Second Slovak Roundtable

PER Home Page
About PER
Board and Staff
Council for Ethnic Accord
The Kona Statement
PER in the Balkans
Russia and the Baltics
PER in Hungary
PER in Slovakia
PER in Romania
Central European Series
Euro-Atlantic Series
PER and the Roma
PER and the Media
PER Bulletins

SECOND SLOVAKIA ROUNDTABLE

Casta-Papiernicka, Slovakia
May 5-7, 1996

PREFACE

More than three years after the Slovak Republic achieved independence on January 1st, 1993, its political landscape is still marked by an intensive debate among the Slovak majority and between the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority of six hundred thousand people. This debate involves differences over the steps toward democratization and a free market, entry into European institutions and NATO, and the relationships between the two ethnic groups themselves.

The Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) is sponsoring a series of roundtable discussions as part of an effort to help the political leaders of the Slovak and Hungarian communities explain and clarify their positions to each other and to sympathetic outsiders. The aim is to find some common ground that could lead to a reduction of the interethnic tensions. The first meeting in the series took place in Washington, D.C., in June 1995, and is summarized in the PER report Slovakia Roundtable in the United States. The second meeting is the subject of this report. It was co-sponsored with the Slovak National Council, (parliament), and took place in Slovakia, at Casta Papiernicka, near Bratislava, from May 9 to 11, 1996. This was shortly after the Slovak government had ratified a treaty between Slovakia and Hungary (the treaty had been ratified by Hungary a year earlier)--a circumstance that provided a starting point for the discussions.

This report was skillfully prepared by Samuel Abraham and Peter Priadka of PER's Bratislava office, from a verbatim transcript of the discussions. It captures both the tone and the details of the emotions and frustrations arising from the differences in perception and vocabulary that separate Slovak and ethnic Hungarian leaders, as well as the faint glimmer of hope for their resolution.

The majority of the participants at the meeting were Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians who play leading roles in the politics of Slovakia (see the note on terminology below). However, another important aspect of the meeting was the participation of a substantial number of senior figures from the most important European organizations and from the United States. (A list of the participants can be found at the end of this report.) Although they attended in their individual capacities, the presence of high-level officials from the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, and from the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense testified both to their strong support for Slovakia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community and to the fears that tensions within Slovakia about interethnic rivalries and related issues (including problems in relations between Slovakia and Hungary) could impede Slovakia's entry into major international institutions. At the same time, the European and U.S. participants were emphatic in stating that Slovakia is not being singled out for negative attention and that the criteria being applied to it are neither more nor less onerous than those faced by other countries seeking membership. At the request of the participants, PER plans to continue its sponsorship of these discussions.

We wish to record our gratitude to the Slovak National Council for its generous cooperation and hospitality in making arrangements for this meeting, and in particular to Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the National Council. Special financial support for this series of meetings is being provided by grants to PER by the Pew Charitable Trusts. Additional funding has been received from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which provides PER's core funding, and from the Starr Foundation. None of them, of course, is responsible for the contents of this report.

The report was edited by Robert A. Feldmesser, PER's senior editor. The summary and the note on terminology were prepared by Aleksey Grigor'ev, of the PER Princeton staff. Although we believe that the report faithfully reflects the conference proceedings, none of the participants has had an opportunity to review it, and PER is solely responsible for its contents.

Allen H. Kassof, President
Livia B. Plaks, Executive Director

Princeton, New Jersey
August 1996

A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

In order to encourage participants to speak frankly, it was agreed that no remarks would be attributed to individuals in this report. However, making sense of the viewpoints expressed in the discussions necessitates some form of identification of the participants.

"Participant from the governing coalition" refers to a member of one of the two principal parliamentary parties that make up that coalition: the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Slovak National Party. (There was no participant from the Association of Workers of Slovakia, the smallest of the three coalition parties.)

"Participant from the Hungarian coalition" refers to a member of one of the three parties making up that coalition in the National Council: the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, Coexistence, and the Hungarian Civic Party.

"Participant from the opposition" refers to a member of one of the parliamentary opposition parties other than those in the Hungarian coalition: the Party of the Democratic Left, the Christian Democratic Movement, and the Democratic Union of Slovakia. (There were no participants from three other opposition parties: the Social-Democratic Party of Slovakia, the Movement of Peasants, and the Green Party of Slovakia.)

International participants are identified as coming from Western Europe or the United States.

Because of the subject matter of this report, it should be understood that the word "Hungarian" usually refers to ethnic Hungarians who live in Slovakia and to their political, cultural, and educational bodies. The context will make clear when that is not the case (as, for example, in the phrase "Hungarian-Slovak treaty").

SUMMARY

Following introductory words from PER's president, participants from the governing coalition expressed the opinion that the problems in Slovakia's foreign policy are attributable to the opposition politicians and the president of the republic, who, they claim, misrepresent Slovakia to foreign audiences. These participants maintained that, despite complications inherent in the process of transition, Slovakia has managed to build a democratic parliamentary society, has achieved a standard of human rights comparable to that of Western Europe, and is successfully building good relations with its neighbors. As for prospective membership in NATO and the EU, the coalition's view is that Slovakia is being judged according to a set of criteria that differ from those applied to other new candidates. (This was denied by several international participants, who held that the criteria are the same for everyone.) It was noted that one party in the governing coalition openly opposes Slovakia's entry into these structures. Participants from the governing coalition also proposed that the question of Slovakia's entry into NATO and the EU should be decided by referendum.

Participants from the opposition parties, both Slovak and Hungarian, expressed the belief that nothing regarding the style of governing and the implementation of democracy has changed in Slovakia since PER's first Slovakia roundtable in June 1995. They claimed that the policies of the governing coalition and its struggle for power damage Slovakia domestically and also damage Slovakia's image abroad. Opposition participants asserted that the government failed to follow democratic principles in the regulation of the secret service, in procedures of privatization, and in state-media relations. They pointed out that no clear government program exists concerning Slovakia's integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Slovakia, in their view, should be firmly committed to becoming a full member of the EU and NATO. Conversely, they declared, it would be a grave error if, because of Slovakia's problems, the EU and NATO were to defer its full membership.

In this first part of the discussion, the line was drawn between the governing coalition and the opposition, irrespective of ethnic affiliation. However, during the discussion of ethnic issues, the Slovak parties tended to group together on one side and the Hungarian parties on the other. PER's president urged the participants to desist from accusations and counter-accusations on interethnic issues and move to a consideration of specifics, even if minor ones, about which at least some common ground might be found. In response, participants from the Hungarian coalition set forth six proposals: restoration of the 1994 level of government subsidies to minority cultures, and giving minority representatives power of control over these subsidies; prevention of forcible centralization of the educational system and promotion of greater autonomy for minority-language schools; restoration of government financial support for the Hungarian musical ensemble "Young Hearts"; permission to establish a private Hungarian business academy with Hungarian as the language of instruction; passage of a law on the protection of minority languages; and passage of constitutional provisions concerning minorities and minority law.

Participants from the governing coalition suggested that they would be willing to engage in a dialogue on all of these points; indeed, they held out the prospect that the first four could conceivably be dealt with in the near future. In turn, they proposed that the representatives of the Hungarian minority should issue declarations in support of the constitution of the Slovak Republic, the Framework Agreement of the Council of Europe on the Protection of Minorities, and the Slovak-Hungarian treaty, which is based on individual rights for minorities; declare loyalty to the Slovak Republic; reject both ethnic separatism and autonomist claims; and support bilingual education for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.

Foreign participants were critical of calls for loyalty oaths, but noted that the Hungarians would be wise to take into account the perceptions of some Slovaks that had given rise to such requests.

Little agreement was found at the meeting about interethnic problems. However, the participants did agree that it would be useful to continue a structured dialogue in some form, and they requested PER to continue its sponsorship of the roundtable discussions.

POSTSCRIPT

On September 6-8, 1996, PER conducted a third Slovakia roundtable, in Le Mont Pelerin, Switzerland. At that meeting, ten members of the Slovak parliament, representing the ruling coalition and the opposition parties (including the three ethnic Hungarian parties), signed a joint declaration affirming their loyalty to Slovakia, as individuals and as representatives of their respective political parties; recommending that the government and parliament of Slovakia begin without delay to draft a bill on the use of minority languages for official business; recommending that a dialogue be continued concerning the protection of rights of members of ethnic minorities in the Slovak Republic; supporting Slovakia's efforts to join international organizations; agreeing to continue, in good faith, the endeavor to establish amicable relations among the people of Slovakia; calling on all political entities in the National Council of the Slovak Republic to support these recommendations.

The full text of the joint declaration, in Slovak and English, is available from the Project on Ethnic Relations.

INTRODUCTION

PER's president, Allen Kassof, welcomed the participants and introduced them. The international participants, he explained, came prepared to listen and to help clarify problems, but not to judge or to offer solutions. He added that international representatives were also present at the first roundtable on Slovakia, held last year, in Washington, D.C., and that their presence at this roundtable was a reflection of their goodwill toward Slovakia. He pointed out that, although interethnic relations in Slovakia were to be the subject of discussion during the next two days, that country was not at all an exceptional case. Indeed, it is very hard to find any country that could serve as a universal model for the resolution of interethnic issues. He urged all participants to set aside everyday political differences during these two days, in order to achieve constructive results.

All majorities have a special responsibility for their minorities, Kassof continued. This responsibility stems not only from international norms but also from the fact that minorities are integral parts of a rich and diverse European culture, which deserves protection. The fear on the part of minorities that they may lose their cultural identity is a real fear, even if the expression of this fear is not always adequate or moderate. Hence, majorities must listen carefully to what minorities are saying. On the other hand, minorities have a specific responsibility as well, although it is of a different kind. They must realize that majorities may have fears of their own, however exaggerated those fears may appear to be. Such a mutual acknowledgment is of particular importance in a new state, which is still in the process of securing its own identity and territorial integrity.

Finally, PER's president cautioned that both minorities and majorities should be very careful about the vocabulary they use. They need to take into account the interests of their common country. No progress could be made without some basic consensus about the kinds of problems that Slovakia faces today. He appealed to the participants to use this opportunity not merely to assert their claims and counterclaims but also to work toward solutions that would benefit the whole of Slovakia.

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXTS

To begin the discussion, a participant from the governing coalition expressed his hopes for a rational discussion, one without emotion, in which the only "force" that was used was the force of argument. He went on to say that evidence would be provided in support of the governing coalition's claim that the status of national minorities in Slovakia exceeds international norms and that Slovakia is among the five most developed European countries in terms of the implementation of minority rights.

Another participant from the governing coalition observed that a number of processes are occurring in Slovakia simultaneously: the creation of the basic institutions of the state; the political transformation from a totalitarian to a pluralistic system; an economic transformation; a change of mentality among the people; and a search for Slovakia's identity. These processes, he noted, do not involve only positive aspects, and given their complexity, Slovakia has not had enough time to cope with them. On the other hand, foreign countries also need more time to understand what is going on here. He added that the establishment of a state is a task requiring several generations, and in that perspective, the Slovak Republic is still very young.

Despite all these complexities, this participant continued, Slovakia is successfully building good relations with its neighbors. Slovakia has achieved a standard of human rights that is comparable to Europe's. He acknowledged, however, that Slovakia could pursue a more active effort to better explain its situation; such an initiative should not be left to others. But Slovakia expects full respect for its positions from other countries, even in cases where disagreement arises.

Another participant from the governing coalition tried to explain Slovakia's actions regarding two issues: the alleged attempt to expel the deputies of one political party from the National Council, or parliament, and the Law on the State Language. He argued that the first of these problems arose from the opposition politicians' misinterpretation of the situation; nobody in the parliament ever spoke about the expulsion of the deputies. The problem of the language law, meanwhile, has been resolved by the ratification of this law by a constitutional majority. He expressed regret that Western authorities had failed to listen to both sides of the case.

A participant from the opposition took issue with this version of the first issue. He maintained that, in an effort to have the deputies of one party disqualified, the governing coalition had used its parliamentary majority to establish a special investigative commission. He pointed out that some government representatives have admitted that this was an attempt to deprive some opposition deputies of their mandates, which would then be transferred to other political parties. Moreover, the special commission was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, and the police have established, beyond any doubt, that this political party had fulfilled all the legal conditions required for entering parliament--in particular, that it had obtained the number of signatures required for registration. He claimed that the minister of the interior was in violation of the law, because he did not submit the police report to the deputies. In addition, he listed several other matters of concern: the continued absence of proportional representation in the parliament; the lack of objective control of the privatization process; and the governing coalition's monopoly of the parliamentary organ that controls the secret service. This last fact means that the prime minister is able to misuse the secret service. And there are other disputes as well: the rivalry between the president and the prime minister; control over Slovak television; and repeated delays in submitting a bill on the use of minority languages. On the other hand, he noted, the criminal code has been amended.

A participant from the governing coalition spoke about the diplomatic notes from the European Union (EU) and the European Parliament criticizing certain undemocratic practices in Slovakia. She pointed out that the political culture is being created not only by politicians from the governing coalition but also by opposition politicians. In any case, she asserted, the controversial issues were resolved at a session of a joint committee of the European Parliament and the National Council. She suggested that many issues are being politicized even though they have nothing to do with politics but are, rather, part of a struggle for power. In this respect, she rejected allegations made in the note from the EU that certain actions have been undertaken against the president of the republic that do not correspond with the constitution. She argued that the Slovak Republic has not undertaken any unconstitutional steps against the president. The "picture of Slovakia" abroad is created by opposition politicians as well.

A participant from the opposition pointed out that the discussion had started out in a fashion typical of Slovakia--with claims and counterclaims. According to this participant, the diplomatic notes were not well understood in Slovakia. The government did not respond officially, despite its promise to do so. He said that he understood these notes to be an expression of fears about the future prospects for the democratic development of Slovakia. Slovakia will keep its position in the movement toward European and Atlantic integration when the country respects those values which are now only verbally asserted. He also said that it is impossible to limit political power in Slovakia and to democratically regulate the secret service, privatization, and relations between the state and the media. Promises by the government to improve in these areas have not yet been fulfilled. Nothing in the style of governing and the implementation of democracy in Slovakia has changed since November 1995. There is still a conflict between the governing coalition and the president, and the kidnapping of his son has not been properly investigated. In order to have a full accounting of these issues, the cooperation of the governing coalition is essential. Finally, he maintained, it is necessary that the governing coalition take steps to ensure that democracy is understood not as the tyranny of the majority but as a polity in which the rights of all citizens, including minorities, are respected.

A West European participant mentioned one example of a negative foreign attitude toward Slovakia: A foreign guest had claimed, in a speech to the congress of a Slovak political party, that the present Slovak prime minister is the biggest obstacle to full membership for Slovakia in the EU. He asserted that this claim is untrue and does not represent the opinion of the European Parliament.

He also tried to provide answers to the question, "What needs to be done to maintain Slovakia's movement toward European and Atlantic integration?" Slovakia is sufficiently developed in terms of its economy, he noted. However, the first condition for EU enlargement, as set down in the Copenhagen Declaration of the Council of Europe, is a functioning democratic system, and that is where questions remain. Great attention will be paid to this issue in the near future. The EU will have much more time to deal with it after the end of its own intergovernmental conference. Finally, he stressed that it is necessary for Slovakia to continue to pursue a pro-European policy.

A participant from the governing coalition emphasized the importance of the geopolitical position of Slovakia. She argued that not only is it in the interest of Slovakia to enter Western structures but it is also in the interest of these structures that Slovakia become a member. She added that full membership of Slovakia in these structures will have to be confirmed by a referendum. She cautioned that the EU and NATO should proceed very carefully, for Slovakia has the right to decide its own fate. She claimed that Slovakia is being evaluated according to a set of criteria different from those applied to other European countries. Regarding the diplomatic notes, she declared that they were poorly received by the majority of the inhabitants of Slovakia, because Hungary, where the Slovak nationality has been destroyed, nevertheless seems to be regarded as a model of democratic accommodation to minorities. Yet Slovakia--which, she claimed, is one of the most democratic countries regarding the treatment of minorities--is constantly being criticized. Slovakia, she reiterated, should be judged by the same criteria as other states are.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition said that the delegates of his coalition came to discuss their concerns rationally. It is necessary, he said, to change the style of governmental politics, to amend shortcomings, and to behave as trustworthy partners. He expressed certain doubts regarding the statements of the representatives of the governing coalition and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He did not think the "mistakes" that the Slovak government is being criticized for are accidental ones. Rather, they are products of the system, and he feared that Slovakia is now further away from EU norms than it was a year and a half ago. He urged the member states of NATO and the EU to resist the current trend of Slovak diplomacy. As far as Slovakia's future direction is concerned, he said, the Hungarian coalition sees no alternative to European and Atlantic integration; this is in the interest of the entire democratic world, of every state in this region, and of the Slovak Republic, as well as of Hungarians living in Slovakia. He declared that both the EU and NATO would be making a great mistake if they were to defer full membership of any state in the region on the grounds of poor performance in foreign or minority policies. The Hungarian coalition regards such deferment to be a risky policy option.

A participant from the opposition declared that there is no such thing as a global anti-Slovak plot, nor is there any such plot against other countries. In terms of its size and population, Slovakia is neither smaller nor more vulnerable to its neighbors than many West European states. He also said he was confident that Western politicians remained committed to making Slovakia a full member of the EU and NATO. The diplomatic notes were, in his view, a legitimate expression of concern by Western democracies. The EU has the right to insist that any state seeking to enter the "family" of these states must be prepared to accept its rules and norms. If the coalition claims that the notes were the result of opposition propaganda, then it is the coalition's job to make that case to EU representatives. His understanding of the notes is that they were a natural confrontation between the political culture and practice of a functioning democracy, on the one hand, and a newly established democracy, on the other, and thus were part of the process of change that Slovakia is undergoing.

Another participant from the opposition agreed with the opinion expressed earlier that the current conflicts were the outgrowth of a struggle for power. The present governing coalition knows very well that it is possible to retain and increase its power only as long as it pursues its present policies, regardless of the internal and foreign opposition they may provoke. Such steps are well accepted by a part of the Slovak electorate but are viewed negatively by the EU. For this reason, Slovakia is not in the same position as other countries are in terms of its eligibility for early and full EU membership. Postponement of membership is justified by such policies as the amendment to the criminal code, the law on foundations, bills supporting the Matica Slovenska, efforts to undermine university autonomy, and the steps taken against the Hungarian minority. Ultimately, he believed, the governing coalition will no longer be able to ignore the connection between the strengthening of its internal power and the loss of respect for Slovakia abroad. It is this connection, he added, that is the greatest problem of Slovakia's current governing coalition. Some citizens of Slovakia, he concluded, question whether the governing coalition has any real interest in entering Western structures.

A participant from the governing coalition said that the note from the European Parliament was a typical example of the lack of fair play. It was sent without prior consultation with the other side and just before the arrival of members of the joint committee of the European Parliament and the National Council. The real purpose of these notes, he asserted, was to serve the interests of foreign investors seeking to participate in Slovakia's privatization process--which is an internal matter of the Slovak Republic. He added, however, that foreign investors are welcome in Slovakia if they seek to build new enterprises that will strengthen market competition. Finally, he mentioned that almost all the Slovak deputies in the Slovak parliament voted for the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty, while not a single Hungarian-speaking deputy voted either for the treaty or for the Council of Europe's Framework Agreement on the Protection of National Minorities.

Another participant, not from the governing coalition, said that the opposition agrees with the declared aims of the governing coalition regarding Slovakia's policy toward Western multilateral institutions. Nevertheless, he maintained, Slovakia is different from Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In these countries, the governing parties, as well as most of the parties represented in their parliaments, support the goal of full EU and NATO membership for their countries. They differ only about the timetable. In Slovakia, however, one of the parties in the governing coalition openly opposes Slovakia's entry into those structures. Hearing such statements from the coalition politicians, Western leaders are right to ask what the real position of Slovakia is.

Members of the governing coalition, he continued, often say that the coalition is not undertaking any unconstitutional steps, that the constitutional framework has not been broken, and that constitutional rules remain in effect. Nevertheless, the West has criticized the coalition's "majoritarian" understanding of democracy, which is at variance with internationally accepted democratic norms and practices. In order to overcome this discrepancy, certain measures are necessary--for example, allowing opposition deputies to participate in the parliamentary body that supervises the activity of the secret service. It is also necessary, he concluded, to consider the consequences and suitability of Western approaches to Slovakia in order that Western diplomacy not be counterproductive with respect to the basic goal of helping to reestablish democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition expressed the desire of his group that the Slovak-Hungarian treaty be ratified in the same form as it was signed--i.e., without any amendments. However, this proposal did not gain the necessary support of the parliament, and, given that fact, the Hungarian coalition deputies abstained from voting.

A participant from the governing coalition agreed with the notion that democracy is a historical process that, in its current phase, is focused on the implementation and observance of human-rights practices and norms. Western Europe has evolved new norms, which are different from those which were the standard during earlier periods of development. During the last fifty years, however, Slovakia has gone through an entirely different process of development; rather than evolving over time, Western norms are being implemented all at once. As far as minority rights are concerned, Slovakia fulfills these norms; indeed, it provides its minorities with protections that are well above the European standard. He also asserted that Western authorities judge Slovakia without being informed about Slovak reality. He illustrated this assertion by citing the case of the Gabcikovo Dam: Slovakia was criticized because it had fulfilled the agreement, while its partner, which actually broke the agreement, received international approval. And as in the case of the notes, he said, Slovakia often has not had a chance to explain itself on controversial issues.

A West European participant mentioned that, although Slovakia became a full member of the Council of Europe some time ago, the achievement of this status is not necessarily permanent. The council has established a system of monitoring to observe the maintenance of its standards, and Slovakia's performance is being evaluated by the same criteria as that of any other member of the council. The main goal of this monitoring is to remind member states of the principles upon which full membership in the Council of Europe depends. There are separate procedures for monitoring political issues, the implementation of the European Human Rights Convention, and so on. He stressed that human rights and democracy are not simply internal matters of member states. On the other hand, this monitoring is aimed not only at identifying shortcomings but also at providing constructive assistance. Criticism from the West is like criticism given and received "within the family," rather than an arrogant assertion that "we know better what to do." He acknowledged that defensiveness is a natural response to criticism, but for positive results to be achieved, it is necessary to explain and persuade, patiently and rationally. In this respect, he noted that Western institutions have their own channels through which they can regularly communicate with member governments.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition said that in many areas, including supervision of the secret service, privatization, the public media, and minority issues, Slovakia's policies are damaging the country's reputation abroad. He also pointed out several other problems with the governing coalition's foreign-policy activities: the speculation on the part of coalition members about the option of neutrality, their questioning of the usefulness of full NATO membership, and their frequent admonishments of Western politicians for "forgetting about Slovakia." He added that new developments in Slovak-Russian relations--such as the strengthening of energy dependence on Russia, the 1993 agreement on military cooperation, and the close working relationship between the Slovak and Russian secret services--are also matters of concern. He insisted that Slovakia is in fact moving toward the East, despite the declarations of its representatives to the contrary, whereas it is necessary to strengthen contacts with West European countries instead.

A West European participant stressed that formal declarations of full EU membership are not sufficient to ensure that all the principles of the EU are being upheld. While the control mechanisms of the EU may sometimes be regarded as interference in a state's internal affairs, any country that seeks full membership in the EU must accept the obligations that full membership entails. If Slovakia should eventually decline EU membership, the West must be prepared to accept the consequences. But it is also necessary to realize that membership in the EU involves certain limitations on state sovereignty.

A Slovak participant said that the citizens of Slovakia are wary of all forms of international "unions" because of the experience of previous decades. Although the necessity of Slovakia's full membership in Western institutions is often declared, it is seldom explained. The most important thing that the politicians can do for the people in this respect is to provide them with concrete information about the advantages and disadvantages that membership in Western structures will have for Slovakia. Without being reasonably informed, citizens will be confused, and the issues will not be resolved by calling a vote.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition stressed that he could not imagine a Europe where minorities did not have a right of veto on matters concerning their interests and identity. Regarding Slovakia's membership in Western structures, Slovak society should consider first whether Hungarians are to be included as full citizens of Slovakia. He agreed that Slovakia is a new state, which is in the process of establishing a parliamentary system and adapting to the norms of the EU, but he raised the question of whether majoritarian behavior toward minorities could be regarded as the norm of the EU. He also expressed concern over the failure of the Slovak constitution to accord a right of veto to Slovakia's minorities.

A participant from the governing coalition asserted that only a few European countries allow a minority veto, and there are several EU states in which the existence of minorities is not acknowledged at all. Regarding his coalition's policy toward Russia, he rejected the accusation of "energy dependence." He argued that the agreement with Russia on financing nuclear energy was signed only after the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development had denied Slovakia's application for credits. More generally, he pointed out that while we do not always understand the problems of Western countries, nobody ever challenges their democratic character. Regarding opposition to Slovakia's entry into Western institutions on the part of some members of the governing coalition, he stressed that it is both right and natural to ask what costs and benefits for Slovakia such membership entails. Another question is what alternatives Slovakia will have in the event that the country is not accepted by NATO. He stressed that it would be very bad if Slovakia has no alternatives.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition said that, from the opposition's perspective, there was not a struggle for power in Slovakia but a struggle for democracy. The question is not "Who has the power?" but "How is power being implemented?" Meetings of people from different parts of the political spectrum are very rare. The main problem is that there are very different understandings of democracy and a lack of dialogue between the governing coalition and the opposition. As far as Slovakia's foreign policy is concerned, the main disputes are among members of the governing coalition; the opposition has a united foreign-policy platform.

Another participant from the opposition asserted that the governing coalition seeks to divide people into "pro-Slovak" and "anti-Slovak" categories. The majority should realize that it came to power democratically and that democratic rule requires a tolerant attitude, both toward those who won only a minority of votes in the elections and toward those who are of different ethnic origins. The kind of dialogue that could help to overcome these barriers is absent in Slovakia. His political party, he said, is prepared for dialogue, but such dialogue must be initiated by the stronger partner--i.e., by the present governing coalition.

Another participant from the opposition pointed out that there is an established set of conditions for entering the EU, which includes a compatible level of economic development and a compatible legal system. Achieving these two criteria is not very difficult compared to meeting the remaining three conditions, which concern democracy, human rights, and minority rights. There are three positions regarding Slovakia's relations with the EU: neutrality; opposition (stressing the negative consequences of membership); and positive acceptance of membership. According to its own declarations, the governing coalition has adopted the positive attitude, and it should therefore consistently emphasize the positive aspects of EU membership for Slovakia.

A participant from the governing coalition maintained that Slovakia does have a genuine interest in entering both the EU and NATO. He also claimed that the opposition's allegations of an alliance between Slovakia and Russia were unfounded, adding that such allegations were examples of efforts being made to tarnish Slovakia's image in the West. He emphasized that the representatives of the EU have been informed by his coalition about the real state of Hungarian minority rights in the Slovak Republic and that this issue should therefore not be a barrier to Slovakia's membership in the EU. He supported the statement made by others that the standard of minority rights in Slovakia is very high.

A Slovak participant declared that Slovakia's domestic policy issues should be resolved domestically and that Western institutions should be careful not to present themselves as if they were members of an exclusive and superior club. On the contrary, European agencies should be very sensitive in their approach to countries that lack the benefits of a long period of democratic development. Before offering solutions to these countries' problems, European authorities should become better informed. One reason that European institutions are perceived as repressive by many Slovaks is that they lack accurate information about those institutions. What is needed is a more active and open discussion of both the positive and the negative aspects of integration. In order to overcome negative opinions, he said, it is important to make a clear distinction between a partial and voluntary limitation of sovereignty, as is required by EU integration, and the forceful and complete suppression of sovereignty, such as occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

A participant with a particular interest in the history of Slovak-Hungarian relations expressed his view of the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. He explained that there were two viewpoints regarding the treaty, one multilateral and the other bilateral. The young Slovak Republic has an inherent interest in normalizing Slovak-Hungarian relations, since the two states have a common border, reciprocal minorities, and common problems. He cautioned against expecting both too much and too little of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. Relations between the two countries are complex and will take some time to work out. In this process, he said, creating an atmosphere of confidence is of utmost importance. The treaty's success requires the political commitment of both sides, as well as mutual tolerance. He suggested, however, that the Hungarian government had its own interpretation of the treaty's provisions for minority rights. The Hungarian government's effort to promote its interpretation threatens to create new problems because of its practice of intervening in the internal affairs of neighboring states. As an example, he mentioned the recent Slovak Law on the State Language, which the Hungarian side had sought to block by any means possible.

A participant from the opposition suggested that the key to understanding the differences between the governing coalition and the opposition lies in their competing conceptions of Slovakia. The coalition begins from the assumptions that the Slovak Republic is in the process of transition and that the special circumstances of transition require laws that are not common in democratic Europe--for example, the recent amendment to the criminal code. The opposition presumes that Slovakia is already a democratic country with democratic experience gained during the first Czechoslovak Republic and during the struggle for democracy under Communism. Accordingly, the laws being passed now are not temporary but will determine the character of the country for decades to come. That is why the opposition demands that all current laws be fully democratic in character.

Another participant mentioned a specific article of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty concerning equality for minorities. In his view, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia should insist upon having the same rights as the Slovak minority in Hungary--in other words, reciprocity. He cited as exemplary the reciprocal agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark. However, he continued, Hungary's leaders have a different attitude, as was shown by the Hungarian president's rejection of the reciprocity principle as far back as 1990. He maintained that it is well known that minority rights in Slovakia and Hungary are not equal at all, a fact confirmed by many official visitors from abroad. According to this participant, this is why the representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia are strongly against the reciprocity principle; they fear it will further weaken their rights in Slovakia.

Another participant mentioned the statement by the prime minister of Slovakia that the nations of the former "Visegrad four" group were not coordinating their actions concerning prospective EU membership. It seemed to him that Slovakia was seeking to exploit the myth that Slovakia is the unwanted child and is being unjustly criticized. This myth, he said, is accepted by a part of Slovak public opinion. He added, however, that even the opposition exaggerates the importance of the geopolitical position of Slovakia in Europe. In his view, the most visible difference between Slovakia and the other members of the Visegrad group is illustrated by the fact that, after the split of Czechoslovakia, the big issue in the Czech Republic has been about "the Czechs in Europe," while in Slovakia it has been about "the Slovaks in Slovakia."

A participant from the United States said that the U.S. government is committed to the process of integrating new democracies into Western institutions. This integration is political, social, and economic in nature, rather than military or strategic. The U.S. government does not see any direct military threat to Europe. The enlargement of NATO is being undertaken in order to provide a security framework for an integrated Europe and is not intended as a threat to any country. The role played by NATO after World War II in integrating the former fascist countries into a common security system can also be played now for the postsocialist new democracies. He noted that there is general agreement that Slovakia belongs to Europe--indeed, that it has been in the center of Europe for centuries.

During a visit to Slovakia last year, this participant continued, the U.S. secretary of defense pointed to several basic conditions that had to be met prior to membership in NATO: democracy, transformation to a market economy, good relations with neighboring countries, and a defense policy compatible with the policy of NATO. The participant went on to say that the main role of NATO is no longer military but rather the defense and enforcement of the common values of its members. It is now clear to everyone that a return to Communism is impossible. However, the emergence of a certain type of Central European "peronism," based on nationalism, remains a real possibility. Each country in this region faces similar problems, although to different degrees. He insisted that the United States is "pro-Slovak," in the sense that it supports the integration efforts of Slovakia and the establishment of good relations with its neighboring countries. On the issue of Slovak-Russian relations, he expressed the belief that Russia views international relations through pre-1989 or even nineteenth-century lenses, which focus on maintaining a balance between "them" and "us." Accordingly, many Russians think that any enlargement of NATO inevitably poses a threat to Russia. He rejects this logic. In his view, the enlargement of Western institutions is in Russia's own interest, because Russia is now a potential partner in European and Atlantic integrations. In any case, the United States does not want Russia or any country of the region to be isolated.

Another participant from the United States said that the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into Western structures ought not be considered a race in which there will be winners and losers. Eventually, all countries will be winners in this "race," though some will be winners sooner than others. He regards the establishment of the Partnership for Peace program to be a very important step on the way to full integration. Associate membership in the EU plays the same role. He said that each country has the right to determine its own contribution to the creation of a new Europe. No small countries will be excluded by larger ones.

A West European participant added that Slovakia is not isolated and is a member of a number of international organizations.

ETHNIC RELATIONS

PER's president opened this part of the discussion by acknowledging that ethnic relations are the source of a number of conflicts and controversies, but he expressed the hope that participants would not dwell on complaints and accusations. He said that he was aware that the different parties will not give up their principles, yet he believed that it was nonetheless possible to achieve a certain amount of progress. He pointed out that, on the one hand, there is a real fear of the possibility of the disintegration of Slovakia and there are legitimate objections to the policies of Budapest. On the other hand, there is an equally legitimate fear of the erosion of minority rights, the decline of minority culture, and the creation of a group of second-class citizens.

He went on to say that, in his view, the statements of politicians are often exaggerated, and so the threats to Slovakia are not as great as they are sometimes presented by politicians. International organizations cannot resolve these problems unless a consensus is reached in Slovakia. He appealed to both sides to express their demands and claims openly and to propose possible solutions. They should also consider and discuss what they are willing to give up and what compromises they would make in order to achieve gains for everybody. He also pointed out that all the inhabitants of Slovakia are in the same boat and should think of themselves in that way. Finally, he appealed to the representatives of the Hungarian minority to be more candid in expressing their views of the problems they face and the fears they have.

PER's executive director added that, in view of the war in Bosnia, the ethnic issue cannot be regarded as only a human-rights issue. It is also a security issue, which can destabilize a country and even an entire region.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition brought up the negative consequences of some recently passed Slovak laws, particularly the Law on the State Language and the Law on Regional Division and Administration. The first of these replaced a law that had allowed the use of minority languages in administrative proceedings in places where the minority constituted more than 20 percent of the population. This law had been consistent with the Slovak constitution. Under the new law, the use of minority languages in administrative proceedings is no longer allowed.

Another participant maintained that it is necessary to create the foundations of a civil society simultaneously with the establishment of the foundations of a new state. The first task is to integrate society, and the state language is one important integrative element. The language situation must be brought to the level of the developed countries of the world. Members of the Hungarian minority may view this as a form of discrimination, but after a generation, they will be able to appreciate the results of these regulations. The state language is valid over the entire territory of the state, which is why minority languages cannot be used in administrative proceedings. However, the language law is a matter of political prestige for some representatives of the Hungarian intelligentsia, and so they continue to dispute it.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition mentioned several examples of the effects of the Law on the State Language. Hungarian-language descriptions are being removed from the previously bilingual signs in a museum in the southern part of Slovakia; and, according to the regulations issued by the Ministry of Culture, the use of minority languages in civil wedding ceremonies is no longer to be permitted. Minority languages can be used only in cultural activities that accompany the wedding.

Another participant from the Hungarian coalition focused on what he viewed as the psychological dimension of the problem. He argued that the coalition is demanding the resolution of real problems encountered by Slovak citizens who are of Hungarian background. There are six hundred thousand citizens in the Slovak Republic who declare themselves to be of Hungarian national origin. The majority of Slovaks see this as a threat. In fact, he said, it is not a threat at all, as these people are also citizens of Slovakia who are seeking only guarantees for their cultural development. He stressed that they want these guarantees in the form of a constitutional law that would protect their identity and their social and cultural development. Hungarians are afraid that the present governing coalition is bent on coercive assimilation, and they regard the present situation as worse than that which prevailed under Communism. The Slovak majority wants a homogeneous state, and the government interprets this to mean that the assimilation of the Hungarian minority is a necessity.

A participant from the governing coalition sought to describe the composition of the territory of Slovakia where most Hungarians live. She pointed out that, besides the half-million citizens who claim Hungarian nationality and those Roma (Gypsies) who declare themselves to be Hungarians, almost one million ethnic Slovaks live in that area. There are purely Hungarian villages, purely Slovak villages, and a number of ethnically mixed villages. She said that her main concern is the problems of the Slovak minority in this territory. She expressed a strong belief that they should be represented through self-governing bodies and that there ought to be Slovak schools, a Slovak press, and Slovak-language broadcasts on local radio stations. She added that, ever since the government had taken an interest in the situation of Slovaks who live in the southern part of Slovakia, many protests had arisen, coming almost exclusively from political parties of the Hungarian minority rather than from Hungarian civic associations. She also argued that the Law on the State Language does not deal with the use of minority languages in administrative proceedings. She noted that Slovakia will soon ratify the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages, claiming that all the necessary conditions are currently being met by Slovakia. She rejected as untrue the assertion that there is a legal vacuum in Slovakia regarding the use of minority languages. She said there are thirteen laws and thirty-five ministerial decrees that make the use of minority languages possible. The Law on the State Language prohibits only the exclusive use of the Hungarian language in the south of Slovakia, as had been the case prior to the passage of the law.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition contended that the main problem is that the "20-percent clause" of the previous language law has been eliminated and that there is now no legal norm regulating the use of minority languages in administrative proceedings. Those norms and decrees that have been passed deal only marginally with this issue, by regulating specific uses of minority languages--for example, in the courts. He pointed out that there are four hundred villages in Slovakia that have Hungarian majorities. Some of these villages have no school, some have only Slovak schools, and some have only Hungarian schools. It is very hard to estimate the number of pupils attending schools in which the language of instruction is other than their mother tongue.

A participant from the governing coalition insisted that some city and village councils deliberately violate the requirement of the Law on the State Language that they conduct their sessions in the state language. In some villages where 30 percent or more of the citizens are of Hungarian nationality, the majority of the council deputies are of Hungarian nationality. As for the effects of the law on weddings, he asserted that only the documents, not the actual ceremonies, must be in the Slovak language, a procedure that, he claimed, is advantageous for those Hungarian couples who later move out of southern Slovakia.

One participant from the Hungarian minority said that, in his view, the fears of the Hungarian coalition concerning the language law are irrational. The minister of the interior and a number of representatives of the governing coalition have stated that the law does not deal with minority languages at all. Where controversial regulations have appeared, they have not been central directives but have been the work of subordinate or local officials. The problem is that the officials of central bodies have failed to ensure the proper implementation of the law, and so subordinates in the regions are acting on their own. They probably are unaware of the existence of the thirteen relevant norms and concentrate only on the Law on the State Language.

A participant from the governing coalition explained that a law on minority languages is currently being drafted. He pointed out that the Hungarian coalition had drawn up its own bill on minority languages, which includes a "10-percent clause" for the use of minority languages in administrative proceedings. He also pointed out that a "25-percent clause" is in effect in Austria. The law under preparation by the governing coalition plans to reintroduce the "20-percent clause." However, he is convinced that even now it is possible to conduct local administration in Hungarian in virtually every ethnically mixed village, regardless of the size of the Hungarian minority. In any case, the absence of an appropriate law is only temporary, and meanwhile, constitutional guarantees of the use of minority languages remain in effect. The law will be enacted shortly. He challenged the earlier claim regarding the use of Hungarian in museums and stated that Hungarian signs have been removed only from the general expositions. Those expositions that are related to Hungarian minority culture will continue to have Hungarian signs.

A participant from an organization of the Slovak intelligentsia argued that every citizen of Slovakia ought to be able to speak and to write in the state language. He contended that the present situation is the result of seventy-five years of linguistically segregated education in Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian-language "ghetto" in the southern part of Slovakia must be abolished. On the other hand, he said, the Slovaks in Hungary have been assimilated to such a degree that only a few among them can still speak and write the Slovak language.

A participant from the opposition stated that there have been two significant developments since PER held its last Slovak roundtable, in June 1995. First, the Slovak-Hungarian treaty that guarantees the full range of individual rights for the Hungarian minority has been ratified. Second, and inconsistently, the Law on the State Language has been passed, thereby creating a legal vacuum concerning the use of minority languages in administrative proceedings. The government promised that a law on minority languages would be passed soon, but there are two camps within the governing coalition. One does support passage of such a law, while the other argues that the accession of Slovakia to the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages is sufficient. He asserted that the current legal vacuum creates room for differing interpretations. Officials at the ministries continue to make decisions that are at variance with the interstate treaty.

A participant from the governing coalition said that certain basic concepts should have been explained at the start of the discussion. The "protection of national minorities" is defined in the relevant international documents as the protection of each person in all aspects of his or her identity, and it calls for guarantees against discrimination. However, this phrase does not mean the promotion of ethnic separatism or self-exclusion or the creation of ethnic ghettos. The Framework Agreement of the Council of Europe on the Protection of National Minorities also provides for the integration of minorities into the larger society. The problem of how to achieve a viable balance probably will not be resolved as long as political parties based on the ethnic principle are dominant.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition maintained that these problems arise from the fact that minorities are now being deprived of established rights. City and village councils, she stated, did not intend to exclude the Slovak language from all administrative proceedings. They simply acted in accordance with the constitutional norm that permits the use of minority languages in such proceedings. They also wanted to place the use of the Hungarian language on an equal footing with the use of the Slovak language. She also said that, in her view, the so-called "10-percent clause" in the Hungarian coalition's bill on minority languages was not designed with Hungarians in mind, because there were only about twenty villages with between 10 and 20 percent of Hungarians. Rather, she claimed, the clause was designed mainly for Ruthenians. What is being overlooked, she said, is that the present government is acting in accordance with another constitutional norm, the one that defines the Slovak Republic as a national state. The preamble of the Law on the State Language declares that the Slovak language is a manifestation of the sovereignty of the state. In her opinion, this means that any person who does not speak Slovak in effect violates the sovereignty of the state.

Another participant said that recent public-opinion polls had found that most Slovaks are convinced that the Hungarian minority already possesses guaranteed rights and protections for their cultural development, while most Hungarians are convinced of the opposite. Different perceptions of the minority policy of the government also exist. The present government is often criticized for its privatization policy, but three-quarters of Slovaks viewed the minority policy of the government in late 1995 either in a positive light or ambivalently. However, three-quarters of ethnic Hungarians viewed it negatively. According to another opinion poll, taken in February 1996, almost one-half of Hungarians living in Slovakia regarded ethnic territorial autonomy approvingly, whereas 82 percent of Slovaks were against it. This finding is probably related to another: that one-third of Slovaks believe that the hidden goal of Hungarians is to change the borders of the state. Another one-third does not believe that, while the remaining one-third has no opinion on the issue. Actually, 92 percent of Hungarians in Slovakia are against separation. However, the opinions of the two groups are closer regarding the Slovak-Hungarian treaty.

The following conclusions can be drawn, said this participant: First, the minority policy of the present government is being perceived positively by a majority of the population. Therefore, the government has a specific responsibility in its approach to this problem. On the other hand, the Hungarian side should define more precisely its position on the issue of territorial autonomy, since this is the issue of greatest anxiety for the majority of Slovaks. Finally, the similarity of attitudes toward the Slovak-Hungarian treaty shows that there is a possibility for consensus.

A participant from the governing coalition asserted that, according to both the constitution of the Slovak Republic and international charters, a state has two kinds of responsibility toward its minorities: first, to protect minorities, guarantee their rights, and create optimal conditions for the preservation and development of their ethnic, cultural, and religious identity; and second, to create conditions for the integration of minorities into the society of the state in which they live. The first of these responsibilities is being fulfilled by the Slovak state. Where problems have appeared, the state has worked to solve them. The Slovak state has encountered difficulties mainly with representatives of the Hungarian minority who see a threat of assimilation in the state's effort to integrate the Hungarian minority into Slovak society. These Hungarians are pursuing an ethnocentric policy, one that would inevitably lead to ethnic isolation and the creation of a ghetto, which should not be the aim of minority policy in a democratic state. The question is whether there is a real threat of the assimilation of Hungarians in Slovakia. Population statistics suggest that there is not. Since 1961, the number of Hungarians in Slovakia has steadily grown. Slovakia is the only country in Europe where this is true. The birth rate of Hungarians is much lower than that of Slovaks, so this trend can be explained only by the assimilation to Hungarian culture of non-Hungarian nationalities in Slovakia.

Another participant declared that some Hungarian minority representatives advocate the right to "self-determination," which in fact means the right to their own state. But this is an unrealistic political aspiration. Furthermore, the often-heard phrase "a peace dictated from Trianon" is an expression of Hungarian revanchism. The representatives of the Hungarian minority accept neither the dominant status of the Slovak language nor the possibility of the so-called "alternative education." The "South Tyrolean model" is based on this type of education and is often mentioned as a model to be followed. It is necessary to put political pressure on Budapest and on political leaders of the Hungarian minority to abandon the political philosophy of collective rights based on the ethnic principle. The assistance of international institutions in shaping the way in which history, political science, and civic education are taught in Hungary is also necessary.

A participant from the governing coalition observed that the chairman of one of the political parties of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia recently pledged to take steps toward the attainment of territorial autonomy for ethnic Hungarians if the Slovak government rejected the "Komarno Appeal" of 1994, which called for the creation of new regional divisions in southern Slovakia that would reflect the actual ethnic composition of the region. This statement, she said, is strong evidence of freedom of speech in Slovakia. On the other hand, statements of this kind do not contribute to the preservation of a peaceful atmosphere in southern Slovakia. Instead, they arouse fears among the Slovak population, who still remember the negative experiences of the past. She also spoke about the alleged legal vacuum created by the passage of the Law on the State Language. Slovakia has ratified a great number of international documents which, according to the Slovak constitution, take priority over Slovak laws. In addition, she mentioned the fourteen laws of the Slovak Republic that guarantee minority rights. One may wonder whether the problem is the protection of minorities or a search for more power by politicians from the Hungarian minority. She also pointed out that there are twelve other minorities in Slovakia; among them, the greatest attention should be paid to the Roma, who have the lowest social and cultural status.

A West European participant stressed the decisive role played by politicians in a democratic society as the citizens' representatives. In this respect, he mentioned the statement by the former Hungarian prime minister that he considered himself to be the representative of fifteen million Hungarians. This, he said, is an example of a negative and irresponsible attitude. He added that the present moment provides a historic opportunity for both Slovakia and Hungary to build better relations, and it must not be wasted. Nevertheless, unless all political parties make a serious effort to overcome their distrust, all of them will lose.

THE HUNGARIAN COALITION PROPOSALS

A participant from the Hungarian coalition said that the coalition's claims are few. Of six proposals that have been drawn up, two can be achieved right now and two others in a short time, although the last two have a prospective character. The biggest problem in Slovakia, he went on, is the lack of a coherent vision of the future. All of Slovakia's international, internal, and minority problems are owed to this shortcoming. He said that he considers himself to be a European, and as such he supports European and Atlantic integration. He sees Slovakia as a multiethnic and multicultural society, in which Hungarians want to base their coexistence with Slovaks on the principle of a multiethnic state. Because the governing coalition has the power, the Hungarian coalition must rely on principles and dialogue. He proceeded to present the six proposals of the Hungarian coalition:

1. Restoration of minority subsidies to the level of 1994. In 1995 and 1996, only 58 million Slovak korunas were appropriated for assistance to minority cultures, compared to 140 million in 1994.
2. Control over minority subsidies. In the past, each minority had its own body to oversee the distribution of grants for cultural activities. Today, this is done by the state culture fund, "Pro Slovakia," where grants are distributed by friends of the minister of culture. The Hungarian minority, said the participant, has yet to receive anything, even though financial support for minority cultures is guaranteed by law.
Greater autonomy for minority-language schools, instead of the forcible centralization of the educational system.
Support for the musical ensemble "Young Hearts." This is a semiprofessional ensemble of citizens of the Hungarian nationality in Slovakia, the only one of its kind, and it has been in existence for more than forty years. It has been abolished by a decree of the Ministry of Culture, the very ministry that used to support it.
Establishment of a private business academy in which the language of instruction is Hungarian. Ethnic Hungarian businessmen from Slovakia have sought to establish such an academy near the town of Nitra, but the Ministry of Education has disallowed it precisely because the language of instruction was to be Hungarian, even though a spokesman for the school has agreed that three special subjects would be taught in Slovak. The ministry has decreed that the school will not be permitted to operate unless all subjects are taught bilingually.
Passage of a law on the protection of minority languages. The Hungarian coalition has drafted a bill on this issue, based on relevant documents of the Council of Europe.
Passage of constitutional provisions concerning minorities and minority law. The Hungarian coalition is proceeding from the principle that all rights and duties of both the majority and minorities should be defined by these provisions. The coalition has already prepared drafts of them.

The participant stressed the willingness of the Hungarian coalition to enter into dialogue with representatives of the governing coalition and of Slovak society generally. He added that he viewed the present roundtable as an opportunity for representatives of all parties to declare their political will to pass such laws.

A participant from a Hungarian political party that is not a member of the Hungarian coalition declared that his political movement was an outgrowth of the belief that the policy of the coalition was leading to distrust. He said that his party's view is that it is necessary to renew dialogue not only with the opposition but also with the governing coalition and especially with its leading party. He emphasized that his movement supports Slovak statehood and demands that the state acknowledge Slovak citizens of Hungarian nationality as equal citizens of the state, entitled to all of the rights guaranteed by the constitution and by international documents that have been ratified by the Slovak Republic. He also noted that his movement does not support all aspects of the Law on the State Language, nor does it support the new regional districts of the Slovak Republic. According to this participant, the main source of tension is the poor socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the southern parts of Slovakia, where the unemployment rate is high, partly as a result of the decline in agricultural production in recent years. He stressed the need for greater cooperation with the Slovak government in order to bring about peaceful coexistence between Slovaks and Hungarians in their common native land.

Responding to the proposals of the Hungarian coalition, a participant from the governing coalition said that financial support of minority cultures is a complex problem and is dependent upon the financial means at the disposal of the state, which have declined significantly in recent years. However, he acknowledged that it is possible to discuss changes in the distribution mechanism. As to the ensemble "Young Hearts," he agreed that it has the right to exist and suggested that it would be useful to take up the dispute with the minister of culture. According to this participant, the government is also willing to discuss the issue of the private business academy. He expressed his confidence that a law on minority languages would be passed shortly.

Another participant from the governing coalition asserted that the Slovak Ministry of Culture is trying to develop an optimal model of financing minority cultures in coordination with the Council of Europe and with countries that have similar problems. The "Young Hearts" ensemble lost state support, he said, because it violated budgetary rules. The fact that the ensemble has survived for more than forty years is proof that it can and will continue to exist under different rules as well.

Participants from the opposition parties supported the first five proposals of the Hungarian coalition. They contended that a number of state institutions could have been abolished for violation of budgetary rules and that the state has no right to determine how private money will be spent. Furthermore, they stated that the Law on the State Language violates their rights as well. Although the constitution guarantees some rights, it offers little protection in practice because implementation laws have not yet been passed. Therefore, passage of a law on use of minority languages is an urgent priority. They did not support the sixth proposal, both because constitutional amendments are legally and politically difficult to enact and because constitutional provisions concerning minorities are not necessary. What is essential is to strengthen the competencies of local self-government in the areas of education and culture over the whole territory of Slovakia.

A West European participant remarked that the language law has many questionable aspects. He appreciated that the Slovak Republic would like to accede to the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages, but, while the charter may provide a useful framework, it cannot replace a domestic law on minority languages. On the other hand, he said, the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty was a step in the right direction. He emphasized that it is in the interest of all political parties for all citizens of Slovakia to feel that they have something in common. This goal requires joint discussions and an agreement on how to coexist in Slovakia.

GOVERNING COALITION PROPOSALS

A participant from the governing coalition said that ever since the Slovak Republic was established, it has been presented as if it were a country where the Hungarian minority has no rights, receives no money, and so on. To counter this image, Slovakia initiated a policy of "open diplomacy," in which a number of commissioners and fact-finding missions from abroad were invited to monitor the situation for themselves. The reports by the high commissioner of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and by the mission of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe confirmed that Slovakia was not violating any international norms. Indeed, Slovakia has paid a great deal of attention to the creation of legal protections for its minorities. It has also participated in several international forums on minority rights, including the Human Dimension of the OSCE, the U.N. Committee on Minorities, the Conference on Stability Pact sponsored by the EU, and the Council of Europe's Framework Agreement on the Protection of Minorities. Slovakia signed and ratified the framework agreement and has prepared a report on how the agreement is being implemented in Slovakia. Concrete facts are published in this document, such as the numbers of schools and periodicals. This analysis has been submitted to Hungary, and now Slovakia is waiting for the Hungarian government to issue its analysis of the situation of Slovaks in Hungary. He maintained that the entire European community is satisfied, except for one minority. He then proceeded to introduce six Slovak proposals, analogous to those presented by the Hungarian coalition. These proposals called on the Hungarian coalition to:

Issue a declaration in support of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.
Issue a declaration in support of the Framework Agreement of the Council of Europe on the Protection of Minorities.
Issue a declaration in support of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty, which is based on individual rights for minorities.
Declare loyalty to the Slovak Republic.
Reject both ethnic separatism and autonomist claims.
Support a system of alternative bilingual education for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia that does not threaten the identity of the minority but does promote mutual understanding among Slovakia's citizens.

Finally, he commented on the proposals of the Hungarian coalition. He rejected the idea of a constitutional provision on minorities, which, he argued, would serve to single out one category of the citizens in terms of rights. According to the constitution, all citizens have equal rights, and such a provision would only provoke conflicts in ethnically mixed regions. However, he added that he does support the passage of a law on minority languages and considers this demand to be legitimate. Regarding the system of financial aid to minority cultures, he said that the state is not legally obliged by any international document to furnish such aid. Nevertheless, Slovakia is currently initiating a new system of financing for specific projects. The Hungarian declaration of loyalty, he maintained, is only a formal statement, while a desire for ethnic separatism can be inferred from concrete actions. For example, if someone demands the election of a bishop on ethnic grounds, that is a form of ethnic separatism. If someone supports autonomy "in principle," it is evidence of self-exclusion and of separatism. Central Europe is an ethnically mixed region. If anyone seeks to construct social or political relations on an ethnic principle, it could easily lead to tragedy. All citizens have equal rights and freedoms, but they have obligations as well. The situation is abnormal when representatives of the Hungarian community prefer to communicate with other states rather than with their own state. The Slovak state is willing to listen to them and is confident that all problems can be resolved. The representatives of the Hungarian minority must accept the existence of the Slovak Republic and behave accordingly.

A participant from the Hungarian opposition said that he would declare loyalty to the state if he knew what such "loyalty" entailed. He complained that, unfortunately, the situation in Slovakia today is such that the mere expression of political disagreement by a citizen of Hungarian nationality is automatically interpreted as an act of disloyalty. Such behavior is indicative of the ethnic segregation which prevails today in Slovak politics.

A participant from the opposition who is a lawyer attempted to define the legal content of a declaration of loyalty. In his view, such a declaration would include the following declarations:

We regard the Slovak Republic to be our state.
We acknowledge the constitution of the Slovak Republic.
We respect the laws of the Slovak Republic.
We acknowledge the constitutionally sanctioned institutions of the Slovak Republic.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition said that the deputies of the coalition have already declared their loyalty to the constitution twice. Admittedly, they did not support the passage of the constitution in parliament; and, although they acknowledge the Framework Agreement and support the Slovak-Hungarian treaty, they declined to vote for the treaty because they did not agree with the amendment that was included with it. They believe that this amendment would take away some of their rights, which are otherwise guaranteed by the treaty. She suggested that the Slovak demands for a loyalty declaration should be resolved together with Hungarian demands for legal guarantees for minorities. A law should be passed that would clearly define the rights and obligations of the state with respect to minorities as well as the rights and obligations of the minorities with respect to the state. A declaration of loyalty would then be a natural corollary.

This participant went on to say that the constitution of the Slovak Republic defines the republic first as the "state of the Slovak nation," and only at the end of the preamble does it refer to Slovakia as a "state of all citizens," including citizens of non-Slovak nationality. She proposed that the constitution be amended to reflect the state-establishing role of national minorities as well. In her view, no one has yet declared that he or she does not acknowledge the constitution and laws of the Slovak Republic, nor does any political party advocate separation from Slovakia. She believes that the requirement that minorities pledge themselves to reject ethnic separatism and the idea of autonomy is tantamount to asking minorities to relinquish their identity--yet the right to choose one's own identity is a basic human right, as is the right to develop one's own culture. By the interpretation suggested earlier, virtually anything could be regarded as ethnic separatism.

On the issue of autonomy, she said that in the absence of specific mechanisms, it is impossible to implement the rights guaranteed by the constitution. For instance, the constitution guarantees a citizen's right to an education in his or her mother tongue, but the mechanism that would help to implement this right simply does not exist. Indeed, only a few people at the Ministry of Education even deal with minority education. Given this situation, it is necessary that minorities have the right to define and defend their collective interests and have the possibility of enforcing their rights. As to the issue of bilingual education, she noted that no Hungarian representative has ever opposed the requirement of learning the Slovak language. On the other hand, all parents must have the freedom to decide what sort of education their children will have. This right is constantly being undermined by the government generally and by the Ministry of Education particularly.

To require a declaration of loyalty from Slovak citizens of Hungarian nationality but not from other Slovak citizens, she concluded, is a form of ethnic discrimination. Although Slovak citizens of Hungarian nationality acknowledge the constitution and laws of the Slovak Republic and properly pay their taxes, they are still not considered "loyal." Yet both international conventions and the Slovak Constitution guarantee the same rights and obligations to all citizens.

Concerning the amendment to the Slovak-Hungarian treaty, a participant from the governing coalition stated that it deals only with the Slovak Republic, prohibiting the government from allowing the implementation of collective rights and autonomist claims. It is fully consistent with international documents, including the recent document of the Venice Commission. The opposition of the Hungarian coalition to this amendment can only mean that its members are unwilling to give up their demands for collective rights and territorial autonomy. However, recent international documents forbid the resolution of disputes in favor of minorities in regions where minorities do not form a majority. The declaration of loyalty that has been referred to is being required from the representatives of the Hungarian minority because they, and only they, have advocated one common native land for all Hungarians.

PER's president reiterated that universal definitions and resolutions are difficult to achieve. It is up to the citizens of Slovakia to define the framework in which resolutions will be found. These resolutions will have to satisfy the aspirations and concerns of the Slovak majority and the Hungarian and other minorities. A very important element in achieving a successful resolution is that all parties make an effort to understand each other. He expressed his appreciation that the Hungarian participants had defined their demands and articulated concrete problems.

A West European participant pointed to the historical reconciliation of the French and German peoples and appealed for a similar reconciliation of Hungarians and Slovaks. He said that Communism had collapsed because the culture of fear, which had dominated this part of the world for so long, had ceased to exist. Unfortunately, he noted, the present discussion shows that many fears yet remain, including fears of national assimilation and fears of territorial autonomy and ethno-territorial separation. It is both necessary and possible to overcome these fears. After all, hundreds of millions of citizens of the EU member states have managed to defeat them.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition said that all problems are a product of the current political climate. A satisfactory resolution of minority issues can hardly be achieved in such an intolerant atmosphere as now prevails in Slovakia.

An observer from Slovakia described a concrete solution aimed at the regional level, based on an ongoing foundation project. This project consisted of two parts. First, a public-opinion poll was conducted among 1,650 respondents to find out what were the issues of greatest concern and what actions were needed to resolve them. Second, the results of the poll were and are being applied through concrete measures for the promotion of interethnic cooperation. Seventeen psychiatrists and psychologists, both Slovak and Hungarian, were selected on a competitive basis to participate in a specially designed year-long program. Currently, the program is being expanded to include mayors, clergymen, teachers, and students from the southern region of Slovakia. Altogether, forty people participated in the first round. The purpose of this training is to show people how to behave effectively and confidently yet not aggressively. The project will continue to expand, with about five hundred people participating over the next couple of years. More training centers will be established. He added that a similar project will be launched to improve relations between the Roma and other ethnic groups.

A participant from the governing coalition agreed that most ethnic problems are of a political nature. International observers have confirmed that the constitution of the Slovak Republic is a democratic one. It goes far toward providing a significant measure of minority-rights protections. The Slovak-Hungarian treaty should be understood as further evidence that the Slovak Republic is developing normal and functioning relations with Hungary.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition reasserted that his political party supports the constitution despite having certain reservations, and he supports such resolutions of minority issues as would be consistent with the constitution. He also said that he respects the principles contained in the Framework Agreement. He pointed out that deputies from the Hungarian coalition support the Slovak-Hungarian treaty fully and do not demand any amendments to it. Instead, his political party requires only that the principles contained in the treaty be effectively implemented. Regarding the loyalty issue, he said that all deputies already have taken an oath to uphold the constitution and that this should be regarded as a sufficient expression of loyalty. No other oath is necessary. He pointed out that statements by Hungarian minority representatives are often judged differently from those of representatives of the governing coalition. On the question of ethnic separatism and autonomy, he maintained that the preservation of national identity is not the same thing as ethnic separatism; what the Hungarians want is merely to preserve and develop their identity. He also stated that they do not support bilingual education.

A participant from the governing coalition said she was confident that the first four proposals of the Hungarian coalition could be carried out, but the remaining two will require further discussions. She appreciated the position of the opposition, which, she felt, essentially supported the position of the Slovak government. On the other hand, she said, she was disappointed with what she viewed as an unconstructive attitude on the part of the Hungarian participants.

A West European participant proposed, as a practical step, the appointment of an independent ombudsman for national minorities.

A participant from the opposition stated that the first priority is to ensure that all citizens have access to legal means for defending their rights. He expressed concern that the proposed reform of electoral districts might result in a situation where not a single Hungarian minority representative could be elected to parliament. According to this participant, the oath to uphold the constitution, which is required of all deputies, is sufficient to ensure their loyalty to the Slovak Republic. The demand of the national majority that the minority should separately declare their loyalty reflects unfounded fears and a lack of trust.

This participant acknowledged that the claims to autonomy do arouse genuine anxiety. In his view, however, much of this anxiety is due to the fact that the term is poorly defined. Everybody has a different interpretation of what "autonomy" means. Therefore, it is essential that the term be clarified, especially when it is used in declarations by Hungarian coalition politicians. He pointed out that the constitution of the Slovak Republic does not contain the word "autonomy," which means that the constitution does not sanction it. In any case, the issue of autonomy will always provoke tensions, anxieties, and conflicts in Slovakia. He appealed to the delegates from the Hungarian coalition to be explicit about what is intended by their demand for "educational and cultural autonomy."

A participant who is a Slovak living in Hungary emphasized the results of the different historical experiences in dealing with minority issues in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia. After the Trianon Peace Conference of 1919, a large Slovak community remained in Hungary, and many Hungarians stayed in Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia had access to education in the Hungarian language, as well as to other political and cultural institutions. On the other hand, Hungary's approach to its minorities was based on the concept of assimilation, so that the Slovaks did not have their own schools or other cultural institutions. Consequently, there is now in Slovakia a large, self-conscious Hungarian minority, while in Hungary there are only the dying remnants of a Slovak minority. Given this situation, he concluded, even the recent Hungarian law on nationalities will be of little help, since it is effective only for conscious minorities.

A representative of the governing coalition returned to the question of amending the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. Slovakia, he said, is prepared to implement and even enhance individual rights but will not recognize collective rights. Slovakia will fulfill the treaty on the basis of individual rights, since it is the opinion of the Venice Commission that no international charter recognizes the legitimacy of collective rights.

A participant from the governing coalition said that the Ministry of Culture supports minority cultural unions and periodicals, as well as a nonperiodical press, although it gives preference to financing more concrete projects. Regarding the dispute over the "Young Hearts" ensemble, he said that the ministry has not abolished the ensemble but has only changed the arrangement of its financing.

Another participant suggested that the tensions between Slovaks and Hungarians are deeply rooted in historical prejudices. Nevertheless, the requirement that Hungarians separately declare their loyalty to the Slovak Republic apparently has the support of both the coalition and the opposition. The loyalty issue, he said, might best be resolved through a "treaty" between the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority--on the model of the treaty between Slovakia and Hungary--although the atmosphere is not yet ripe for such an action. What is required is patient dialogue. According to public-opinion polls, he continued, at least 50 percent of Slovak citizens desire a more strict enforcement of Slovak national interests vis-�-vis the Hungarian minority. On the other hand, 91 percent of the Hungarians living in Slovakia prefer the route of patient dialogue with the Slovak majority. Only 3 percent of Hungarians have irredentist tendencies, and so a verbal declaration of loyalty is neither necessary nor helpful. Even though the Slovak-Hungarian treaty has been signed and ratified, relations between the two groups remain tense and uncertain.

CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS

A participant from the opposition said that to require a declaration of loyalty from only one group is unacceptable. However, he said, he hoped that progress could be made without convening a third roundtable, for it is necessary to continue dialogue without help from abroad. He proposed the establishment of a working group to address daily problems, to prepare the basis for negotiations, and to otherwise assist in resolving interethnic disputes.

A participant from the United States said that the U.S. government does not have any definitive responses to the questions raised here. He agreed that international conventions on human and minority rights do not endorse separatism or ethnic autonomy, although such endorsement is possible in the future. Washington does not support territorial changes or the revisions of borders as solutions to communal, ethnic, or national disputes. In the present case, the U.S. government's position is that the Hungarian community in Slovakia is an integral part of Slovak society and that Hungarians have as legitimate a claim in viewing Slovakia as their historic homeland as does the Slovak majority. The identity of this community should be preserved.

This participant stated the belief that current fears of disloyalty stem from the past, especially from what happened during World War II. But to use the past as a weapon in the political struggles of the present is not a constructive way to proceed. Typically, those who look to the past in this way become prisoners of the past. If progress is to be made, history must first be overcome. He was convinced that it was the desire of the U.S. government to support Slovakia's efforts to become an integral part of a unified Europe. Nevertheless, he cautioned, this will be possible only when Slovakia has resolved these problems and when relations between the majority and the minorities of Slovakia show signs of improvement.

Another participant from the United States observed that there are several possible models of the successful management of ethnic relations; countries like Belgium, Switzerland, and Canada have some lessons to offer. However, none of these countries provides a universal model that is suitable for all times or situations. Each country must work to find its own solutions, and this requires that those concerned first develop the confidence to communicate their own needs and understand the needs of others. Discussions like this one are a useful way to build such confidence.

Still another participant from the United States expressed the hope that Slovakia would continue on the path of reform, which has already yielded significant success. Regarding military and defense issues, Slovakia can learn from the experiences of the United States and its Western allies, as well as from its own recent participation in peacekeeping activities in the former Yugoslavia. He also recalled Winston Churchill's statement at the end of World War II that one victory does not mean that all goals have been achieved. It is not the beginning of the end but the end of the beginning.

PER's president observed that this roundtable had brought together an important group of international "friends of Slovakia." This is a rare opportunity, and it should not be wasted. The proposal to establish an informal working group that would continue the work of this conference is highly welcome, and PER is prepared to support this activity. He noted that there are a number of models whose experience might contribute to the success of this working group. While dialogue does not guarantee that the situation will improve, the absence of dialogue can only make things worse. However, a constructive dialogue cannot be based on the repetition of claims and demands. Rather, it must begin with those issues on which there is already a degree of concord. Unlike a dispute, a real discussion seeks an outcome in which all sides gain.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition said that the first priority is to create new rules of the game. Returning to the issue of rights, she maintained that the distinction between individual rights implemented collectively and collective rights is not so sharp. She advocated the creation of mechanisms to help implement legal norms for individual rights, but stressed that there remain some rights that can be implemented only collectively. She maintained that international experience can be very helpful in this respect. In her view, even the Venice Commission has acknowledged a number of different models by which individual and collective rights can be balanced; the Framework Agreement is only a minimal standard.

A participant from the governing coalition emphasized the need for a continuing dialogue. The provisions of the Framework Agreement and of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty can serve as the new "rules of the game." Those parliamentarians who supported these documents are looking to the future. He added that, in his view, the question of loyalty is less a legal issue than it is a moral and ethical one.

Another participant observed that communication between Slovak and Hungarian political parties, as well as between the Slovak governing coalition and the Slovak opposition, is currently in a state of paralysis. Outside mediation is badly needed. In his view, the geopolitical stability of Slovakia requires good Slovak-Hungarian relations, which in turn require improved relations between the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.

A participant from the Hungarian coalition remarked that most participants basically agreed with the first four of the coalition's demands. He proposed that all Slovak political parties, including the Hungarian parties, agree to organize a roundtable on the law on minority languages, in which experts from the Council of Europe would also participate. On behalf of the Hungarian coalition, he declared that the coalition is eager to participate in the work of the commissions that are implementing the Slovak-Hungarian treaty.

Another participant observed that both international documents and the legal foundations of the Slovak state provide useful standards by which to evaluate and satisfy legitimate minority claims. Transparent and objective rules respecting human and civil rights do exist. However, the rules governing minority rights are less clear; the limits of minority rights must be better defined. In his view, the integrity and sovereignty of the state and the rights of other citizens are two such limits. He also proposed that money should be found to finance research on methods of preventing ethnic conflicts.

A participant from the governing coalition agreed that continued dialogue is necessary. However unpleasant the idea may be for some, it is true that relations between Slovakia and Hungary will critically depend on how Slovakia approaches its Hungarian minority. In his view, the fact that the Hungarian community has only six demands is evidence that minority problems are being resolved. In fact, the most essential problems have already been solved.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

From Slovakia

Edith Bauer, Vice-Chairman, Coexistence

Lydia Becova, Director, Department of Schools with Ethnically Mixed Populations, Ministry of Education

Mojmir Benza, Ethnographer

Martin Butora, President, Slovak PEN Centre, and Member of the Council for Ethnic Accord of the Project on Ethnic Relations

Jan Carnogursky, Chairman, Christian Democratic Movement

Rudolf Chmel, former Ambassador of Czechoslovakia to Hungary

Pal Csaky, Vice-Chairman, Hungarian Christian Democratic Party

Ladislav Deak, Historian

Viliam Fabry, Journalist

Jergus Ferko, Journalist, Slovenska Republika

Milan Ftacnik, Vice-Chairman, Party of the Democratic Left

Jan Gabor, General Director, Section for Foreign Nationals and Media, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Eva Garajova, Member of the National Council of the Slovak Republic; Member of the Finance, Budget, and Currency Committee

Laszlo Gyurovsky, Vice-Chairman, Hungarian Civic Party

Milan Knazko, Vice-Chairman, Democratic Union of Slovakia

Jan Langos, Chairman, Democratic Party

Zora Lazarova, Slovak Green Alternative, Head of Parliamentary Committee for Environmental Affairs

Frantisek Miklosko, Vice-Chairman, Christian Democratic Movement

Dusan Mikolaj, General Director, Section for Local Culture and Nationalities, Ministry of Culture

Laszlo Nagy, President, Hungarian Civic Party

Miroslav Pacola, Member of the National Council of the Slovak Republic; Deputy Chairman of the Committee on the Economy, Privatization, and Commerce

Jan Podolak, Special Advisor, Office of the Prime Minister

Jozef Prokes, Member of the National Council of the Slovak Republic; Deputy Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs

Dusan Slobodnik, Member of the National Council of the Slovak Republic; Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs

Laszlo Szigeti, Director, Kalligram Publishing House

Zlata Turcanova, Director, Department for Culture, Ministry of Culture

Viera Zacharova, Director, Section of Primary and Secondary Schools and Educational Organizations, Ministry of Culture

Peter Zajac, Chairman, Advisory Board of the Democratic Party; Deputy Chairman, Standing Committee of the Civic Institute

Eva Zelenayova, Member of the National Council of the Slovak Republic; Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Milan Zemko, Director, Department of Domestic Policies, Office of the President

From European Institutions and the United States

Philip Blair, Deputy Director, Private Office of the Secretary General, Council of Europe

Stephen Del Rosso, Jr., Program Officer for Public Policy, The Pew Charitable Trusts

Daniel Fried, Special Assistant to the President; Senior Director, East Central Europe, U.S. National Security Council

Audrey Glover, Director, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Geoffrey Harris, Head of Secretariat, Joint Parliamentary Committee, European Parliament

Ralph R. Johnson, U.S. Ambassador to the Slovak Republic

Bruce A. Messelt, Country Director for Slovak Affairs, Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense

Jonathan Rickert, Director, North-Central European Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Observers

Maria Blahova, Special Advisor, Department of Foreign Affairs of the National Council of the Slovak Republic

Stanislav Bajanik, Secretary, Matica Slovenska

Gyorgy Gyimesi, Chairman, Hungarian Public Movement for Reconciliation and Prosperity

Maria Hatalova, Director, Department of Foreign Affairs of the National Council of the Slovak Republic

Peter Huncik, Chairman, Sandor Marai Foundation

Klara Orgovanova, Program Director, Open Society Fund

Danica Sivakova, Special Advisor, Department of Informations and Analysis of the National Council of the Slovak Republic

Ondrej Srebala, Executive Director, Slovak National Center for Human Rights

Elena Zatkova, Director of Media Affairs of the National Council of the Slovak Republic

Project on Ethnic Relations

Allen H. Kassof, President

Livia B. Plaks, Executive Director

Samuel Abraham, Representative, Bratislava office

Ferenc Melykuti, Representative, Budapest office

Peter Priadka, Assistant, Bratislava office

PER Home Page About PER Board and Staff Council for Ethnic Accord The Kona Statement PER in the Balkans Russia and the Baltics PER in Hungary PER in Slovakia PER in Romania Central European Series Euro-Atlantic Series PER and the Roma PER and the Media PER Bulletins

PER Home Page
About PER
Board and Staff
Council for Ethnic Accord
The Kona Statement
PER in the Balkans
Russia and the Baltics
PER in Hungary
PER in Slovakia
PER in Romania
Central European Series
Euro-Atlantic Series
PER and the Roma
PER and the Media
PER Bulletins