Russia and Eastern Europe and Central Europe: Old Divisions and New Bridges

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RUSSIA AND EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE: OLD DIVISIONS AND NEW BRIDGES

Moscow, Russia
March 29-30, 1996

Preface

The problems of interethnic relations in Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR are inseparable from the larger tapestry of regional security issues. We certainly know from the Yugoslav and Chechen disasters, if we did not know before, that interethnic tensions, magnified by political rivalries, can escalate into hostilities that not only devastate the combatants and disrupt their neighbors but also do serious damage to intra-European interests and strain the Euro-Atlantic alliance. An approach that takes these dimensions into account is imperative for anyone trying to deal with the political dynamics and consequences of interethnic rivalries.

With this in mind, the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) has given attention both to local, on-the-ground aspects of interethnic issues and to their international dimensions. One of PER's most important efforts in the international sphere has been to bring together leading policy-makers and experts from Eastern and Central Europe with their counterparts from the Russian Federation in an effort to deepen their understanding of the role that ethnonational sentiments and perceptions play in their mutual relations and to explore practical steps that might be taken to protect the region from the self-destructive behavior that has been the hallmark of so much of the twentieth century.

There has been a remarkable lack of communication between Russia and most of her neighbors to the west since the collapse of Communism. This can be explained to some extent by the fear and resentment with which many former members of the Soviet bloc recall their involuntary association with Moscow; and, on the Russian side, by the inward-looking preoccupation with rebuilding a shattered economy and establishing a new sense of national identity following the loss of empire. Nevertheless, the failure to create regular lines of communication represents a serious loss of opportunity.

Responding to this need, PER has organized two high-level discussions in Moscow, bringing together Central and East Europeans and Russians along with American policy-makers and analysts. The first of these discussions took place in January 1995, a few weeks after the outbreak of the Russian-Chechen war. It focused on comparative experiences with ethnonational rivalries in the region and on the emerging problems of "East-East" relations and their part in East-West political and military dynamics. It is summarized in the PER report, "Ethnonationalism: Fears, Dangers, and Policies in the Post-Communist World" (1995).

The second meeting, which is reported here, took place on March 29 and 30, 1996, and was marked by an intensive debate over the implications of prospective NATO enlargement: the Russian participants against it, the Americans and Central and East Europeans in support. While this alignment is hardly news, the arguments, in an informal setting where frankness was the rule, vividly revealed the depth and nature of the national political sentiments on both sides, and demonstrated the difficulty as well as the urgency of initiating confidence-building measures. In pursuit of this aim, the participants have asked PER to create a standing working group to examine these and related questions and in due course to convene a third meeting.

We acknowledge with gratitude the indispensable contributions of our Russian partners in organizing this discussion. Alexei Salmin, president of the Russian Public Policy Center, played a key role in creating the agenda and selecting the Russian participants. His staff provided expert and efficient logistical support for the meeting. Special thanks are due to Boris Makarenko, deputy director of the Center for Political Technologies, who also serves as PER's liaison in Moscow, for his tireless efforts in connection with all aspects of the meeting and for his substantive contributions to the debate.

A list of participants is appended to the report. Many of them occupy official posts, but all attended the meeting in their individual capacities.

This report was prepared by Thomas Szayna, an American participant. In completing the report, he consulted with Boris Makarenko. The report, for which PER takes full responsibility, has not been reviewed by the participants. The final manuscript was edited by PER's senior editor, Robert A. Feldmesser.

Allen H. Kassof, President
Livia B. Plaks, Executive Director

Princeton, New Jersey
June 1996

A note on terminology

In order to ensure the participants' ability to engage in frank discussion, none of them spoke for attribution. However, making sense of the differences that emerged necessitates some form of identification of the participants in this report. For this purpose, those from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia are identified as "Central European" participants. Those from Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine are identified as "East European" participants. Russian and U.S. participants are identified as such. The division into Central and East European participants stems from the differences between them that became clear early in the discussions on a wide range of questions. Specifically, distinctions arose between former Warsaw Pact members, non-Russian CIS members, and Russia. The terminology used here in no way implies that somehow Russia is not located in the eastern part of the European continent or that Moldova somehow belongs to a different geographic sphere than Romania.

Another problem with terminology has to do with the acceptance of new members into NATO. Russian participants tended to describe the process as "NATO expansion," and a few even referred to it as "NATO proliferation." The Central Europeans were more disposed to refer to the process as their countries "joining NATO," or simply as "NATO enlargement." The differences over which term to use not only implied certain positions but even came up directly during the discussions, showing the depth of disagreement and emotional feelings about the topic. This report uses the term "NATO enlargement," since that is the term commonly used in current discussions of the process in the U.S. Usage of this term does not imply any favorable or unfavorable views toward the process.

Summary

Relations between Russia and the former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe have been limited since the fall of Communism. Weakened political ties and (by comparison with the pre-1989 era) low levels of trade and economic ties have replaced the previous extensive relations. This decline is an international dimension of the fundamental transformation processes taking place in the region. These changes also may deepen distrust and make misperceptions more likely--as, for example, in the debate over a new security structure in Europe and NATO's role in it. In order to initiate discussions between Central and East European and Russian foreign and defense policy-makers, PER has sponsored a series of conferences to provide a forum in which the issues can be discussed. One of these meetings took place in Moscow on March 29 and 30, 1996. The following points emerged as central during the discussion:

The Central Europeans and the Russians have different views of NATO and of the goal of its enlargement. The Central Europeans see their membership in the organization as a natural step on the way to full integration into European security and economic institutions, which, in itself, they perceive as a fundamental and unassailable aspiration shared by their societies. Russians, on the other hand, see such membership as primarily an anti-Russian move, seeking to isolate Russia and to keep it from participating fully in European security arrangements. They continue to believe that NATO has only partially changed its previous role as a military organization designed to counter the USSR (and, implicitly, Russia). Since, in this view, Russia has little or no chance of becoming a NATO member, Russians do not want to see NATO become a Europe-wide security institution.

Russia could accept NATO enlargement, but only with certain provisions, such as a pledge not to station foreign troops or nuclear weapons on the new members' territory, an overall Russian-NATO agreement on security, and, ideally, Central European participation only in the political, not the military, structures of NATO. Unless Russian views are taken into account, Russian reaction to NATO enlargement is likely to be a strengthening of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into a Russian-led security counterorganization and an overall climate of confrontation. The East European states are caught in the middle of the debate, unlikely to join NATO, concerned about Russian countermeasures in the CIS, and uncertain about being able to safeguard their sovereignty status.

Little agreement was found at the meeting about the increase in trade and economic relations between Central European states and Russia.

The representatives spoke at different levels, with the Central Europeans contending that the market will determine the reestablishment of the ties and governments can do little at this stage. Until a climate favorable to business appears in Russia, the Central Europeans said, the prospects for cooperation are limited. On the other hand, the Russian representatives proposed certain large-scale projects that would involve intergovernmental agreements.

Differences also emerged concerning the overall state of current relations. The Central Europeans did not feel that relations were bad, though they also felt that relations were not extensive enough. However, they pointed out that a lack of appropriate institutions at the level of the civil society made more difficult the establishment of such ties with Russia. The Russians argued that phobias and biases played a role in limiting the ties between Russia and Central Europe.

In terms of concrete suggestions for dealing with the situation, several Russian participants proposed a U.S.-led effort to examine the issues that divide Russia and Central and Eastern Europe and offer solutions. A Central European participant proposed that the whole topic of Russian relations with Central and Eastern Europe be reexamined in November 1996, following the presidential elections in Russia and the U.S. At that time, a working group could prepare recommendations for the improvement of ties.

Introduction

The ouster of Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe that began in 1989 brought to an end forty-five years of Soviet hegemony over the region. The former satellites quickly reoriented their political systems toward democracy and pluralism and their economies toward market principles. The subsequent breakup of the USSR ensured the sovereignty of these countries and the continuation of their transition processes and led to the emergence of Russia and other successor states, which also embarked upon a similar path of reform, though at varying paces.

With the collapse of the former Soviet mechanisms of control over the Central European countries--especially the Warsaw Treaty Organization, in the military realm, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), in the economic realm--ties between them and the USSR (and later with Russia) changed drastically, from highly extensive to very limited. Economic ties in particular suffered because of the disruptions associated with the transition process, currency problems, and the lack of appropriate mechanisms for trade. In Russia's push for Western investment and aid, dealing with the other countries of the "East" became distinctly unimportant. Meanwhile, the later starting point for the transition process in Russia than in Central Europe and the instability the Central Europeans saw in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union strengthened their perception of Russia as a source of instability and not worth the effort to expand relations. Mutual distrust and resentment between the Central European states and Russia also seem to have played a role in causing a reduction in the level of contacts. Many Central Europeans had long considered that the USSR was synonymous with Russia and that the recent history of Soviet domination was built on earlier historical attitudes. Many Russians, however, felt the distrust was undeserved and misplaced.

It was in the midst of this state of relations that the debate over NATO enlargement began in 1993. There were many reasons for the Central Europeans' desire to become NATO members. For one, their goal of joining the European Union (EU) showed signs of becoming an increasingly distant prospect, because of West European inability to agree as to when and under what conditions to bring in new members. Secondly, they were attracted by the change in NATO's role, from being an anti-Soviet military alliance to being a crisis-prevention and peace-enforcement mechanism that would prevent the renationalization of defense policies in Europe in a time of flux. In its new form, NATO still offered the Central European states a shield against any threats to their sovereignty while they were going through a difficult transition period. Thirdly, NATO membership would amount to a major step on the road to integration into other Western multinational institutions.

However, Russian views of NATO differed greatly. To Russia, NATO enlargement seemed designed to isolate Russia and to draw new lines of division. It seemed to exclude Russia from participating directly in the European security architecture, and it implied a continued view of Russia as an adversary. In addition, the Central Europeans' open lobbying for NATO membership drove home to many Russians the humiliation over their loss of empire and their forced adjustment to a diminished status in the world.

The limited trade and economic relations as well as the disagreements on basic security matters have continued to encumber the Central European countries' relations with Russia. Trade and economic ties have stabilized and even increased slightly, but they remain far below the levels of trade during the days of command economies. As NATO has taken steps to prepare to bring in new members, the divide between the Central European states and Russia has, if anything, grown wider on the issue of security arrangements.

Under these circumstances, the Project on Ethnic Relations decided to sponsor discussions between Central and East Europeans and Russians on the issues that divided them. The first meeting took place in Moscow on January 20 and 21, 1995, and, as befitting PER's orientation, it dealt with the dangers of ethnonationalism as a potential source of conflict and tension. Russian military action in Chechnya provided the background and a source of much controversy during those discussions. The second meeting, under the title of "Old Divisions and New Bridges," took place in Moscow on March 29 and 30, 1996. Without ignoring the security implications of ethnonationalism, this meeting also tackled the larger issues of security, including the reasons for the limited ties and the differences over NATO enlargement. This report provides an overview of the discussions during the second meeting.

Several themes emerged at this meeting. One concerned the perceptions of neighbors and the orientations of foreign policy. The issues dealt with under that heading included the principal reasons for the distancing between Russia and the Central and East European states and the role played by ethnonationalism.

Another theme revolved around the prospects for restoration of relations. What preconditions were needed to restore dialogue between Russia and the Central and East European states? What areas of consent and mutual interests still existed? A third theme, related to this, concerned the tools for rebuilding relations. Which areas of cooperation held the greatest potential for increased and mutually beneficial relations? Could increased contacts at the level of "civil society" improve the present situation?

A fourth theme dealt with NATO and the differences in views of security that divided the Central and East European states and Russia. Why were the Central European states pressing for NATO membership? Why did Russia oppose their drive for membership? What areas for compromise existed?

This report groups the discussions analytically along the lines of these themes. It does not aim to give a detailed account of the discussions, but it does try to capture all of the main points. Though some participants made lengthy remarks, no one presented papers, in line with the purpose of the meeting, which was to facilitate an honest and open exchange of views and the development of constructive solutions. Although all four of the themes kept recurring during the often free-ranging discussions, the issue of NATO enlargement and the overall security architecture in Europe emerged clearly as the primary focus of the meeting.

The Context

At the outset, a U.S. and a Russian participant attempted to set the stage for the meeting. The Russian participant described the context for the current state of Russia's relations with the Central and East European countries as consisting of four main challenges:

The integrative processes in Western Europe have now extended to include Central Europe. The issue of security integration of the region into Western institutions, through NATO enlargement, is one aspect of the overall integration process.
A parallel process of integration has begun to pick up steam in the area of the former USSR.
A pronounced shift toward left-wing governments in Central and Eastern Europe has become noticeable.
The forthcoming presidential elections in both the U.S. and Russia present a potential for change in global political dynamics.

The U.S. participant placed the meeting in the context of the overall transformation processes in the former Communist states, with their attendant failures, problems, and successes. Simultaneous integrative processes in the West provided an external but crucial background for the transformations in Central and Eastern Europe. Interethnic issues and problems linked to the security situation in Europe added a potentially explosive component to these processes. The lack, or limited extent, of political communication between Russia and the Central and East European countries is a worrisome trend, for it makes misperceptions more likely and increases insecurity. Since the 1995 PER-sponsored meeting in Moscow, some bilateral discussions, notably between Poland and Russia, have taken place, but the process of improving communication remains at an early stage.

Perceptions of Neighbors and Foreign-Policy Orientations

A fundamental question to which the participants repeatedly returned throughout the meeting dealt with the identity of the contemporary Russian state and its relationship to the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire of tsarist times. The former was an ideocratic authoritarian state, the latter a "divine empire," and under such conditions, the Russian national identity had not developed in the same manner or to the same extent as had occurred in most other European states (although Russia's neighbors and other nations nevertheless came to associate that identity with imperial or messianic strivings). It was thus not surprising that, at the time of the collapse of Communism, there was no underlying sociopolitical outlook in Russia, based on the idea of a "nation," that could have united the emerging state, as there was in many Central and East European states. Five years after the victory of democratic forces, the country continues to struggle with this problem. But should national identity be the basis for the new Russian state? Or should a civic identity and a truly federal structure form its core? And what should be Russia's role in the CIS? The answers to these questions have important consequences for the neighboring states.

Russia-USSR Differences

Several Russian participants debated the question of just how Russia differs from the USSR. One suggested that many Russians do not themselves have a clear understanding of the difference, given the presence of twenty-four million ethnic Russians outside Russia's borders and the fact that for several centuries a Moscow-based government has ruled some of the territories that are now independent states. The participant posed the problem in terms of the attempt by each of the states that have emerged from the USSR to create its own identity. In this sense, Russia has played the role of the "other" to the various post-Soviet states, providing the identification of what another successor Soviet state is not. In a similar vein, this participant felt that the Central European states looked to the West for a sense of what they hope to be and identified Russia as what they did not want to be. A Central European participant agreed that, in his country, Russia is seen as the "other." Whereas freedom is perceived as a basic value in his country, Russia stands as a symbol of the place where there is no freedom.

Another Russian participant put the difference in more functional terms. The USSR played a leadership role for a bloc of countries, but Russia has no such bloc. Still another Russian participant pursued this line of thought further by focusing on the internal difficulties in Russia stemming from the disappearance of a bloc. During the Soviet era, Soviet citizens felt protected because of the existence of the USSR and the socialist countries. Now, both are gone, with the consequence that the world seems irrational and unpredictable. In domestic politics, forty-three political parties competed in the 1995 Russian parliamentary election, instead of the single party of the Communist days. The current Russian political scene illustrates the outcome; the present Communist leader, Gennady Zyuganov, appeals to the "Soviet man," emphasizing protection and predictability, while President Boris Yeltsin appeals to the dynamic "market man." The Russian polity is deeply split, and symptoms of the split can be seen in the very names and terms used. For example, there is still a Leningrad oblast, though the city of Leningrad has been renamed St. Petersburg. This duality does not exist to such a stark extent in the Central European countries.

An East European participant agreed that the differences between the USSR and Russia were not clear, but he added that, among the three entities being considered--the Russian Empire, the USSR, and the Russian Federation--the last is by far the most acceptable to him.

A Central European discussant portrayed the main difference between Russia and the USSR as arising from the fact that the USSR forcibly imposed its system on other countries. He also questioned some of the Russian policy moves toward Central Europe. Authoritarian forces exist in all of the countries in Central Europe. Is Russia supporting them? And if the current Russian leadership is not supporting them, are there other forces in Russia that might do so? He suggested that it should be a shared goal to make sure that Russia does not see authoritarian forces in Central Europe as helpful to it. The success of democratic forces in both Russia and Central Europe is the best guarantee for democratic developments in Russian relations with Central Europe.

The discussions about the differences between the USSR and Russia led one East European participant to suggest that many of the misunderstandings between the Central European states and Russia stem from the fact that the Central European countries and the states that have emerged from the former USSR are at different stages in their transformation. Whereas the institution-building process is over in Central Europe, it is continuing in the former USSR. Thus, the problems that the Central European states are dealing with differ qualitatively from those of Russia and the other successor states to the USSR. Several Russian participants seemed to agree with that comment, one of them observing that, psychologically speaking, the Central European states and Russia do not understand each other.

Expansionist Tendencies?

Perhaps the most contentious part of the meeting occurred when a Russian participant, discussing the formation of a Russian state identity, suggested that Russia's borders were "unnatural" and the country must thus become either smaller or larger, mentioning Ukraine in the latter context. An East European participant responded that use of the term "unnatural borders" is unwise. No state in Europe has "natural" borders, and using the term only reinforces anxieties in the states near Russia about Russian intentions.

Several East European participants called attention to the aspects of Russian foreign policy that might be a continuation of strands of the Soviet policy of domination of neighbors. One East European discussant saw the main difference between Russia and the USSR as consisting of the fact that Russia has embarked on a path toward a democracy and has abandoned militarism. Nevertheless, he felt that expansionist vestiges of the Soviet era remained in Russian policy and complicated the improvement and deepening of relations between Central and East European states and Russia. To illustrate his point, he referred to the Duma's resolution in March 1996 calling for the reestablishment of the USSR and to the continued presence of Russian military units in Moldova.

Another East European participant felt that the crucial difference between Russia and the USSR lay in the role of central power. Currently, a good deal of freedom exists in regions of Russia and in the federation--much more than had existed in the USSR. Moreover, the CIS is a loose confederation of independent states rather than a Russian-led entity. Nevertheless, this participant expressed uneasiness that the limitations on central power at a variety of levels may not last. He pointed to the acceleration of the integration process within the CIS. Although this process has proceeded thus far at different tempos, depending on the country, that implicit freedom of choice in the pace of integration may be in danger.

A Central European participant alluded to what he saw as expansionist elements in Russian foreign policy by noting the negative motivation in Russia's dealings with the Central European countries. According to him, Russian policy has concentrated on the countries that seem to be first in line for NATO membership. Russian policy toward the Central European states seems to follow the line of--in his words-- "you are free to join the West but we will make sure that you will not," which he interpreted as a new elaboration on an old tendency to curtail the Central European states' sovereignty.

"Civilizational" Differences?

A Russian participant took issue with the allegations of "expansionist" aspects of Russian foreign policy by considering the evolution of Russian views on security in historical perspective. According to him, Russian security concerns formed around three fundamental challenges to the country's sovereignty: the Tatar/Mongol invasion, the German Drang nach Osten, and the Turkish expansion. Dealing with these three challenges led to their internalization as threats in the Russian consciousness. In his view, the consequent uniting of the Slavic peoples was a method of preserving Slavic civilization and led to the Russian acceptance of the historic Christian-derived mission of protecting the weak against exploitation. Although tsarist aggressiveness and Soviet expansionism certainly existed, self-defense was also a motive behind the territorial growth of the Russian Empire and the USSR.

This view of the evolution of the Russian state stresses the cultural or "civilizational" aspects. Thus, the participant commented that the Russian Empire and the USSR were truly neither nations nor empires but a Slavic civilization held together by state interests. This civilization has three components: it is Christian, it is European, and it unifies Slavic and Turkic elements. The components focus on spiritual values, formed on the basis of religion and historically shaped. In the discussant's words, Russia is a synthesis of the East and the West; it is spiritually European yet differs from the West, and it provides a bridge between the West and the "unstable Eastern spontaneity." The discussant felt that the distinctiveness of Russia also meant that the attempt to bring democracy to the country will fail. He asserted that his views are congruent with the "civilizational" approach to conflict proposed by the U.S. political scientist Samuel Huntington.

Another Russian participant agreed with the concept behind those comments but saw a need for a fundamental reconsideration of the Russian mission. According to him, the belief that underlies a new Russian mission is that the Russian people will live better not through expansion but through economic reorientation. The crucial component of such a belief is the notion of civil society, which includes economic pluralism, observance of human rights irrespective of religion, and the promotion of a state of laws.

The comments about Russia's civilizational mission brought forth responses from several participants. One Central European discussant noted the negative implications for neighboring states resulting from the search for new ideas and missions going on in Russia. In his view, the very concept of Russian "missions" is quite dangerous. Indeed, he said, such formulations would put into question the peaceful and voluntary dissolution of the USSR, for they introduced messianic overtones that harked back to a different era. He pointed out that invoking old ideas about Christian and Islamic pasts is a step backward and provokes suspicions among neighbors. The participant suggested that a discussion about contemporary Europe should proceed without using such terms or notions.

An East European participant also questioned the wisdom of using the concept of civilizational differences in the discussions, for he felt that the use of such terminology leads to self-fulfilling prophecies. In addition, he argued that the differences between Western Europe, on the one hand, and Central and Eastern Europe, on the other, tend to be exaggerated. For example, the distinction between Orthodox East and Catholic and Protestant West overlooks the basic similarities between the two types of Christianity. Similarly, freedom is valued in all of the parts of Europe. In this context, the participant questioned the Russian objections to the enlargement of Western institutions to the east by asking, "What is wrong with expanding the zone of freedom and democracy?" This comment elicited a clarification from a Russian participant that the civilizational differences were a matter not of sharp distinctions but of ranges along a continuum.

Another East European participant pointed out that a discussion in civilizational terms leads to the drawing of boundaries and dividing lines, a fact most troubling to the non-Russian successor states to the former Soviet Union. These states are in a gray zone, and the competition over that zone is becoming intense. In popular terminology, "Central Europe" seems to stop at the former Soviet border. What does this mean for the states on the western periphery of the former USSR? The participant suggested that Russia must demonstrate that it accepts the breakup of the USSR and treat the other successor states as sovereign nations. Until now, the Russian leadership has pursued farsighted policies, but will that continue? The discussant saw the accord on a Belarusian-Russian union as troublesome, for it points to the persistence of expansionist ideas in Russia. To the states that have emerged from the former USSR, this is a crucial issue.

Several Central European discussants attempted to explain the foreign-policy and security paths pursued by the Central European countries in similar "civilizational" terms. One said that the division of Central Europe from the West after World War II was completely "unnatural." Central Europeans always considered themselves to be a part of Western democratic civilization. Now, they simply want to revert back to what they consider to be the "natural" situation of integration with the Western community. In contrast, Russia seems to be searching for a new status to show what it believes to be its properly strong position in the world. This participant emphasized that the Central Europeans' effort to become reintegrated into the West is not intended as a move against Russia. Similarly, he said, the Central Europeans want Russia to search for its new status for itself and not against them. The different paths do not necessitate enmity or distance; on the contrary, Central Europeans want Russia as a partner in the economic, cultural, and political realms.

Another Central European participant felt that Russia had difficulties accepting and understanding European integration as a whole; its misunderstanding of Central Europe's integration into Western structures was only one component of a larger problem. Some issues need clarification. For example, how can Russia cooperate with an integrated Europe in which Russia is not expected to be a member?

Perceptions of the Past

Some old grievances came out in the context of divergent perceptions of the Soviet era. Whereas some Russian participants spoke of both positive and negative experiences during the Soviet era, the Central and East European participants mentioned only negative experiences. Thus, one East European discussant declared that the Moldovan people had been brought almost to the brink of extinction during the Soviet era, because they had been prevented from having ties with Romania despite the similarities between the peoples and languages of Moldova and Romania.

A Central European discussant felt that historical legacies still burdened relations between the Central European states and Russia. For example, the Soviet interventions in Central Europe during the cold war or the participation of some of the Central European countries in the German attack on the USSR in World War II continue to influence popular perceptions. Such legacies will have to be overcome in order to move beyond the present pattern of relations. The participant linked these legacies to the readiness of Central Europeans to see a threat in Russian policies. Russian behavior tends to be interpreted in the light of past Russian efforts at domination. The Duma declaration referred to above and Russia's opposition to Central Europe's membership in NATO are two examples of Russian actions that provoke old fears. Even if no one in Central Europe believes any longer in a Russian military threat, the images of expansionist and imperial Russian behavior continue to play a role.

In another instance of the same problem, a Central European participant criticized some of the seemingly expansionist themes presented openly in the Russian media. He mentioned the broadcast of a program entitled "An Army That Was Betrayed" on Russian television in March 1995. The program portrayed the Soviet and then Russian military withdrawal from the territories of the former Warsaw Pact states as akin to betrayal of the armed forces by the politicians in Russia. Moreover, it portrayed Soviet/Russian military presence in those countries as wartime gains, supported the principle of using force, and was, to say the least, demeaning to the Central Europeans. How can such programs be broadcast on Russian state television? They perpetuate some of the worst images of Russia in Central Europe.

Perceptions of the Current State of Relations

Some of the Central European participants said that relations between the Central European states and Russia were not as bad as the comments emanating from Moscow would seem to suggest. One of those participants suggested that, although some misunderstandings and misjudgments exist in these relations, two issues in particular tend to be overemphasized: NATO enlargement and the change in Central European elites. NATO enlargement is not likely to have any great negative impact on relations; and the expectation that a return of socialists to power in some Central European countries would lead to a greater pro-Russian orientation has not materialized (and it will not materialize, because of the fundamental support in these countries for the market and for integration).

The same participant also mentioned some of the similarities of purposes and goals that existed until recently in Russia's relations with the states in Central Europe. For example, there was a mutual desire in 1989 to bring down Communism. The Soviet understanding of Central Europeans' needs was good at that time, and there was a rapid transfer of power. In 1990, there was an understanding of the need to end the Warsaw Pact and withdraw Soviet troops from Central Europe, as well as to institutionalize the Helsinki process (including the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, or CFE), all of which contributed to European security and understanding. During the coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991, the Central European leaders supported Yeltsin and encouraged the West Europeans to do so, too. This common understanding carried over to the beginning of talks about NATO enlargement (as evidenced in Yeltsin's declaration in Warsaw in 1993) and the initiation of the Partnership for Peace. But then a shift took place, and there ensued a stream of tough statements from Moscow. The participant admitted being puzzled as to just where the problem was, because he felt that even now there exists residual goodwill on the Central European side (and the Central Europeans are pleased to have Russia participate in IFOR, the implementation force for the Bosnian peace agreement).

Another Central European participant also objected to implications that relations between Russia and the Central European countries were not good. He believed that the relations were good, though they are not extensive enough. The collapse in trade and economic relations resulted from the transformations in all of the post-Communist countries. As the transition bears fruit, relations would become more extensive.

Prospects for the Restoration of Relations

The kind of relations that should now be established and the steps in establishing them were issues that came up throughout the discussions. These must be relations among sovereign and equal entities, and they must be adapted to market conditions. Different perceptions of the past, fears of future dependency, and suspicions of state-sponsored initiatives impede the establishment of new, wide-ranging ties, and the uncertain political evolution in Russia further complicates the problem.

Domestic Russian Politics

A Russian participant emphasized the role of the June presidential election in Russia. He believed the consequences of the election would be crucial for ties with the Central and East European states, because such issues as NATO enlargement, the pace of CIS integration, and support for Communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe would be affected directly by the outcome. His judgment was that, if Zyuganov and the Communists won, the situation in Russia would change abruptly and the continuation of reforms would be in doubt. Russia would then be likely to become more like the USSR, and, in the context of NATO enlargement, there would be a prospect of returning to the bipolar world and a new cold war.

The Communists' denunciation of the Belovezha accords on the dissolution of the USSR, this participant continued, provided an early indication of their proclivities. The denunciation, and especially the manner in which the issue of reintegration of the USSR was approached, were telling; the resolution ignored the presidents of the former republics and asked for the opinion of "the people," in a seeming revival of the Leninist method of bypassing governments and addressing "the people" directly. The discussant also suggested that a Communist victory would probably lead to Russian support for Communist governments in the neighboring countries. Such support would provoke incidents and increase tensions, out of fear of an attempt to resurrect the USSR. Although the discussant felt that such an attempt could not possibly succeed, he thought that the attempt would be made, anyway. Zyuganov's election platform openly calls for the reestablishment of the USSR. But, the participant added, no matter who wins the elections, difficulties in relations between Russia and the Central and East European states will remain. If Yeltsin wins, relations will continue to be cool and distant; if Zyuganov wins, relations will become much worse.

Another Russian participant rejected so bleak a prognosis. Although he agreed that the elections would be crucial in determining whether the trend toward an open society would continue or would be stopped or even reversed, he did not think that a Zyuganov victory could lead to the reestablishment of a totalitarian state. The attempt might be made, and aspects of such a state actually might be set up; and if that were to happen, then autarky, isolation, a return to a closed society, and a shift in economic policies would result. But, argued this discussant, it would be an exaggeration to say that such an outcome would lead to a Russian military threat to its neighbors.

The discussion of Russian elections was conducted mainly among the Russian participants, but one Central European participant contended that the elections would not change much in Russia, regardless of the outcome. He based this view on the premise that the end of the cold war came about because of Soviet internal difficulties. Since those internal difficulties still persist and, indeed, have even increased, the specter of a new cold war seemed out of place. Another Central European participant questioned the enormous significance being attributed to Yeltsin by the Russian discussants. He said that if one person was so crucial to the continuation of the transition process in Russia, it would be a worrisome sign about the stage of democracy in Russia.

Should We Look to the Past?

Noting that the Central European states and the USSR had been intimately linked to each other for forty-five years, a Russian participant suggested that it might yet be possible to retain those parts of the relationship that were useful for all participants. A U.S. participant added that, without rejecting the natural bonds between Central Europe and Russia but bearing in mind the different perceptions of the past, it should be up to the Central Europeans to define what had been good and what had not been good in the relationship. He also argued that in order for the Central Europeans to embark on the path to rebuilding some of the old ties, they must feel secure and integrated into the Western community. The example of Polish-German relations shows that a relationship between equals liberates nations from old phobias, and the same pattern needs to be followed in Central European relations with Russia. The shadow of Soviet domination hangs over Central European relations with Russia, and only by adopting policies based on equality and respect for others' goals will the relations develop successfully. A Central European participant acknowledged the existence of a widespread desire in the Central European states to improve relations with Russia in the same way that some of these countries have improved relations with Ukraine. However, he expressed concern that this desire might not be reciprocated in Russia.

Several Central European participants questioned the logic of the idea that previous practice could offer useful lessons for the future development of relations. One Central European participant suggested that the following questions need to be asked: (1) Why have the links between Central Europe and the former USSR been severed? (2) What kind of links had existed? (3) Why do we need new links? (4) On what grounds should the new links be built? In a line of thinking that followed that of the U.S. discussant, he considered the essence of the difference between Russia and the USSR to center on their actions. Russia cannot make a positive impact on Central Europe or convince the Central Europeans that the present state is indeed different from the USSR unless the difference is translated into substantive new behavior. In other words, what kind of destiny is to be permitted for our people? The discussant went on to say that the Central Europeans have turned toward the West because the West was always an engine for the development of all of Europe. Thus, Central European businessmen are looking to the West for sources of modernization. These links had existed previously, but they were severed after World War II. Now there is a perception among the Central Europeans that an opportunity exists to go back to a "normal" situation. In this sense, looking at the past forty-five years for lessons on the development of future ties provides only false lessons.

Another Central European participant also questioned the whole idea of the "restoration" of ties and contacts between the Central European countries and Russia. As he put it, "Restoration to what?" He suggested that no one was interested in restoring the ties that existed during the Soviet period. Instead, efforts should concentrate on creating relations that were altogether new and qualitatively much better than those that had existed prior to the fall of Communism. The crucial factor in those efforts was the presence of an intention on both sides to solve problems in a mutually advantageous fashion. Such an intention seemed uncertain or missing on the Russian side--for example, in dealing with such issues between Russia and his country as a huge trade deficit, the repayment of debt, and the return of confiscated objects.

Still another Central European participant observed that the break in relations between Central Europe and Russia, especially in trade and economic affairs, took place spontaneously. He expected that the reestablishment of links would also be 90 percent spontaneous, as part of normal economic forces, and only some 10 percent would take place through state action. But more important, he said, were the problems at a deeper structural level. The current trade flows in Central Europe have a completely different direction from what they had before 1989. At present, trade flows resemble those of the days before World War II, meaning a primary orientation toward Western Europe (less than a third of their trade turnover was with countries that are now non-members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). This is not a situation that the Central Europeans want to change. Some of the Central European countries, particularly those that implemented a radical and rapid economic transition program, paid enormous social costs to change the direction of trade flows. In any event, it is market forces that determine trade flows. The Russian market is not an easy one to work with, for a variety of reasons related to the transition taking place in Russia. The Central European countries' trade with the former USSR has settled at fairly low levels when compared with the pre-1989 situation, but it is still substantial. The next task is to increase the Central European trade turnover in absolute terms, since that will mean the growth of Central European trade flows with the former USSR.

A U.S. participant agreed in general with the idea that only about 10 percent of relations can be structured from above, but he added that governments can hinder the development of economic relations. Eliminating that obstacle is a task worthy of consideration. Although another U.S. participant urged the discussants to give consideration to that 10-percent area where nonspontaneous revival of ties might take place, no concrete proposals emerged from the meeting as to how to go about it.

Another Central European participant elaborated on the difficulty of doing business with Russia. Although current economic and trade relations are weaker than he would like to see, he felt the reasons for the weakness are structural: the financing problems of Russian enterprises; the instability in Russia, which is an obstacle to long-term investment; and the effects of organized crime. These comments were supported by another Central European discussant, who suggested that the democratization and marketization processes taking place in all of the former Communist countries were beset by a basic problem of confidence-building. Just as there is not enough confidence in Western Europe regarding the marketization processes in Central Europe, so there is also not enough confidence in Central Europe in the marketization process in the former USSR.

Yet another Central European participant placed the responsibility for the drop in interaction and trade between the Central European states and the USSR and Russia on the latter. He traced the collapse in trade to the Soviet introduction of hard-currency regulations in trade with Central Europe. However, according to one Russian participant, the drop in trade and contacts between the USSR and Russia and the Central European states was more than just the collapse of CMEA and the Warsaw Pact. The end of these two organizations was simply a symptom of the larger systemic collapse, which has forced the Central and East European states and Russia to "cross the wilderness." Nevertheless, he expressed the belief that "common sense" would prevail and contacts would resume. Another Russian discussant said that the Central Europeans are motivated by "phobias" and only time could be a remedy for the present low level of contacts and the legacy of the previous era.

Another Russian participant suggested that, given the often conceptual nature of the disagreements, an objective research institution from a third country, such as the U.S. think tank RAND, prepare a study on the differences that divide the Russians and the Central Europeans and try to propose solutions. The idea was supported by another Russian participant, who suggested that the study should also include the U.S. viewpoint.

Tools for Rebuilding Relations

Just as disagreements between the Central European and Russian participants surfaced in the discussions regarding prospects for increased ties, the same problems were present in the talks about the tools to use for the improvement of ties. The differences seemed to stem from the different stages in the transition processes, with the Central Europeans arguing in favor of market-based methods and the Russians suggesting greater state efforts.

One Russian participant suggested several possibilities for cooperation between the Central European countries and Russia (and including West European participation). According to him, the most promising areas were in the field of nuclear energy and strategically important communications projects that would link the Russian Far East with the EU. However, a Central European participant questioned such proposals, for they still seemed to indicate thinking about trade and economic ties along the lines of measures directed from above. Such a mindset, he said, was inappropriate. Indeed, he added, grandiose projects planned from above are bound to fail. But the same participant suggested two other sectors where he felt a potential existed for the growth of Central European trade with Russia: raw materials and armaments. However, the problem with these areas is that they are sensitive in terms of potential strategic dependencies or for political reasons. Especially in the armaments realm, the Central European countries want to decrease their dependency on Russia (e.g., for licenses and lubricants), because they see it as a limitation on their sovereignty.

Another Central European participant observed that bilateral meetings between Russia and the Central European states devoted to discussions of security matters (as have already taken place between Russia and Poland) are useful and should be expanded. He went on to say that nongovernmental meetings should tackle highly technical matters and produce concrete results.

Yet another Central European participant noted that the limited contacts between Russia and the Central European countries is part of the broader issue of limited contacts among all of the former Communist states, even among the Central European countries themselves. According to this discussant, too often these relations are too formal and often only formal. For example, Polish relations with the Czech Republic and Slovakia are not as intensive as they are with Germany or France. He suggested that relations between similarly oriented political parties in the Central European countries and Russia should be given more attention. The Christian Democratic party in the participant's country had good ties with its counterpart in Germany (indeed, he thought, better ties than with the Socialists in his own country). The problem with establishing such ties with Russian parties is that few if any parties with outlooks similar to those of West European or Central European parties exist in Russia yet. The participant urged the other Central European participants to pay more attention not to the politicians of the Zhirinovsky type in Russia but to those with whom cooperation could develop. Agreeing with this general line of thought, another Central European participant suggested a strategy of "small steps" to promote the growth of many ties at the grass-roots level with Russia. Still another Central European participant noted that one reason for the limited contacts between Central Europeans and Russians is that few opportunities exist for the Central Europeans to present arguments to the Russian public.

Continuing in this vein, still another Central European participant agreed that developing relations between the Central European countries and Russia at the nonstate level is crucial. He did not think that the problem stemmed from a lack of political will; he pointed out that the Socialist governments that have come to power in several Central European countries have not been able to improve relations with Russia very much more than the previous liberal-nationalist governments had. Rather, the problem is structural.

Overall, several Central European participants felt that their countries could improve relations with Russia and provide assistance to Russia based on their own experience with and knowledge about the transformation so far. However, some of them felt that Russia was not interested in such assistance.

One Central European participant noted that some of the countries are better qualified than others to act as "bridges" in the improvement of relations. He suggested that Slovakia is the best suited for such a role. It has good relations with Germany and Russia and with the other Central European countries. According to him, NATO enlargement was an abstract academic issue in Slovakia, lacking resonance at the popular level; thus, Russia can deal with Slovakia relatively easily. On the other hand, Slovakia cannot be a Russian "agent" in the region, since such a role would antagonize Slovakia's neighbors.

NATO and Views of Security

No other topic sparked as much discussion and controversy as the question of security and, specifically, the question of NATO enlargement. The Russian participants argued in favor of security arrangements without NATO, while the Central European discussants justified their desire to join NATO in a variety of ways. The East European participants were caught in the middle of the controversy, while the U.S. participants approached security from a post-cold-war perspective.

Rationale for and Consequences of NATO Enlargement

A Russian participant attempted to lay out the negative consequences to European security as a whole that would come with NATO's enlargement. He suggested the existence of a post-Communist syndrome of thinking about solutions to security problems in terms of blocs. This has led the Central Europeans to press for NATO enlargement. It is not NATO headquarters or the current NATO members that are leading the drive for enlargement but the countries that are applying for NATO membership. There is an implicit anti-Russian aspect to this process. However, a unique opportunity exists now to live without blocs in all of Europe.

This participant portrayed NATO as not only a military-political bloc but also an institution with a certain mentality. At the popular level, Russians see NATO as an organization that has been an aggressive bloc with an anti-Russian orientation for forty years. In the current situation of democratic politics in Russia, public opinion has to be taken into account; thus, such views have some influence. The participant cautioned that if NATO enlarges, a tense situation of opposing blocs will reappear, and that will be a situation from which no one will gain. Indeed, everyone will then try to overcome the very obstacles that would thus be built. Security could be built on different grounds, for example, on the basis of security agreements between countries. In any event, rather than dissolving NATO, the goal should be to incorporate it in a new, larger, more inclusive organization. At present, the pressure for NATO enlargement is leading to the loss of the possibility for a more unified and secure Europe. This pressure is based on short-term considerations, which have negative consequences for the long term. Another Russian participant warned that the integration of the Central European states into NATO would lead to their being not Russia's military partners but military targets.

A U.S. participant took exception to such views and suggested that the discussions rise above the level of thinking about security in bloc terms. He objected particularly to the portrayal of NATO as an "aggressive military-political bloc." He recalled the old crude British-originated maxim that NATO had three purposes: to keep the U.S. in, the Soviets out, and the Germans down. The second purpose, he said, was no longer relevant, but the other two continued to apply. The U.S. role on the European continent continues to be important, as does the integration of Germany into international structures in Europe. Forty years ago, NATO was the vehicle for integrating Germany into the Western community of states. Today, that integrative function can serve to bring the Central European states into the Western community. From that point of view, he expressly objected to the description of the Central and East European states as a "buffer zone." The participant also pointed to the benefits of NATO enlargement to the east in preventing the recurrence of a situation akin to that in the 1920s and 1930s, when all of the states in the region had nationally oriented foreign policies that defined their neighbors as potential adversaries. That situation led to instability and insecurity. The integration of the Central European states into NATO and the Western community is the best way to prevent it.

Another U.S. participant addressed the seeming persistence in Russia of the view of NATO as an aggressive military organization, with offensive plans against the USSR. Such a view is straight out of Soviet propaganda of the cold-war era, when it was disseminated to strengthen cohesion among Warsaw Pact members. However, the Soviets themselves knew that such a portrayal was false, and anyone who was knowledgeable about security issues would recognize it as such. Its persistence shows a failure on the part of the Russians to dispel some of the myths of the cold war.

Still another U.S. participant asked the Russian discussants to try to understand the security concerns of the Central Europeans. In a vivid allusion to the power disparities that underlie some of the Central European perceptions, he suggested that if you are a mouse, it does not matter whether the elephants around you are making love or war-- you get trampled in any case. The Central Europeans' concern about security is understandable, even if their view of the problem is different from that of the Russians.

Another U.S. participant pointed out some of the seeming contradictions in Russian objections to NATO enlargement. First, the image of NATO as an anti-Russian military-political bloc ignores the fact that NATO has changed greatly over the past five years. It has ceased to treat Russia as an adversary and is now a crisis-prevention mechanism and an instrument for peacekeeping. The Russians are fully aware of these changes. As part of the Partnership for Peace, Russian liaison officers and representatives are stationed in Brussels, they attend meetings at NATO headquarters, and they have access to the highest NATO officials. Moreover, the Russian military values its contacts with the U.S. armed forces through the Partnership for Peace. Through participation in IFOR, Russian units are operating alongside U.S. Army units in a NATO operation. How can such cooperation be reconciled with an adversarial image of NATO?

Secondly, the argument that NATO enlargement would draw new lines of division in Europe and isolate Russia represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the process. The enlargement of Western institutions, on the contrary, would have the effect of dissolving the dividing lines that originated in the cold war but continue to this day in the form of a division of Europe into a part that is integrated into a security realm and a part that is not. The process of European integration has been going on since the late 1940s, with EU and NATO being two sides of the same coin. This process is not primarily concerned with Russia, much less directed against Russia; it is concerned with Europe. Furthermore, the process of NATO enlargement is deliberate, slow, and transparent. Five years after the breakup of the USSR, NATO has not enlarged; it has gone on record only that in principle it plans to enlarge. Meanwhile, far from trying to isolate Russia, NATO has bent over backwards to include Russia in the larger processes of cooperation and integration. When initially proposed, the Partnership for Peace was offered to all of the former Communist countries, including Russia (despite the fact that some Central Europeans complained that the program treated the "exploiters" and the "exploited" in the same fashion). In addition, in every step taken so far, NATO discussed the issues with Russia beforehand. How can such behavior be seen as aimed at the isolation of Russia?

Thirdly, the argument that NATO enlargement might push Russian politics in the direction of nationalism and Communism does not hold water. Five years after the breakup of the USSR, NATO has not enlarged--and yet the Communists did well in the 1995 Russian parliamentary elections, and they are running strong in the 1996 presidential race. NATO enlargement thus appears to be irrelevant to Russian politics. Domestic social and economic problems are the driving forces, and the issue of NATO enlargement is of concern only to a small foreign and defense policy elite in Moscow.

This U.S. participant also asked what the Russians' specific objections to NATO enlargement were. If Poland were to join NATO in, say, 1999, what negative consequences do the Russians foresee? The Polish military would be smaller, foreign troops would not be stationed in Poland, the Polish-German problem would be solved once and for all, and a confident and secure Poland would be able to cooperate with Russia without any phobias or complexes. In other words, Russia could only gain in such a situation.

Several Russian participants responded by attempting to explain the Russian concerns about NATO enlargement. One of them noted that if Russia is left out of an enlarged NATO, it will be isolated from the only all-European organization dealing with security issues. Yet, he went on, there is no satisfactory substitute for NATO. OSCE is a relic of a different age and purpose; its large and diverse membership (ranging from the U.S. to Central Asian states) and its failure to find a new raison d'etre do not provide grounds for optimism about its future. The Council of Europe (which Russia recently entered) is a prestigious European "club" and an important organization for the promotion of democratic and human-rights standards, but it has no role as a security organization.

As for NATO itself, continued this participant, it started as a military bloc and remains one to this day. Blocs do not stand for something; they are against something. The evolution of NATO in favor of greater emphasis on humanitarian and peacekeeping issues is a step in the right direction, but these new functions remain secondary. It is the fundamental military function of NATO that is of concern to Russia. NATO is the preeminent military organization on the continent, and it continues to have a united military command. Although it is not currently a threat to Russia, it can become one, given certain kinds of changes in Russia, the U.S., or Western Europe. The accession of Central European countries to NATO would create the potential of NATO troop deployments close to Russian borders.

Another Russian participant presented the problem in the context of collective security. Although NATO has evolved substantially from its role as an organization devoted to opposition to the USSR, its evolution is not yet complete, and if the international situation becomes more tense, NATO has the potential to be used for anti-Russian purposes. That is why Russian interests must be taken into account in the considerations of whether to enlarge NATO. Moreover, NATO is not the only institution capable of ensuring security in Europe. Indeed, the organization seems to contradict the idea of security for all of Europe. The building of new common structures stands a better chance of providing security in a broader sense.

Yet another Russian participant said that the drive to isolate Russia was implicit in the motivation for NATO enlargement. He compared present-day Russia to a "wounded bear," which is "sick" in many respects. But is this sickness contagious, and is it worth all the effort to keep it at arm's length? This participant felt that NATO has not yet changed sufficiently. During a recent visit that he paid to NATO headquarters, he found that the answers by NATO officials to some of his questions about NATO's future were not fully satisfactory. He agreed that NATO was not as much an adversary of Russia as it had been in the past, but he urged that NATO reorganize further and faster while proceeding with enlargement slowly. In the present situation in Russia, haste in the enlargement process could provoke countermeasures by Russia.

The suggestion that NATO enlarge slowly provoked responses from several Central European participants. Why would anything change with time? Would the Russian government embark on a campaign to build up public opinion in favor of NATO enlargement? One of the Central European participants pointed out that the processes of transition and integration taking place in the former Communist states are proceeding at varying paces in different countries. Because some countries are not as far along as others should not hold back the more advanced countries.

Several Central European participants attempted to explain their countries' rationale for wanting to join NATO, while insisting that this desire is neither anti-Russian in motivation nor likely to have any negative consequences for Russia. One Central European discussant saw no specific national reason for wanting enlargement. He suggested, rather, that the reasons for his country's wish to join NATO are precisely the same as the reasons for the continuation of NATO that are widely shared in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe-- namely, to create a zone of stability and to prevent the nationalization of security policies. The participant also criticized the Russian attempt to differentiate between those European countries that are in NATO and those that are not. Such differentiation encourages the suspicion among the Central Europeans that Russia seeks to establish a special security relationship with the countries that are not in NATO (a goal that the USSR pursued in the period immediately after the breakup of the Warsaw Pact through the mechanism of bilateral treaties with individual Central European countries).

Another Central European participant expressed the belief that the Central European drive for NATO membership stemmed from the fundamental desire for full integration into the democratic and prosperous Euro-Atlantic community. In a comment echoed by a number of other Central European participants, he stated that this desire is not directed at any other country or motivated by fears of another country. The Central Europeans understand that the integration process will be protracted and slow. But the purpose is to demolish the artificial lines of division in Europe that were put in place at Yalta and Potsdam and which have no historical precedent.

Yet another Central European participant stated that his country's goal is to participate in the formation of an integrated entity with a Euro-Atlantic identity. Members of such an entity would be contributors to rather than consumers of security. As an example of what such an entity would do, he pointed to Bosnia, where military contingents from several Central European countries were currently cooperating with NATO. The crucial factor, he felt, was the wish to be part of an effort to stabilize European security, and only NATO could succeed in that effort. The participant asked whether the Russian fears centered on NATO itself or on NATO's enlargement to the east. He argued that a Central Europe that is integrated into NATO would be a more attractive and more reliable partner for Russia, because these countries would then be able to deal with Russia from a position of confidence and security and on the basis of mutual benefit. Healthy and vibrant relations would be the result. Russian opposition to what are perceived in Central Europe as perfectly justifiable aspirations already has caused problems with the perceptions of Russia in Central Europe. For example, public-opinion surveys in Central Europe show an increasing distrust of Russia, even though in some of those countries there is no history of negative views toward Russia and during 1991-92 there was even an increase in positive views of Russia. Just as there existed a willingness to improve perceptions of Germany in Central Europe, the same willingness existed with respect to Russia as well. But now it is the negative Russian view of what are the normal economic and security aspirations of the Central Europeans that is causing the increasing distrust.

According to another Central European participant, the level of support for NATO membership has remained steady for more than two years at about 80 percent in the countries that favor NATO membership the most, such as Romania and Poland. Furthermore, young people in those countries are especially favorable, which he attributed to their view of NATO as not only a security organization but also a tool for the modernization of the society. In other words, joining the organization meant forming integral bonds with the most developed countries in the world. As such, NATO membership would be a step toward achieving stability and prosperity in an integrated and peaceful Europe. Russian opposition to NATO enlargement stirs resentment in Central Europe, for it seems to amount to an objection to the goal of uniting all of Europe and to the attainment of higher standards of living and security. Is Russian opposition to NATO enlargement, asked this participant rhetorically, really opposition to a united democratic Europe?

An East European participant observed that Russian opposition to NATO enlargement has not been in Russia's interests. Russia cannot stop enlargement, and its opposition to it has had the effect of painting itself into a corner and rekindling old suspicions.

Several Central European participants pointed out seeming contradictions in Russian policy. Two of them noted Russian opposition to NATO enlargement but not to EU enlargement. The EU's security organization, the Western European Union, is supposed to be brought into harmony with NATO and become the European pillar of NATO. Another Central European participant observed that the argument that NATO enlargement plays into the hands of the extremists in Russia presupposes that the moderates in Russia do not oppose NATO enlargement. However, the moderates do oppose it. Why, then, would enlargement lead to a shift toward the extremists? This question was addressed by a Russian participant, who pointed out that there were degrees of opposition and potential reactions to NATO enlargement that differentiate the moderate and extremist political forces in Russia.

Another Central European participant called attention to the benefits that have accrued to Russia from NATO's existence. For decades, Turkey's anchoring in the Western alliance has acted as a bulwark against Islamic militants and kept them away from the USSR. NATO also has solved the German problem in European security. In addition, NATO countries spend less on defense than they would individually, and the same is likely to be the case when NATO enlarges. Thus, according to this participant, Russia stands to gain, and will actually feel more secure, when NATO enlarges.

Russian Countermeasures and the CIS

A Russian participant outlined what he believed were the potential consequences of NATO enlargement. He expressed certainty that confrontation would result. As NATO enlarged, Russia would look to build up its own coalition to counter it. The agreements with Belarus provide an indication of the greater security role for the CIS that might come about. In addition, the notion of a Eurasian center and an increased focus on relations with the Muslim south might appear. The provision of nuclear reactors and technology to Iran and better relations with countries such as Libya are two examples along those lines. The building of bridges with the West as well as with Central Europe would assume an even greater salience, but by that time the situation would have deteriorated, making the search for such bridges more difficult. Another Russian discussant added that some countries find the current unipolar world is not to their benefit, and to those countries Russia remains attractive.

Another Russian participant considered the possibility that two main "stabilizing" forces would emerge in the foreseeable future in Central and Eastern Europe. Before World War I, according to him, this area had been stabilized by four empires: German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman. After World War II, stability was brought by two blocs, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Since the end of the Warsaw Pact, the area has been unstable, but a new stability might be established by the CIS and NATO. The participant described the process in "civilizational" terms--the increasing distinctions between the Western and Slavic civilizations. He felt that the borderlines between the two regions had shifted throughout history but that the current period is one of especially rapid shifts.

In the context of the discussion of the evolution of the CIS, two East European participants questioned some of the comments regarding NATO enlargement, saying that they overlooked the states that have emerged from the USSR and are located between the Central European countries and Russia. According to one of these discussants, these East European states, among which Ukraine is crucial, strive for neutrality and nonparticipation in blocs. He said that these states understand the Central European desire to join NATO, but he urged that the Central Europeans also take into account the interests of the East European states. Central European integration into NATO has implications that are different from its integration into the EU. The former, he went on, conjures up weapons, whereas the latter brings up the idea of prosperity. He suggested that not enough time had passed yet for the popular image of NATO as a threatening organization to disappear in Russia. Thus, this East European participant agreed with some of the Russian participants that more time was needed and that the NATO enlargement process should proceed slowly.

Another East European participant also wondered about the final look of Europe after NATO enlargement. Where will NATO stop? How will it deal with the countries of Eastern Europe? Will it define Europe in cultural (and implicitly patronizing) terms and stop at the borders of Catholic and Protestant Europe? Will it ever be able to include Russia? In any event, the participant felt that for Russia to make alternative security arrangements, such as the CIS, in opposition to NATO and its enlargement, would be self-defeating.

Finessing NATO Enlargement

A Russian participant suggested that, just as the Partnership for Peace was a compromise solution that took Russia's interests into account, a similar resolution of the NATO enlargement impasse should be sought. He called attention to the Primakov proposal, which would bring new countries into NATO at the political but not at the military level. In addition, Russia could become a guarantor of security in Europe, alongside NATO. This participant urged that the current NATO "monologue" become a dialogue with Russia, so that Russian interests could be taken into account.

Another Russian participant suggested that, while Russia understands the motives for the Central European pressure to join NATO, the Central Europeans must recognize and understand Russian security concerns. According to him, NATO, as a system of collective defense, is oriented against something. From the Russian standpoint, the military machine of NATO is expanding and diplomatic dealings over NATO's enlargement are at a deadlock. It may come to pass that Russia will have to face NATO enlargement as a fact and draw appropriate conclusions from it. Issues such as the degree of protection for the new members and the stationing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on their territory are of concern to Russia. The participant criticized some of the Central Europeans for saying that they are ready for dialogue but not offering any concrete proposals. In any case, a special relationship between Russia and NATO is needed. Recently, this participant had visited NATO headquarters, and in his discussions with NATO officials he did not hear a satisfactory concept for NATO's cooperation with Russia. Such a concept must be formulated. In addition, the idea of how NATO is to fit with other organizations, such as OSCE, needs greater attention.

Still another Russian participant added that a threat to Russia is not likely without the presence of foreign troops on the territory of the Central European states in an enlarged NATO. However, the participant also felt that circumstances could change, and that is why guarantees that an enlarged NATO would not pose a threat to Russia were needed.

A U.S. participant questioned the validity of Russian concerns about the placement of nuclear weapons on the territory of any new NATO members. The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy has declined, the U.S. has withdrawn its nuclear arsenal from Europe, and no one in the U.S. is contemplating placing nuclear weapons on the territory of the new members. The whole idea seems so far-fetched that it does not deserve serious consideration in the discussions.

A Central European participant declared that in his country there was a unanimity of opinion among both elites and the general public that NATO membership is a fundamental goal and that there are no alternatives to it. In view of such strong views, borne out by public-opinion polls, little room for maneuver exists in these countries. However, the participant suggested, there was room for maneuver on the Russian side. Russia could formulate certain options for negotiation. This might not be a propitious time for such action, because of the forthcoming Russian elections. Nevertheless, assuming that the NATO integration process goes forward, the ball is in Russia's court regarding the specifics of NATO enlargement. The participant cautioned the Russian discussants that issuing threats about targeting the Central European countries with nuclear weapons, renegotiating the CFE agreements, and abandoning the framework of agreements for the reduction of nuclear-weapons stockpiles will be counterproductive and only will anger the Central and Western Europeans and speed up integration.

Addressing the suggestion by a Russian participant that the Central European countries might join the political but not the military structures of NATO, this participant pointed out that NATO is not looking for new members whose status would be like that of France or Spain. Furthermore, NATO enlargement would not necessarily mean the stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons on the territory of the new members. But depending on Russian actions, enlargement could lead to the stationing of German and U.S. troops there. The participant pointed out that substantial room for negotiation between NATO and Russia exists. To illustrate the possibility of "creative thinking," the participant gave the example of Finnmark, the northernmost area of Norway: Even though Norway is a member of NATO, special arrangements prohibiting deployment of non-Norwegian NATO troops in that area have existed for decades.

Another Central European participant echoed the comment that "the ball is currently in Russia's court," in that NATO and the Central Europeans are willing to bend to Russian concerns and informally agree not to station foreign troops or nuclear weapons on the territories of prospective new NATO members.

Alternatives to NATO

A Russian participant suggested that OSCE should be the alternative to NATO enlargement, since a military alliance like NATO cannot perform such functions of OSCE as preventive diplomacy, genuine peacemaking, and protection of minority rights. In view of the existing problems in the Balkans, with continuing uncertainty regarding the solution of the conflict there and the possibility that the Dayton agreement will unravel, said this participant, OSCE was the only viable instrument for managing the strife in post-cold-war Europe. He suggested reexamining some recent proposals, such as the creation of a Security Council in the OSCE. He asked that the chances for the evolution of OSCE not be dismissed. Another Russian participant observed that another alternative to NATO enlargement, in addition to greater powers for OSCE, was a system of reliable bilateral security agreements.

A Central European participant suggested that Russian ideas for strengthening OSCE be revisited in November, after the Russian and U.S. elections, but only if progress takes place in integrating some of the Central European countries into NATO. He also suggested that, concomitant with the potential strengthening of both NATO and OSCE, there be an increase in the role of Russian resources in the EU economies. Finally, he suggested dealing with one regional source of problems: the high level of militarization in the Kaliningrad region. If this level were to be reduced, the region could become one of the arenas for Polish cooperation with Russia.

A U.S. participant insisted that, given the goal of a united, prosperous, and integrated European continent, only NATO could guarantee security while progress toward that goal was being made. The reason that OSCE could not fill that role is that OSCE is a new structure, and building it up would be formidable task in itself. It seems more feasible to take an existing institution, NATO, and adapt it to the changed situation. U.S. policy is to allow new members to join the organization. That is a subtle but important difference from simply saying that U.S. policy is to enlarge NATO. The states that will be allowed to join NATO will be democratic, peacefully disposed countries. As such, their joining does not pose a threat to any other states.

A Russian participant expressed frustration about the entire NATO enlargement issue because it seemed to him that the move was designed to deal with a nonexistent problem. In the context of both present- day and longer-term European problems, there is no military threat in Europe and no reason to expect that one might emerge. And yet considerable resources are being devoted to the solution of this nonproblem, resources that could be used in better ways. While there is instability in Russia, it does not necessarily translate into a threat. As an example, the participant reminded others of the fears in the early 1990s of massive out-migration from Russia, fears that did not materialize. Now the fears center on potential Russian threats, but these fears are just as misplaced. The current problems in Europe have an economic and social character rather than a military one. The participant suggested to the Central Europeans that, if they do believe that there are military threats in Europe, they and the Russians should focus on the practical issues of security in Central and Eastern Europe. But the motive should be to find alternatives that would ensure security for all. NATO does not meet that requirement.

Ulterior Motives?

Some of the Russian participants said that they were not persuaded by the U.S. rationale for NATO enlargement. One of them commented that this rationale seemed to imply that the U.S. was either extremely cynical or unbelievably idealistic. Another interpreted U.S. policy as growing out of the need to sell military equipment and armaments of secondary quality to the Central Europeans, and he added that the Central European determination to get rid of Russian standards in the military realm represented only a change of dependence from one country to another. And another Russian discussant asked the participants to understand the problems for the Russian defense industry that NATO enlargement entailed. According to him, the rearming of the new members' armed forces with Western weapons systems would infringe on the interests of the Russian military-industrial complex. It was simply a matter of the decline and disappearance of a "traditional" market.

A Pledge to Gorbachev?

A brief but sharp exchange took place between two discussants about whether U.S. officials, during negotiations in 1990 over German unification, had made an informal pledge to Gorbachev not to enlarge NATO. A Russian participant declared that there had been such a pledge, but a Central European discussant responded that the memoirs of several U.S. officials involved in the negotiations made it clear that no such guarantee was given. The only U.S. official to suggest anything to the contrary was the former U.S. ambassador to the USSR, Jack Matlock, but even he said only that some informal guarantee may have been implied. According to the Central European participant, even Gorbachev was equivocal as to whether such a commitment was ever made. But the Russian participant claimed that Gorbachev personally confirmed to him that such an assurance was indeed given. Another Central European participant also denied the existence of any commitment about NATO enlargement. This participant had served in an official capacity at the last CMEA meeting, and, according to him, there was no hint then that the dissolution of CMEA or of the Warsaw Pact had introduced any obstacles to potential NATO membership by the Central Europeans in the future.

Conclusions and Next Steps

The meeting produced no agreement on the basic issues of security structures or on ways to improve trade and economic ties. The divide between the Central European and Russian participants seemed especially wide and extended to diverse perceptions on a whole range of issues. As one Russian participant suggested only partly facetiously, the title of the meeting, rather than "Old Divisions and New Bridges," could have been "Old Bridges and New Divisions."

But differences between the Central and East European countries and Russia are to be expected. They are all engaged in fundamental processes of the transformation of their societies. They differ in size, level of development, and aspirations. They are all inventing and reinventing institutions. However, these differences should not hide the fact that a common vocabulary and a framework for discussions also exist. The unusual element is that it took a U.S. effort to bring participants from the various countries together to discuss relations between them. The meeting may have given an impetus to launch such efforts without U.S. mediation.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Czech Republic

Ivan Gabal, former Head, Department of Political Analysis, Office of the President

Hungary

Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, State Secretary for Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Tamas Wachsler, Member of Parliament

Moldova

Victor Grebenschikov, Advisor on Ethnic Affairs to the President

Vladimir Solonari, Chairman, Commission on Human Rights and Ethnic Minorities, Parliament of Moldova

Poland

Henryk Szlajfer, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Romania

Ioan Mircea Pascu, Deputy Minister of Defense

Petre Roman, former Prime Minister; Chairman of Defense Committee, Romanian Parliament, and Chairman, Democratic Party

Russian Federation

Oleg Bogomolov, Member, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Director, Institute of International Economic and Political Studies

Igor Bunin, Director, Center for Political Technologies

Elena Khotkova, Senior Researcher, Center for Strategic Research

Marina Kuchinskaya, Senior Researcher, Center for Strategic Research

Boris Makarenko, Deputy Director, Center for Political Technologies, and Consultant, Project on Ethnic Relations

Viktor Parshutkin, Spokesman, Committee on International Affairs, State Duma

Vladimir Rubanov, Deputy Secretary, Security Council of Russia

Alexei Salmin, Member, Presidential Advisory Council, and President, Russian Public Policy Center

Valery Tishkov, Director, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences

Vitaly Tretyakov, Editor-in-Chief, Nezavisimaya Gazeta

Mark Urnov, Head, Analytic Department, Administration of the President

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Lev Klepatsky, Head, Department of Long-Term Planning

Vadim Lukov, Director, Department of Foreign-Policy Planning

Aleksandr Vladimirov, Head, Romanian Desk, Third European Department

Russian Public Policy Center

Maxim Bratersky, Head, Department of International Programs

Dennis Dragunsky, Director, Center for National Models of Democracy

Elena Gerasimova, Assistant to the President

Alexei Makhlai, Head, Department of Regional, International, and Economic Programs

Sergei Mikhailov, Director, Analytic Center

Gen. (ret.) Oleg Vishnevsky, Executive Director

Slovakia

Jan Carnogursky, former Prime Minister; Chairman, Christian Democratic Movement

Dusan Slobodnik, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, Slovak Parliament

Ukraine

Igor Kharchenko, Head, Analytic Department, and member of the board, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

United States

Deana Arsenian, Assistant Director, Watson Institute, Brown University

Daniel Fried, Special Assistant to the President; Senior Director for Central and Eastern Europe, National Security Council/White House

Jonathan Rickert, Director, North-Central European Affairs, Department of State

Thomas Szayna, Analyst, International Studies Group, RAND

Foreign Embassies in Moscow

Tomas Gelzecki, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Republic of Poland

Stepan Grigoryan, Political Counselor, Embassy of Republic of Armenia

Aleksandr Kinchenko, Second Secretary, Embassy of Ukraine

Wlodzimiecz Marcynyak, Counselor, Embassy of Republic of Poland

Gyorgy Nanofszky, Ambassador, Republic of Hungary

Andras Telkes, Second Secretary, Embassy of Republic of Hungary

Vladimir Votapek, Second Secretary, Embassy of Czech Republic

Pavel Zatkai, Second Secretary, Embassy of Slovak Republic

Project on Ethnic Relations (U.S.)

Allen H. Kassof, President

Livia B. Plaks, Executive Director

Larry L. Watts, Senior Consultant

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