated. The list of participants at the beginning of this report perforce omits information about some individuals who did not register or who did not provide complete data about their title or affiliation.
This was no mere academic meeting. While much of the discussion drew on expert knowledge and research, there was throughout a sense of urgency, frustration and desperation. At times the discussions took on a confrontational tone. It could hardly have been otherwise. The Roma have long been the outcastes of Europe and it is sometimes forgotten that they were among the victims of the Holocaust. They were the target of efforts at enforced assimilation by the Communist authorities. All too often, these programs destroyed old patterns of culture and social structures without providing coherent alternatives, and they left poorly educated, unemployed populations living in deep poverty, segregated, despised by the majority groups, victimized by the darkest prejudices and hatreds, and lacking the group cohesiveness or leadership required to defend themselves against violence, let alone to compete for a place in the sun.
On the part of government officials, there was occasionally bewilderment about how to cope with the special needs of the Roma at a time when economies are in rapid decline, national resources are evaporating, and even the minimal needs of the general population cannot be met. There was disappointment that Roma leaders had been unable to find grounds for agreement among themselves; there was a perception that opportunities that had been offered to them had gone unrecognized or unappreciated; and there was considerable confusion about how or whether to strike a balance between integration and the preservation of group identity.
However, the contentiousness that was so often evident came to seem not so much a conflict between two clearly identifiable "sides" as a reflection of a collective inability to grapple with a set of social problems so complex and contradictory as to defy any foreseeable prospect of solution. Readers will find here striking echoes of the debates, hopes, fears, and disappointments about the position of minority groups in the United States.
Yet in the end, one could not help but be impressed by the good will of all the participants as they struggled, despite the difficulties, to take steps toward a more hopeful future. The Project on Ethnic Relations intends to continue its efforts to bring together Roma leaders and public officials in the region.
The meeting included parallel workshops as well as plenary sessions attended by all the participants. Larry Watts, an American participant who also served as PER's rapporteur, has skillfully woven together the principal themes of all these separate sessions, in part on the basis of tapes and notes provided by others. Of course some selectivity was required to produce a coherent summation, and it has not been possible to include every aspect of the discussions; we apologize to anyone whose contribution may not be adequately captured. In any case, PER, which has prepared and is distributing this report, is solely responsible for its content.
PER takes this opportunity to thank all those who participated in the meeting and the many organizations and individuals who made it possible. Cosponsors included the government, and the Office of the President, of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic; the government of the Slovak Republic; the Government of the Czech Republic; the Citizen's Initiative of the Romanies of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic; the Institute of Ethnology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences; the International Romani Union; the Minority Rights Group of Slovakia; the Marai Foundation; and the Milan Simecka Foundation. Local arrangements were made by the European Cultural Roundation. PER's work is made possible by grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Starr Foundation.
Allen H. Kassof, Director
Livia B. Plaks, Associate Director
Project on Ethnic Relations
September 1992
A note on terminology: Faced with great inconsistency at the conference about the name used for the ethnic group that was the subject of the meeting , we sought the advice of linguistic specialists. (The English term Gypsy and the several European variants of Tsigan are considered by many to be pejorative.) At their suggestion, this report uses the term Rom to refer to a member of the group; Roma to refer to a plurality of members and to the group as a whole, and also as an adjective to modify group members ("Roma participants," "Roma children"); and Romani as an adjective to describe the group's language and culture. These terms are sometimes confused with Romania, the country, or Romanian, because of the similarities in spelling and the fact that Romania has a significant minority of ethnic Roma; in fact there is no connection.
Other conference materials: A group of Roma leaders met separately between
sessions of the Stupava conference and issued a document, "....." in the
name of the International Romani Union. Copies are included in the initial
distribution of this report. Additional copies can be obtained through the
International Romani Union.
Illusions and Reality
After welcoming remarks by Klara Orgovanova, Martin Porubiak opened the conference. He took note of the conference subtitle, "Illusions and Reality," and remarked that distinguishing between the two was a worthwhile goal. Today, after the euphoria of post-Communist Europe has begun to fade, hard realities must be faced in a region suffering from the consequences of a prolonged "rule of lies." Apprehensions lead to a search for enemies: people who are both near at hand and "different." The legacy of the former "social engineers" is falling most heavily the Roma population. In expressing American solidarity with beleaguered Berlin during the Cold War John F. Kennedy said, "Ich bin ein Berliner." Today, everyone at this conference, including the representatives of the federal government and the Czech and Slovak governments, is saying, "Wir sind alles Roma."
Rajko Djuric stressed what was to become a recurrent proposition at the conference. The gaps between illusions and reality, theory and practice, plans and implementation, national legislation and local enforcement, create mistrust and alienation on all sides. Governmental authorities who fashion laws and provisions concerning minority rights often view Roma criticisms of their actions as ingratitude and bad faith. On the other hand On the other hand, the Roma community, which is often unaware of these provisions because of inadequate publicity, perceives the central authorities as uncaring or even abusive when, as is commonly the case, the provisions are not implemented at the local level.
Allen Kassof pointed out that the United States can offer no ready solutions to the problems of European ethnic conflict. Americans have had only partial success with their own efforts to deal with racial and ethnic conflicts, as the race riots that had just erupted in Los Angeles so vividly attested. What Americans can offer is decades of experience in grappling with these problems, a tradition of public discourse and objective research, and a neutral stance towards particular ethnic problems of eastern Europe. Ethnic strife threatens the entire region and constitutes the single greatest obstacle to the development of democracy. The concern of the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) is reflected in the wide array of its initiatives in the region, including this meeting on the Roma. There are two major reasons for singling out the Roma for urgent attention. First, there is an immediate and practical need: outbreaks of often deadly violence directed against the Roma because of their status as an underprivileged and disadvantaged minority. Second, the Roma constitute a test case for the new Europe, where a sophisticated internationalism exists side by side with dangerous tribalisms. How will post-Communist societies deal with their minorities?. It is tragic that, a half century after World War II, ethnic warfare is again common in Europe. Surely we must not surrender to its inevitability.
As the conference progressed, it became apparent that three issues were of
most concern to the Roma: human and civil rights, minority rights, and
community development and political organization. As Peter Skerry noted,
there were in reality two parallel and related conferences going on: one
dealing with issues and problems of social policy, the other dealing with
the Roma's efforts at political organization. While issues of social policy
can be discussed separately from those of political organization and, in
some cases, initially should be treated separately so as not to lose
valuable time or allow the current situation to worsen, the long-term
success of remedial social policies will depend on successful political
organization among the Roma.
Basic Rights and Ethnic Violence
Within Central and Southeastern Europe the ethnic rights debate ranges from minimal claims which can be accommodated within universally-accepted individual rights guarantees, such as freedom of cultural expression, to collective rights demands which at their extreme advocate versions of ethnic apartheid. What rights are granted within this range is a political issue, subject to the negotiation of the respective parties within the broad boundaries of international laws and agreements.
Many of the conference participants maintained that the most immediate concern of the Roma in Europe is a guarantee of basic civil rights, particularly protection of life and limb. As Ian Hancock pointed out, this is especially important to a people who, for centuries in certain European countries, have been subjected to capital punishment merely being Roma and who, moreover, were among the main victims of the Holocaust.
Numerous participants stressed the significance of ethnically-motivated violence during the post-Communist transition in Central and Southeastern Europe. The violence directed against the Roma in all the former socialist states is pervasive. Since the beginning of 1990, Roma have suffered more than 45 attacks, resulting in the deaths of twenty Roma and the destruction of over four hundred Romani dwellings. The violence has been especially well documented in the former Czech and Slovak lands and in Romania and Hungary, but it has also taken place in Poland, Bulgaria, and former Yugoslavia.
Although, from the perspective of the Roma, the important aspect of anti-Roma violence is grounded in deep-rooted prejudice and racism, it became clear during the course of the conference that there are demographic variations in the specific nature of the violence and the rationalizations and justifications behind it. As Emil Scuka recounted, in the urban setting of Hradec Kralova in the Czech Republic on September 12, 1991, fascist skinheads claiming a desire to "protect racial purity" attacked a Romani club, beating its members and killing a Rom. In Romania, however, as Nicolae Gheorghe pointed out, violence against the Roma was generally a rural phenomenon, usually consisting of assaults on local Roma inhabitants after some real or imagined precipitating event. In Bolentina, on April 6-7, 1991, after a Rom allegedly raped a village woman, the villagers drove 137 Roma families from their homes--the entire Roma population of the village--and burned the homes of 26 Roma to the ground as "retaliation.".
Unfortunately, governmental responses have been markedly ineffectual when they have been made at all. In the case of the attacks by the skinheads, as several participants noted, although there was little or no ambiguity concerning the identity of the attackers or the ethnic nature of the targets, only one of about thirty persons was prosecuted on charges of racism and propagation of fascism. There has been a marked reticence on the part of state and municipal authorities to recognize the ethnic nature of the violence and a corresponding tendency to underplay any fascistic and racist incidents. For instance, a member of the law faculty at Comenius University in Bratislava asserted that it took him six months to have an article on such attacks published. Even then he was told he ought not talk openly about such matters and that other factors such as the attacker's identity were more important than who was being attacked.
Likewise, according to Aladar Horvath, the skinheads have had the help of the police on the streets of Hungary, and the justice system there has made no public comment on demonstrations against the Roma. Manouch Romanov described how, in Bulgaria, Roma were "chased like dogs in the street," and Djuric asserted that, after he had received several death threats, his home was ransacked by state authorities and he was forced to leave Belgrade and Yugoslavia. It emerged from discussion that, aside from the pervasive and broad support for anti-Roma attacks, which was often shared by central authorities, one of the obstacles to ending such attacks is the desire of state authorities to preserve a positive and "clean" self-image, particularly in circumstances in which they perceive their state in competition for Western aid. Racist and fascist violence, even if committed by marginal groups, is seen as something best kept quiet if the state is to continue to receive necessary aid during the current transition.
The racial/ethnic nature of the violence in rural settings is neither hidden nor ideologically driven, yet local authorities are still perceived as doing little or nothing to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators. Gheorghe expressed the general frustration of the Roma. He acknowledged that investigations into mob incidents are difficult and time-consuming and that authorities in Romania, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics are trying, but the Roma are looking for some sign of good faith, some evidence that the governments are serious about putting into practice the constitutional provisions recognizing and guaranteeing basic human rights. While Roma who are charged with crimes are quickly apprehended, crimes against Roma appear to be investigated in an extremely leisurely manner, and often no suspects are apprehended at all. What accounts for this variation in the speed and effectiveness of the justice system? When pressed by Roma leaders, the local authorities in the Bolentina case suggested that the Roma themselves did not want to pursue the prosecution too vigorously because so many villagers were involved that it was likely to create more animosity and result in more attacks against the Roma.
Various participants pointed out that local police and justice authorities, when they do not lack the will, often lack the capability to deal with mob violence. Where central authorities do not provide support or exert pressure for the implementation of state policies and the enforcement of laws at the local level, the local authorities are left to make their own arrangements, which will then depend on the resources available to them and their personal proclivities. Such arrangements often ignore centrally mandated policies and laws and violate basic human and civil rights of local minorities. This phenomenon is as evident in rural Romania, Hungary, and Poland today as it was in the southeastern United States during the 1950s. The failure of central authorities to publicly and persistently condemn ethnic violence sends ambiguous messages to a population already saturated with negative images of the Roma.
It was clear from both Roma and governmental participants that centuries of negative images play a tremendous role in the current violence. Viktor Sekyt noted that in the past, Roma in Bohemia were considered a "pathological group," and under the pretext of suppressing Romani crime, the state suppressed the Roma's rights as well. Dushan Ondersek added that this situation is common throughout central and southeastern European societies. In a recent pollXXX 81 per cent of the population stated that they were against having a Rom as a relative, 62 per cent were against having a Rom as neighbor, and 19 per cent were against having Romani as work colleagues. Communist regimes, according to Ondersek, created a false sense of security, which has now given way to a sense of social insecurity. A combination of ethnocentrism, parochialism, and barriers to the diffusion of information leads to the use of minority populations and especially Roma as scapegoats for this insecurity.
Vojislav Stanovcic suggested three other factors behind current anti-Roma violence. First, in the whole of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, authoritarian political views were prevalent. In Yugoslavia, for example, more than three-quarters of the population expressed extremely authoritarian attitudes in a recent poll. Second, the new oppositions are often not so much democratic as anti-Communist and nationalist. Finally, during Communist rule nationalism was a strong opposing force. The collapse of Communism made it possible for nationalism to become stronger than ever.
Donald Horowitz noted that the negative image of the Roma was similar to the stereotyping of subordinate ethnic groups in hierarchical societies formed through slavery and conquest. This was the case, for example, with the Burakaman of Japan, blacks in the United States, and the low castes of Indian and African societies. The Japanese Burakaman, for instance, were characterized as dirty, lazy, sexually promiscuous, and akin to four-legged beasts. But such images can be changed. Policies of equality and the education and creation of elites among the subordinated groups have proven particularly effective in undermining such ethnic stratification.
Horowitz went on to say that ethnic violence displays several common ingredients and follows a general timetable, which can be interrupted. First, justifications for the killing and destruction are made both before and after the fact. Second, official and unofficial condoning results in the deliberate or inadvertent "miscuing" of the population. Finally, immunity from punishment or retaliation is conferred, either de jure or de facto, and the consequent absence of fear facilitates further incidents of ethnic violence.
The attitudes of elites, especially at the local level, are critically important in that they can either remove or provide these essential ingredients. Clear signs of elite disapproval tend to significantly inhibit violence as do police neutrality and a determination to enforce applicable laws at the local level. Conversely, police bias and indifference are universally present in instances of attacks on ethnic groups.
The sequences of events in ethnic riots is fairly regular. They begin amidst a decline in multiethnic political participation and severe fluctuations in domestic policy, which create general uncertainty. The mass violence is preceded by rumors of prior aggression on the part of the target group, which have the function of justifying the forthcoming "counter"-violence as self defense. (These rumors often project certain atrocities on to the target group that the attacking group intends to inflict on it in "retaliation.") Following the incidents of ethnic violence, three recurrent types of events often all but ensure that such incidents will be repeated: exceedingly slow investigations, nonapprehension of suspects, and insignificant punishments.
Kassof observed that, only two years after the revolutions, it is hardly surprising that disorganization characterizes the various governments of the region as well as the various Romani organizations. Improved organization will come in time. Meanwhile, the fact that the Roma are weakly organized can hardly be accepted as an excuse for violations of their basic civil rights, which governments have a fundamental obligation to protect. Governments in transition have both an opportunity and responsibility to establish strong laws against discrimination and to closely monitor their enforcement.
Drawing on experience in the United States, Jennifer Hochschild suggested
that there is a moment of opportunity when new people come into public
office. Horowitz added that the relatively limited amount of violence
against the Roma in among the states of central and southeastern Europe,
compared with amounts elsewhere in the world, tends to confirm the existence
of such a moment of opportunity, during which intervention may be undertaken
to avoid devastating ethnic violence. Riots are often preceded by a brief
period during which strategies are devised and forces marshalled; sometimes
small incidents of violence are staged to test the resolve of the
authorities. This would be a time for the authorities to emphasize the need
to enforce the rule of law and to protect all groups and individuals from
violence. Instead, out of a fear of "stirring up trouble" or appearing
"anti-national" to the majority population, they may down play the
problem--but this behavior may then be interpreted as a lack of resolve to
punish the instigators or even as passive approval of further violence.
The "Rootless" People
The Rom are a unique group in Europe. As Gheorghe pointed out, they are a people in diaspora who have no homeland. The Roma do not consider India, whence they began their migrations centuries ago, as a homeland; indeed, they reject the notion of a homeland altogether. This lack of a territorial base has had a profound effect on the perception of the Roma by host societies. As Helena Klimova noted, the ownership of a historical territory is closely associated with the idea of permanence and stability. A transnational group, lacking a geographical homeland or political territory, is perceived as unstable and, hence, untrustworthy. Several participants suggested that the heart of the problem is that the Roma do not fall easily within the framework of traditional national politics. Some suggested that new categories are needed.
Scuka argued that it will be difficult to resolve the problems faced by the Roma in any one state if they cannot be resolved in all of Europe. At present, their lack of a territorial base is a great vulnerability. Djuric observed that this lack prevents them from taking part in the current negotiations in Yugoslavia, even though these negotiations directly interest and affect them.
Another unique aspect of the Roma is that they have been the target of repeated attempts by state authorities throughout Europe to deny them their identity. Traditionally, the Roma were a social caste--a separate collectivity that inherited an imposed position of inferiority. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, they were subject to slavery. This status was "justified" by racial characteristics. In the twentieth century the Roma were reclassified from a social caste to a social problem, in which their identity as a cultural group was denied. Hancock pointed out that Roma were initially vulnerable to attacks on their identity because of geographical fragmentation as the original migrations followed separate routes into Europe, and this vulnerability was then exacerbated by linguistic fragmentation through natural dialectical differentiations and, most radically, by the assimilationist policies of host societies.
The first target of assimilationist policies was usually the use of a distinct language--a primary determinant of ethnicity. Concomitantly, the Roma were treated as a purely "social" population rather than an ethnic or racial one. As late as the early 1980s, Bulgaria forced all members of the Turkish and Romani ethnic groups to take Bulgarian names and use only the Bulgarian language, thus giving up their own ethnicity. Similarly, in Hungary until 1968, all minorities had to take Hungarian names and adopt the Hungarian language. After 1968, the policy was abandoned but continued in practice; the decree abolishing it was not publicized.
In Poland, according to Andrzej Mirga, the Roma were recognized as people of Gypsy origin, but the Gypsies were considered an "ethnographic category" rather than an ethnic group until 1989. After 1989, the Roma were recognized as an ethnic group but not as a nationality group, which would have entitled them to certain rights not available to ethnic groups. The greatest positive change in 1989 was the removal of the Roma from the control of the Ministry of the Interior, where the police had collected data on them, which were considered secret, to be used in implementing the policies of assimilation. Now, the Roma are the concern of the Ministry of Culture, which has adopted a much supportive role and has established a genuine dialogue with the Roma.
Milena Hubschmanova described Czechoslovakia's policy of forced assimilation after World War II. The Roma were labelled a social group with a dying ethnic identity; they were not allowed to have Romani teachers for their children, nor could their language be used in classrooms. According to a representative from the Slovak Academy of Sciences, postwar communist pseudoscience held that the Roma had no culture of their own and that their language bordered on slang; therefore, they had no right to a distinct ethnic existence. Consequently, they were prohibited from setting up folklore ensembles and clubs, from printing in the Romani language, and even from relating Romani stories over radio or television. Because state policy had for many decades refused to recognize the Roma as a self-standing ethnic subject, they were reduced to the level of a peripheral, "socially degraded" stratum of society. Acknowledgement of membership in the Romani ethnic group amounted to admission of membership in an antisocial stratum. (In Slovak, the word for a Rom, tsigan, is barely distinguishable from the word for liar and cheat, cigan.) This also had the effect of robbing the Roma of role models, since economically, intellectually, or politically successful Roma tended to disassociate themselves from their ethnic backgrounds completely rather than accept stigmatization. Tomas Haisman noted that, since 1989, the federal, Czech and Slovak governments had instituted new principles establishing the full equality of all ethnic and national minorities.
There were several reasons why the European states considered it in their interest to treat the Roma only as a social population rather than as an ethnic or racial one. First, Hancock pointed out, as a social group, the Roma themselves could be blamed for their lot, but if they were an ethnic group, the host societies would have to take some responsibility for their disadvantaged status. Second, in the welfare capitalism of Europe, the status of ethnic minority (or national minority, when the two are differentiated) often confers certain entitlements and rights which the status of social group does not. This was the reason that the German government, in March 1992, refused to sign an agreement recognizing a Roma minority in Germany, although the Roma have had a centuries-long history there.
Finally, categorizing the Roma as a social group or "problem" legitimizes intrusive state intervention to deal with the "problem." Perhaps the most radical instance of such intervention was the policy of social sterilization adopted by the Slovak government between 1980 and 1990 to curb what it called "unhealthy high fertility rates" among the Roma. Although Slovak law stipulated that sterilization was to be applied only to women 35 years or old or more who had four or more children, there were many cases of women as young as 21 and with only one child undergoing sterlization as a result of psychological and financial pressure. Roma participants at the conference demanded that such policies be halted and condemned as attempted genocide.
Another aspect of the redefinition of Romani identity was the transformation of ethnic and cultural differences into social deviance. Romani children who did not speak the host language very well were treated as mentally deficient and put into special classes within which they could advance only to the fourth grade. Young Roma thus became increasingly alienated and isolated from the host society, experiencing an enforced "social retardation" which led to withdrawal, aggression, and other forms of antisocial behavior.
While policies of forced assimilation did not achieve their stated goals, they were successful in a purely negative sense: they destroyed traditional social structures, occupational skills, and values without providing replacements. As Renata Weinerova explained, the traditional legal occupations of the Roma were peripheral activities oriented toward rural life. Moreover, the work activity was seasonal and sporadic, in accordance with the nomadic life-style of the Roma. Those trades with the highest prestige among the Roma--horse-trading, music, and smithing--were also valued by the host populations.
However, the Communist regimes put an end to the capitalist enterprise of horse-trading, while orchestras and smithing were forbidden as private businesses. With their old trades gone, the Roma were relegated to the ranks of unskilled labor. In one sense, they retained their nomadic life-style, moving from place to place and town to town, but it was not out of choice. Instead, they moved under societal pressures and were kept at the lowest level of social stratification, gradually losing the defining characteristics of an ethnic group and coming to resemble an urban proletariat. In this sense, whole settlements of Roma became "rootless." After the long years of imposed inferiority, the continued experience of color prejudice, and pervasive negative images, it should come as no surprise that many Rom have internalized the belief in their own unworthiness.
It is within this framework of beleaguered ethnicity that the Roma, as
Gheorghe explained, are undergoing a process of ethnogenesis--from a
despised marginal community known as tsiganis to a recognized ethnic
minority known as the Roma. In view of this fact, it is not surprising that
much of the discussion was centered upon language issues and the need to
standardize the Romani language. There was general agreement that, as a
defining characteristic of ethnicity, a single unified language was an
important tool for strengthening ethnic identity and for facilitating
communication among members of the ethnic group. With very few exceptions,
both Romani-speaking and non-Romani-speaking Roma supported the efforts of
Marcel Kurtiade and others to standardize the Romani language.
Democracy and Disadvantage
Ironically, the collapse of Communism and the advent of democracy has been, in several respects, a negative development for the Roma. Societal transition fosters insecurity, especially in conditions of economic difficulty, and many search for "guilty" parties to scapegoat. In Romania and Poland, the Roma are now characterized as the group most heavily involved in black market activities and are frequently blamed for the lack of consumer goods or for high prices. Under the Communist regimes, violence against the Roma was fairly well restrained (unless it occurred at state direction.) Since the revolutions, however, both open discrimination and violent racism have been on the rise. Before, the state dictated social norms and behavior, and these norms were always defined so as to enhance the stability of the state. Now, the as yet weak state leaderships bend before popular opinion and, when popular opinion is racist, the state has done little to counter it. Gheorge, in agreement with Stanovcic and Klimova, noted that, while claiming and desiring to be democratic states, most European nations remain ethnic states and, in the midst of transition, they continue to drive towards ethnic homogeneity.
Another serious problem for the future of the Roma is that the emergence of democratic principles has in some cases actually reduced their access to advantageous treatment. Under the Communist regime, the Roma were allowed and even pressured to enter secondary school. Now, however, there is a completely different attitude. In the Czech lands and Slovakia, for instance, the Roma must compete on an equal footing with all other candidates, and the results are determined by computer. The principle of ethnic equality, and the unpleasant memory of granting rewards and exceptions to persons of the "working class," often lead governments to prohibit quotas and special treatment of groups and the treatment of an ethnic minority as socially disadvantaged.
It is true that the societies of central and southeastern Europe are moving toward democracy and a market economy, but more attention is being paid to implementing the market economy than to operationalizing equality and democracy. These societies, all with substantial disadvantaged populations of Roma and deep-rooted and long-standing prejudices against them, have not initiated any affirmative action, Headstart, or other programs of positive discrimination. It appeared from the conference discussions that there was an lack of understanding on the part of government officials concerning the realities of disadvantaged populations and what would be required to bring about equality for them. In general, these officials seemed to feel that a guarantee of something quite a bit better than the status quo before the communists took over, such as guarantees of equality and the provision of certain resources on par with that available to other ethnic groups, were enough and should satisfy the Roma. This was evident from such questions as why, after the government has provided assistance, the Roma were not taking advantage of it. "The government has built the road but now the Roma must walk it themselves."
Roma leaders replied that, while they did not expect governments to do everything for them, they still required their aid. As Scuka explained, the establishment of the necessary juridical framework in Czechoslovakia, especially the declaration on human rights that recognized the Roma as a nationality group, was an important achievement and deserves the thanks of the Roma; nevertheless the Roma are now like children who are still unable to walk on their own. As Hancock put it, the Roma have not yet escaped the "cycle of despair." The needs are to instill belief in self, to teach new skills, and to provide opportunities. As Hochschild explained, there are two strategies for dealing with such "estranged poor." The first is to enable them to enter mainstream society, and the second is to provide a satisfying alternative. In the first strategy, the teaching of skills must be accompanied by a restoration of faith if it is to be effective. Unfortunately, such programs require a lot of money and long period of time.
It was evident that this topic had evoked considerable frustration on both sides. Governments felt that they had done their share, and that they had limited resources and many other complicated and costly problems to deal with. Within the Roma community, frustration arose over the gap between provisions and implementation, form and content. Some Roma participants accused the governments of bad faith. There was also great frustration among the Roma directed against themselves, especially among those from the Czech lands and Slovakia who recognized the efforts made by the government and were angry at their people's failure to benefit from them because they were not in a position to do so. At times, the discussion of how to remedy this situation was hampered by mutual recriminations.
An additional source of frustration for the Roma participants was their perception of a patronizing attitude among government officials. On the other hand, many government representatives cited their unhappy experiences during the past two years in dealing with numerous Roma organizations which were often at odds with one another. There was a clear feeling on the part of government representatives that the Roma first needed to speak with a unified voice within their own countries before they could be taken seriously. This stance was opposed by Roma leaders, who pointed out that their people were still in a period of experimentation in political organization and, while some leaders are self appointed, after one or two years they will either have succeeded or discredited themselves. At this point, it was premature to demand that a single leader be designated.
Haisman, expressing the governments' point of view. said that after one year the Czechoslovak federal government had still not managed to gather all of the Roma organizations at the negotiating table. On several occasions, the government took important decisions with the backing of many Roma organizations, only to be subsequently attacked by other Roma organizations. The problem lay in knowing how to identify authentic representatives. Peter Visek asked whether there was any standard policy in such cases and whether it would not be better for the state to appoint representatives. Skerry replied that, if the state is to make important decisions affecting the Roma, the Roma organizations had to articulate their own interests. Any arranged alternative is paternalistic and will be viewed as an illegitimate imposition.
In some cases, the new democratic governments have left the Roma out of the decision-making process altogether. Scuka noted that the Slovak government had accomplished more than the Bohemian and the Czechoslovak federal governments because it had involved more Roma in the process. In Bohemia, there were no Roma in the department concerned with such matters. According to Scuka, despite the availability of able Roma in Bohemia, the non-Roma, or Gadze officials said that they were "more competent." Mirga related "a beautiful example" of how such problems are dealt with in Poland. Both representatives of the Roma minority and academic experts were invited by the government to a long meeting. The Roma presented their point of view, and then the experts had their say, after which the government ministers asked the Roma to leave while the government and the experts resolved the problem.
Horvath described the evolution of Hungary's law on national minorities as an indication of the government's attitude. A Roma parliament, together with representatives of the thirteen other minorities, prepared a draft law and asked the government to start negotiations on it. These negotiations were completed in February 1992 and the results presented at Strasbourg. But the government then enacted a law completely different from the one proposed by the minorities. This law violated international law and treaties to which Hungary is a party by limiting rights of cultural autonomy and providing no guarantees of minority rights.
All Rom participants stressed that, after long experience of being treated
as the objects or victims of state policy, the only method that would gain
support and cooperation from the Roma was one of partnership. Hana
Fristenska pointed out that, although the Roma are now theoretically equal
with other minorities in Czechoslovakia, they still suffer from social
handicaps, Governmental programs will be effective only if they are coupled
with power-sharing.
Current Status and Future Policy
One of the issues raised during the conference was the quality of statistics relating to the Roma. None of the demographic statistics from any of the states in the region were deemed reliable by the Roma participants. Even where deliberate political manipulation of the numbers was not suspected, the statistics depended heavily on the organization that collected them, the purpose for which they were collected, and the methods of collection. Often, official census statistics gave figures very different from those published by local record offices. For example, the 1991 Czechoslovak census listed the Roma population at about 114,000, while the 1989 records of the urban and communal offices of public administration showed a total of 399,681. Likewise, the 1992 census in Romania listed approximately 470,000 Roma, almost twice as many as the 1977 census but still well below the number accepted by local Roma leaders, who contend the population is between 2.0 and 2.5 million. Minority groups generally have an interest in claiming the largest possible number of members, because larger numbers normally mean greater political power, whereas governmental authorities often favor lower figures for minorities, to emphasize the "national" character of the state and to deemphasize the multi ethnic nature of society.
A spirited debate arose over a presentation by Weinerova presenting preliminary data linking the economy of the Roma to that of the majority system. After acknowledging the complexity of the problem, Weinerova broke down the occupations of the Roma into legal and illegal, and skilled and unskilled. Such research inevitably has political implications. While a few of the Roma participants discouraged it, the majority, after expressing some cautions, supported it. After so many years of being scapegoated for all sorts of crimes, the Roma needed to emphasize the positive aspects of their culture, especially during the current process of ethnogenesis. Horowitz said none of the statistics are reliable; they are often distorted by exaggeration and selective interpretation. Hancock added that expectations of high criminality among the Roma are preserved in cultures in whose languages "to gyp" means "to cheat." Nevertheless, the rate of conviction rate for theft is no higher among the Roma than the national averages, while the rates of conviction rate for rape and murder are significantly lower. Still, there is an internalized image of Roma as "bad guys" which has been fostered by literature and journalism.
Hochschild remarked on the problems of what data to gather and whether to gather them. Often, the data do not come out in a way one would like. Some may decide not to gather data at all, others not to use them when they have been gathered, or to use them only in the context of other data. Still, even when data are intrinsically political, they need to be gathered. At present, effective measures to address the social problems of the Roma are hampered by a lack of information and a resistance to gathering information.
Gheorghe presented the "ego-and-id" character of such research for Roma leaders. On the one hand, as a sociologist he wanted to encourage Weinerova, but as an ethnic Rom he wanted to discourage her efforts to examine the dark side of Romani culture. However, he realized that it would be impossible to win sympathy or persuade others if such issues as Roma "deviance" were not dealt with openly. But the methodology of such work must be very rigorous. For example, in a recent poll published in Prague, it was asserted that 80 per cent of all thievery in that city was committed by Gypsies. But how were thefts counted? How was "Gypsy" defined? One of the central problems in determining the amount of deviance among the Roma is the definition of Gypsy or Rom. It is clear that there are professional thieves among the Roma, just as there are in other groups, but how many of them there are is not known.
Concerning strategies for addressing the needs of the Roma as a disadvantaged population, the Slovak minister of education advocated the education of Roma students in their mother tongue because it made learning easier and allowed children to learn more quickly. Until the Romani language is standardized, the local dialect could be used as the language of instruction if teachers are available. The Romani language should be used at the preschool level and again in the upper grades of primary school, but not in the lower grades, in order to ensure a good knowledge of both Romani and the national language. Also, as in American Headstart programs, a preschool should be introduced where children can learn to adapt to the school situation. Often, there is great pressure for children to be "like the others"; in a recent poll, only 5.6 per cent of Roma students replied that they would like to be linked with their ethnic background. Specially trained teachers of Roma children are needed who are aware of the problems that Roma children are apt to face, including high proportions of failure in the upper grades, unemployment of parents, and problems related to the source of family income. Hancock also noted the pressure on Roma children from their own parents, who may not want their children going to school past a certain age or socializing with the Gadzes and forming non-Roma romantic attachments.
Hochschild set forth an array of choices concerning the strategy of social development facing the Roma communities. These choices included both appeals to be made to central authorities and decisions to be taken regarding Roma policy goals. At the most basic level, the Roma could choose total assimilation or total separation. Total assimilation would imply the abandonment of anything like a strong Roma identity for the sake of being incorporated into the dominant society. Total separation implies complete withdrawal from the main community, including language, schools, even territory. This general choice entails a series of corollary choices. What will be the dominant language of the Roma? Will Roma children be educated in the larger society or will they maintain their own skills? Are Roma to be included into government on equal terms or according to specific negotiated arrangements? For the Roma, there is also a third alternative, representing an entirely new political possibility: trans-European nationality.
A second set of choices concerns the strategies deemed necessary to achieve the desired goals. Several participants emphasized that policy choices always bring costs, often unintended, and careful evaluation was therefore necessary to limit unwelcome side-effects. Gheorghe repeated on several occasions that it was important to keep in mind the experimental nature of policies and to continue to evaluate them. Have they been successful elsewhere? Under what circumstances? Have they been successful within the region? What have been the noneconomic costs associated with them? Are the Roma willing to pay these costs? Skerry noted that in welfare state politics there is a strong tendency to regress to one-sided arguments, Claims are made on the basis of victim status to prove legitimacy and worthiness; the claimant group refers only the positive features of its culture, denying or remaining silent about any negative aspects whatsoever. In the U.S. case, for example, sometimes only the benefits of social services are presented, ignoring the costs and trade-offs.
Gheorghe spoke to this point, stressing that all aspects should be considered in making policy choices. For example, the Roma should carefully evaluate the effects of the subsidies given in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Have they been good or bad? Have they achieved their stated aims or have they contributed to political alienation and a relationship of dependency? Have populations become more talented because of money spent on the cultural activities of the Rom? None of the answers to these questions is clear.
Hochschild noted that, while claims of victim status may be effective in getting something out of the dominant society and eliciting resources from the state through manipulation of guilt and social responsibility, there is a very real danger that the disadvantaged group may come to believe in them, to internalize victim status as an unchanging reality of life. Historically, it may be true that one has been a victim of state policies. However, insisting on victim status in order to continue to elicit state resources, after the state has made a genuine attempt to change its policies and to enlist the former victim as a partner, may reinforce a victim mentality and create a barrier to achieving the very goal for which the strategy had been adopted. Thus, policy choices require much conscious forethought.
Hochschild highlighted several other factors that could affect the success or failure of the policies chosen. First, would the Roma focus on a universal or a targeted policy? Universal social policies are designed to benefit the entire population. Since they are inclusive, they are politically palatable, but they may not benefit those who need them most. However, the universalist approach to certain demands of the Roma--for instance guarantees of basic human and civil rights--could be an effective tactic. Instead of claiming protection only for the rights of the Roma, the demand could be broadened and based on the need for implementation of the rule of law for everyone, which is generally a more persuasive argument for state intervention and public sympathy. In most cases, however, a targeted policy aimed at ethnic welfare is necessary to address the needs of the Roma as a group or of people who are disproportionately poor.
A second consideration concerns the relationship between the attitudes and behavior of the Roma and the behavior of the dominant population. It is clear that discrimination against the Roma exists and that the Roma in turn feel estranged and tend to behave in undesirable ways, thereby creating a vicious circle. This circle can be broken into, although it is probably necessary to change both official and Roma practices before there is real hope of changing attitudes.
Third, it is necessary for the Roma to begin forming political coalitions with other groups. Currently, the Roma are not considered attractive political partners, yet they are not likely to get far without political coalition-building. It is a difficult and uncomfortable step, but a necessary one. Such coalitions are likely to change from one issue-area to another.
Finally, the Roma need to think about trade-offs among goals and tactics. A common political tactic is to demand as much as possible as often as possible. This sometimes makes very good sense, but from the government perspective it is not useful. Resources are scarce, and the Roma need to establish priorities and be prepared to negotiate trade-offs so that their highest priorities can be reached as soon as possible. For example, can integration begin in the schools of the dominant population, or is it imperative that schooling be separate? Is the mother tongue to be used in primary schools only or must it be used in higher education as well? The Roma need to distinguish among demands they that must be implemented as soon as possible, demands that ca be deferred, and demands that can be abandoned altogether.
At the conclusion of the conference, several Roma and governmental participants thanked the Project on Ethnic Relations for initiating what proved to be a very fruitful gathering. Haisman noted that the conference was conceived as an initial meeting that would provide the pattern for long-term dialogue among the majority cultures of central and southeastern Europe, the minority culture of the Roma, and the culture of the United States. The American role, Haisman added, has been to try, rather successfully, to unravel some of the confusion.
Livia Plaks of PER reiterated that the Americans had not come to teach, but to help in the process of mutual learning about the complexities of the social problems left in the aftermath of socialism. An understanding of these issues, she said, also sheds light on American minority problems. All of us are asking, what is my responsibility to myself, to my group, to other groups? She remarked that it was encouraging it was to see the great reservoir of goodwill in these discussions and the willingness to listen despite profound disagreements. The American participants, she said, were deeply impressed by how forthrightly the governments, the non-governmental organizations, and the members of the Roma community have begun to address these complex issues. We all owe a debt of gratitude to the Czech and Slovak and Roma co-sponsors and organizers of the conference. It is a very encouraging sign for the future, even though it is only the beginning of a process. PER looks forward to a follow-up conference in Bucharest.
Gheorghe noted that, during the second conference, the Roma will again be
partners and not simply beneficiaries. That conference will benefit from the
discussion at this one. He added his approach underwent a change in the
course of this conference. He came seeking to have the conference
participants subscribe to an activist political statement focussing on the
plight of the Roma, which a group of Roma participants, meeting separately
between sessions of this conference, had indeed produced. But he now
acknowledged that a non-partisan report reflecting the wide variety of views
and the controversies revealed during these days would carry a good deal
more authority. Therefore, he wished to thank the sponsors not only for
their material help but for the balanced strategy that they brought to the
task.
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS (Partial List)
AUSTRALIA
Jiri Neustupny, Monash University, Melbourne
BULGARIA
Christo Kjucukov
Manouch Romanov, Roma Democratic Union
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Anina Botosova
Martin Butora, Federal Office of the Presidency
Dusan Eremias
Klara Ferlikova, Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic
Ludovit Fliegel
Hana Fristenska, Czechoslovak Federal Government
Helena Galiova
Ondrej Gina
Ladislav Goral
Tomas Haisman, Czechoslovak Federal Government
Peter Huncik, Federal Office of the Presidency
Milena Hubschmanova, Charles University Faculty of Philosophy
Helena Jacosova, Slovak Federal Government
Anna Jurova, Slovak Academy of Sciences
Helena Klimova
Jan Kompus, Roma Civic Initiative of Czechoslovakia
Milan Lescak, Slovak Academy of Sciences
Milan Lindner
Tibor Loran
Arne B. Mann, Slovak Academy of Sciences
Miroslav Mihok, Roma Civic Initiative of Czechoslovakia
Vladimir Olah, Matica Romska
Klara Orgovanova, Government of Slovakia
Pavel Pekarek, Ministry of Labour
Ruben Pellar
Martin Porubiak, Government of Slovakia
Jan Rusenko, Roma National Congress
Miroslav Rusenko, Roma National Congress
Attila Szop, Government of Slovakia
Emil Scuka, Roma Civic Initiative of Czechoslovakia
Rachel Tritt, Human Rights Watch
Renata Weinerova
Viliam Zeman, Slovak Ministry of Culture
ENGLAND
Suzanne Pattle, Minorty Rights Group
FRANCE
Clair Auzias, Institute for Children & Family
Pierre Brumberg, Modern Times
Jean Pierre Liegeois, Center for Romani Studies
GERMANY
Suljo Adzovic, RCU
Dan Brzezinski, Union Roma-Sinti Hamburg
Rajko Djuric, International Romani Union
Rudko Kawczynski, Roma National Congress
Momara Sejdovic, RCU Hamburg
HUNGARY
Janos Bathory, Office for National and Ethnic Minorities
Janos Bogdan, Roma Parliament
Aladar Horvath, Hungarian Parliament
Ferencz Kalanyos, Roma Parliament in Hungary
Judith Toth, Ministry of the Interior
ITALY
Giovanna Grenga, Center for Romani Studies
POLAND
Roman Kwiatkowski
Andrzei Mirga, Jagiellonian University
ROMANIA
Nicolae Gheorghe, International Romani Union
RUSSIA
Nadezda Georgievna Demeter, Institute for Ethnology & Anthropology
Valerij Nikiforovic Samsurov, State Committee for National Affairs
UNITED STATES
Ian Hancock, International Romani Union
Jenifer Hochschild, Princeton University
Donald Horowitz, Duke University
Allen H. Kassof, Project on Ethnic Relations
Livia B. Plaks, Project on Ethnic Relations
Peter Skerry, Center for American Politics & Public Policy
Theodore Zang, Kaplan Fund
YUGOSLAVIA
Vojislav Stanovcic, Belgrade University