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Bulletins
June 13-14, 1995
INTRODUCTION
Upon the breakup of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia emerged as a newly independent country seeking its own place in Central Europe. Attempts to define its priorities and interests and to assess its capabilities have occupied policymakers, parliamentarians, and academics during the last several years. Few issues have gained more attention than integration into the West. The sometimes divisive debate of this issue has been inextricably interwoven with discussions of domestic problems, particularly interethnic relations and democratic procedures.
Meanwhile, the nations of the West have been looking for reassurance that disagreements within Slovakia will not become obstacles to Slovakia's good relations with its neighbors. The disaster in the Balkans demonstrates that domestic instability can create regional security problems that draw in other members of the international community.
Concern over these issues prompted the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) to convene a meeting on June 13 and 14, 1995, in Washington, D.C., of representatives from the ruling coalition parties, the opposition parties, and the Hungarian parties in Slovakia. The parties represented were the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement; the Party of the Democratic Left; the Hungarian Civic Party; Coexistence (a Hungarian party); the Democratic Union; the Slovak Workers' Association; the Christian Democratic Movement; the Slovak National Party; and the Social Democratic Party. Also participating or observing were representatives of the Slovak government, the president's office, and several private institutions in Slovakia, and policymakers from the U.S. White House, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and Congress. (A list of participants and observers is appended to this report.)
The meeting provided an opportunity for leaders of political life in
Slovakia to inform American colleagues about current developments in
Slovakia and their implications for regional security. In turn, they were
briefed by U.S. government officials about U.S. policy toward the region,
including the question of potential NATO membership.
SLOVAKIA AND THE WEST
PER's director welcomed and introduced the participants. He pointed out that the attention the roundtable was receiving in Washington was evidence of the great interest in and sympathy for Slovakia in the United States. He also reminded participants of the dual purposes of the meeting: on the one hand, to provide Americans with better information about current developments in Slovakia, especially the matter of interethnic relations; and on the other, to enable the participants from Slovakia to better assess the positions of American policymakers and opinion leaders concerning their country.
As the discussion got under way, it became clear that most of the participants from across the Slovak political spectrum agreed that integration into European and international economic, political, and security institutions would be in Slovakia's interest. This support for integration forms the basis for their agreement about Slovakia's role in the world. The political divisions arose not over the value of integration, but over the pace at which integration should occur, the form it should take, and the relationships between integration and the process of democratization.
A participant from the governing coalition, while confirming his party's support for Slovakia's integration into European and international economic and security structures, pointed out that Slovakia had, in one model proposed in the U.S. Senate, almost been excluded from the planned integration of the Visegrad group. He warned that this would be an unwise step, given Slovakia's strategic position in Central Europe.
Another participant disagreed with the notion of Slovakia's importance within the Visegrad group or in Central Europe. He argued that the Visegrad group was no longer operative, its demise having been accelerated by the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the current state of Czech-Slovak relations. However, the disintegration of the Visegrad group may turn out to be beneficial for Slovakia, by putting the country in a better position to confront its problems.
One of the leaders of the Hungarian parties commented that, although there is a consensus in Slovakia about the goal of integration, more attention needs to be paid to the steps that would bring Slovakia into an institution like NATO. Some people in Slovakia feel that the government is not taking the measures that would help Slovakia realize such a goal.
Some members of the ruling coalition did express hesitancy about integration. One of them, for example, felt that more time was needed to conduct a thorough public discussion of the pros and cons of integration. He argued that more analysis was needed to gain public support so that it could win approval in a referendum. This was not to cast doubt on Slovakia's orientation, he added, but to emphasize the need for the public to be adequately prepared for integration, or else its actual consequences might come as a shock.
Having just left the Warsaw Pact, why do we want to join another organization? asked another participant. What would be the harm if Slovakia remained independent? What are the costs of membership in the European Union (E.U.) or in NATO? In Austria, businessmen involved in iron casting have stated that the only contribution of that country's membership in the E.U. thus far has been higher costs in many aspects of production.
The need for careful analysis was also stressed by another participant. Integration should proceed only after a thorough examination of the consequences of both membership and nonmembership. It should be recognized that integration would be a slow process and that it should occur only when both the West and Slovakia are ready and willing. Those conditions may not arise in this decade.
The same participant questioned whether integration had to be an all-or-nothing matter. He suggested that the term "Western institutions" was being used too loosely in the discussion, without adequately distinguishing between European and international institutions or between economic and political and security institutions. For example, Norway is a member of NATO but not of the E.U. And the situation is made even more complicated by the fact that the E.U. is trying to build its own security structure. A member of the ruling coalition disagreed, arguing that it is difficult to become a member of only selected Western institutions.
Surveys show that public support for NATO membership increased between 1992 and 1994, said another participant. Roughly half the public supports Slovakia's membership in the E.U., a proportion similar to that in the Czech Republic. A poll taken in January 1995 found that expectations of benefits from E.U. membership exceeded predicted negative consequences, although a considerable number of people were undecided on the issue. The main factor affecting this evaluation was whether people believed that E.U. membership would improve the economic situation.
Participants generally agreed that Slovakia has been moving toward democracy since becoming independent. Between 1990 and 1992, the foundations were laid for the country's transformation into a democratic society. Appropriate legislation was adopted, including a Charter of Human Rights, which became an integral part of Slovakia's constitution. Although the opposition believes that there have been shortcomings, such as its exclusion from the supervision of security structures, its lack of influence over the public radio and television systems, and its lack of participation in the privatization process, the opposition representatives nevetheless agreed that Slovakia is still proceeding toward democracy.
Nearly all participants also agreed that the bilateral treaty recently signed between Slovakia and Hungary was an important sign of Slovakia's intentions. It should become a basis for stability in the future, because it achieved two important goals: stabilization of the borders and establishment of extensive provisions for securing minority rights. However, a dissenting opinion was voiced by a participant from the ruling coalition, who stated that his party believes that the treaty allows Hungary to interfere in Slovakia's internal affairs but does not afford Slovakia the converse right. He argued that this takes on significance in view of the continued disappearance of minorities in Hungary.
Many members of the opposition, including representatives of the Hungarian parties, declared that the process of Slovakia's integration into Western institutions had already commenced: It has signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and has initiated cooperation with various European and international institutions. The underlying questions, though, are whether Slovakia shares Western values and whether it is prepared to defend them. A member of one of Slovakia's Hungarian parties asserted that not only does Slovakia share the same values, but the country belongs in the West and has already adjusted itself to the West in many ways. On the other hand, these values are not shared in the East. Thus, the significance of membership in NATO and other Western organizations is precisely that they are the upholders of these shared values. For this reason, NATO is not purely a military organization, nor is it concerned only with a Russian threat. It is essential to understand this, because the main threat toSlovakia is not of a military nature.
Another participant asked whether Slovakia has any alternative to NATO membership, and he answered in the negative. What should be discussed, then, is the kind of NATO Slovakia wants to enter. It should be made clear to the public that Slovakia would not be joining the NATO of the 1950s but a NATO that is being redefined to fit the 1990s. It is time that the West accepted its responsibility, too, added a member of the opposition. It must decide which countries belong to the West and deal with the implications for those that will be excluded from Western institutions.
The discussion then turned to the disagreements among the coalition parties
about integration and the bilateral treaty. A member of the ruling coalition
argued that although the governing parties may have divergent views
regarding these issues, the coalition remains firm, because its constituents
are in agreement about 95 percent of the time. Ultimately, the people should
decide and all should accept the majority's opinion. A member of the
opposition said that a disagreement within the governing coalition about
NATO membership is not a minor matter; in fact, it shows that there is no
consensus about Slovakia's foreign policy. He also stated that issues such
as paying for the cost of membership need to be part of an ongoing public
dialogue if there is to be a referendum on the question.
Differences in views about foreign policy are hardly unique to Slovakia,
pointed out a representative of the government. In the United Kingdom, there
is a wide range of opinions among political parties, government leaders, and
other policymakers about whether it should join the E.U. What is important,
rather, is that Slovakia's foreign policy is unambiguously committed to
NATO, as demonstrated by Slovakia's participation in the Partnership for
Peace program.
SLOVAKIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA
PER's director opened the discussion of this topic by stating that, although attitudes about Slovakia's integration into Western institutions seemed to be clear, there are many questions about Slovakia's policy toward Russia.
Participants were in agreement that some kind of relationship with Russia had to be maintained, because of Slovakia's dependence on Russia's raw materials and the likely adverse consequences of a feeling of isolation in Russia. This relationship had to include increased cooperation and communication, while leaving no doubt about Slovakia's orientation toward the West.
Several members of the opposition stated that, while Slovakia's relationship with Russia was being studied, some arrangement needs to be made between Russia and NATO. The bipolar perception of the world is a thing of the past. What is needed is a pan-European security mechanism in which Russia would play some part. Furthermore, Slovakia cannot formulate its relationship to Russia without simultaneously determining its relationship to NATO. In other words, the two must be developed concurrently.
Slovakia's current relationship with Russia is complicated, stated another participant. Although Slovakia is dependent on raw materials imported from Russia, the output from them goes westward. The structure of Slovakia's economy has already been reoriented toward the West (which now includes the Czech Republic). Meanwhile, political instability lies to Slovakia's east. The values shared by the political elites in the East are not identical to those of political elites in the West. It is clear that integration into Western institutions will be linked to compliance with democratic principles. Slovakia needs to decide which values it wants: those of the East or those of the West.
Several members of the ruling coalition pointed out that Slovakia is inextricably connected to Russia culturally, historically, and economically. Good relations should be maintained, but Slovakia is not gearing itself, politically or militarily, toward Russia.
Another participant stressed that NATO membership should not be seen as a guarantee against a possible Russian threat. NATO's role is not to protect countries from external threats but to prevent conflicts between member countries. Russia has "big country" ambitions, which predate the current situation and are likely to continue into the future. A united Europe will also have its own "big power" aspirations, which could not accommodate similar aspirations on the part of any of its members. Therefore, it is not realistic to include Russia in NATO or other European security structures, though some kind of relationship will have to be defined.
A participant from a Hungarian party agreed with the assessment that Russia
is interested in a "big power" role in international affairs and that the
political tradition of Russia will prevent its integration with the West.
Russia's interests are not in line with those of Central Europe where
integration is concerned. He added that within Slovakia, there is a degree
of orientation toward Russia among political leaders and the public, but
that this was more of an emotional bond, based upon historical and cultural
links, rather than a rational one based on national interests.
THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
As part of the stated purpose of the meeting, participants from Slovakia were provided with an opportunity to hear from U.S. officials. A high-ranking official of the Department of Defense commented that defense relations are good between the U.S. and Slovakia, but the U.S. is concerned that any expansion not weaken NATO. Therefore, there is a need to proceed at a steady, but not rapid, pace. The Defense Department will be even more cautious than other branches of the U.S. government, and it wants a thorough study of what NATO expansion will do and what it will look like before considering potential members and a timetable. What is clear is that new members must be at peace both internally and with their neighbors, and civilian leadership must be honored.
The same official went on to say that prospective members of NATO currently can demonstrate their good faith by participating in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, which focuses on a country's capacities in humanitarian relief, search and rescue operations, and peacekeeping. Participating countries are asked to share information with each other, as is done in NATO, since the goal is the same: to create transparency. It is also important that expansion not be seen as anti-Russian. Now that Russia itself has entered the PFP program, there is hope for greater cooperation on these issues.
Within the U.S., there still needs to be a serious dialogue about NATO expansion, and decisions must be made about whether and where the U.S. is willing to risk its soldiers, whether to extend nuclear deterrence to new members, and whether to give financial assistance to new installations in countries such as Slovakia. Yet this is only the beginning of the debate, for the Pentagon will favor those countries best fulfilling the conditions of the PFP program; the State Department will favor those countries that have good relations with their neighbors, strong civil structures, and an absence of domestic problems; and Congress will ask how much will it cost. It may take years before the West is truly ready to deal with the expansion question. The U.S. is not even convinced that Slovak politicians are willing to accept NATO soldiers on their soil.
In a separate briefing, an official of the National Security Council also discussed the redefinition of NATO as a security organization of the democratic community. He explained that NATO is more than a military alliance; it also represents the underpinnings of the global democratic community. Central Europe, now independent of Russia, should be given an opportunity to join NATO if desired, but the countries of the region must do their part to make this possible. He also emphasized that NATO is not anti-Russian and should not be viewed as a military alliance directed against other countries. The choice is not between NATO and Russia. The enlargement of NATO is an effort to build a European-wide system that will develop a strong relationship with Russia. This should be part of a general strengthening of international institutions, which include not only NATO but also the PFP and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The enlargement of NATO will occur on a case-by-case basis. No one wants a new boundary drawn east of Hungary. The question is not about which countries will be the first to be admitted, but about which will be in the second and third tiers. The West has no plans to exclude any country, but it is likely that some countries will in effect exclude themselves by the path they pursue.
There are two questions Slovakia will have to ask itself. Is it willing to contribute to a common defense? And is it prepared to be a full member of the democratic community? The indications thus far are positive but not decisive. That is why the U.S. is so interested in Slovakia's relations with its neighbors. The belief is not that treaties will solve all the problems, but that they provide a sound basis, because they demonstrate political will.
Equally important is the fact that the U.S. views the ethnic issue no longer as only a human-rights issue but also as a security issue, added an official from the U.S. Department of State. Bosnia has confirmed this point of view. U.S. interest in ethnic issues does not mean partisan support for every minority cause, issue, or group, however. Officially, the U.S. believes not in group rights but rather in individual rights.
These officials agreed that, ultimately, the resolution of internal
problems, including ethnic conflicts, is a practical matter. If a government
has to show more tolerance than that demonstrated by other European nations,
so be it. The U.S. is concerned that governments avoid political foolishness
and the exacerbation of problems by retracting previously granted
rights--e.g., revoking the use of already existing bilingual signs. Slovaks
must ask: What is in Slovakia's best interest? How will the country best
prosper?
DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
As part of the discussion of democratization, the participants considered some of the internal obstacles that create political divisions in Slovakia.
Participants from the opposition parties voiced their concern that Slovakia's transition to democracy could be threatened by the rise of an authoritarian government and an intensification of nationalism. Specific charges included "political cleansing" in the public administration, the misuse of power by the police, the persecution of the Democratic Union, partisan investigations in the parliament, and the lack of opposition influence in the privatization process and over the systems of television and radio.
Participants from the ruling coalition parties rejected these charges, arguing that there was freedom of the media, though admittedly less so in the spheres of television and radio. They also insisted that the civil service and public administration were free of political influence, except for a small stratum of top positions, as was the case in most countries. Regarding a claim by the opposition that the parliament's vote of no confidence in the president was unconstitutional, the participants questioned why some members of the opposition nevertheless took part in the vote. Furthermore, they declared that the vote resulted from the monitoring by Slovakia's secret service of the movements and activities of two important constitutionally elected officials.
PER's associate director opened a discussion of interethnic relations in Slovakia by reminding the group that the conflicts between Hungarians and Slovaks in Slovakia are mainly between political leaders, rather than at the community level. These conflicts stem partly from the fact that Slovakia is a young country. In any case, the Slovak majority must realize that peaceful interethnic relations are beneficial to both minority and majority populations. Unfortunately, there is on each side a lack of understanding of the positions of the other side. To the majority population, the concerns of the minority are just one of many problems facing the new country. But to the Hungarian minority, its own collective identity is at stake and minority issues therefore should have high priority. Not surprisingly, the tensions between Hungary and Slovakia have also affected the question of minority rights. The resolution of these problems is a process that will take time and the concerted effort of all sides.
There are three areas of controversy between the Hungarian parties and the government: education, culture, and language. These areas are involved in recent government programs and actions, such as budgetary cuts in the Ministry of Culture, alternative education programs, and a proposed law on the official state language. These actions are adversely affecting Hungarian interests, claimed the Hungarian participants.
According to the representatives of the Hungarian parties, Slovakia lacks opportunities for dialogue. Current legislation obliges members of the cabinet to receive members of parliament for the discussion of any matter, but in practice this does not happen. Likewise, the constitution states that minorities are entitled to participate in decision-making on affairs that concern them, yet there is no legislation to implement this right. When the government was developing its proposals on bilingual education and budget restructuring, the minorities were not consulted.
How minorities are to be involved in the decision-making process has yet to be decided, said a member of the opposition. The president has held three roundtable discussions of the minority problem, but there has been no practical progress. What is needed is legislation to carry out what is in the constitution. The Framework Convention on Minorities makes rights subject to loyalty, and the Hungarian community has expressed only conditional loyalty so far.
The Hungarian minority should be regarded as a constituent element of Slovakia, and it would be detrimental to Slovakia if it is left out of the decision-making process, added another participant. Consensual mechanisms in decision-making need to be observed, so that political decisions involve representatives of the Hungarian community or at least take their views into account.
According to a Hungarian participant, access by minorities, especially to the Ministry of Culture, has been restricted at the same time that funds for supporting minority cultures have been cut or have been used by the Ministry of Culture to subsidize the publication of inserts targeted at ethnic minorities in several progovernment Slovak periodicals.
All citizens in Slovakia have the right to participate in all aspects of political and civic life, countered a participant from the ruling coalition. In regard to the recent budget cuts for minority cultures, the Hungarian community ignores the fact that the budget cuts are affecting the entire culture and indeed are occurring throughout the economy. They also fail to note that the funds earmarked for culture were designed to be in addition to the rights guaranteed to each individual citizen.
A member of the opposition suggested that the publication of supplements in progovernment newspapers means that they are not being read by those supposedly targeted. He argued that it would be more helpful to spend funds to present government opinions in minority publications.
Instead of promoting progress in the area of minority rights, recent developments are threatening gains already made, said a Hungarian participant. In the alternative or bilingual education program now being proposed, the government is trying to restrict the teaching of certain subjects to Slovak teachers, even in Hungarian schools. It is also proposing bonuses for teachers in Slovak schools in ethnically mixed regions and the reallocation of funds to Slovak nursery schools and kindergartens to make them more attractive.
The government claims that these proposals arise out of its concern that Hungarians will otherwise have difficulties in mastering the Slovak language, which would contribute to a kind of economic segregation within the country. (The Hungarian minority is concentrated in southern Slovakia.) However, kindergarten is already conducted in the Slovak language, and the language is taught at both primary and secondary levels in Hungarian-language schools. It is in the Hungarian minority's interest to learn Slovak. In fact, 98 percent of Hungarians speak and understand Slovak, and 94 percent can communicate in Slovak at an advanced level. Nevertheless, said some participants, the system of education should be expanded to include a Hungarian-language university, financed from taxes, to train teachers, priests, and intellectuals.
The minority community's claims contain a number of serious distortions, argued a member of the ruling coalition. For example, knowledge of the Slovak language in Hungarian communities is closer to the 50-percent than to the 90-percent level.
Children and teachers need to be able to communicate with each other, said a member of the opposition. Experts have pointed to the lower performance of Romani children, yet in some communities Romani children are taught in Slovak from the beginning, even when they do not have a command of the Slovak language. Perhaps in Hungarian communities, children could have teachers of Hungarian origin teaching in the Slovak language until perhaps the fifth grade, by which time the students will have an adequate command of the Slovak language.
Another participant from an opposition party mentioned that a recent state study indicated that teachers of Hungarian origin are aging and need to be replaced. That idea was challenged by a member of the ruling coalition, who argued that there was no need to train more teachers of Hungarian origin to work in minority schools. He asserted that there are plenty of teachers of Hungarian origin already teaching in Slovak-language schools, and they could transfer to Hungarian schools if there was a shortage. What was really needed was an effort to bring more teachers of Slovak origin to teach in mixed areas. Slovaks residing in ethnically mixed areas are living in a minority situation, and in these areas, Slovak cultural activities should be supported. Slovak schools should be established in towns without any schools, and instruction in the Slovak language should be given by teachers of Slovak origin, even in the Hungarian schools. Such support is crucial in view of the fact that Slovaks living in Hungary are being "Magyarized."
Also an issue for the Hungarian participants was the proposed law on an official state language, which they claimed threatened their right to register their names and surnames in their own language. In addition, they questioned why Hungarian could not be permitted as a second official language in the 416 communities in Slovakia where Hungarians make up more than half of the population.
A member of the ruling coalition pointed out that this law is a normal piece of legislation. Its goal is to rectify shortcomings in existing regulations and to make them consistent with the constitution of the Slovak Republic and with international legal standards. The same type of legislation is seen in other countries. In France, the French language has been declared to be the cultural heritage of all its people and to be respected in all walks of life.
These issues must be addressed in a democratic manner, said several Hungarian participants. The government must recognize that Slovakia is a multinational state. Too many attempts are being made to portray the Hungarian minority and the opposition parties as the "enemy." Violence against Hungarians has broken out for the first time in thirty years, as in the case of the teenagers who were assaulted for speaking in Hungarian after a soccer match.
The conditions for minorities prior to 1989 were not so bad, said a member of the ruling coalition. There were Hungarian-language schools and large allocations from the state budget for Hungarian-language publications; there were representatives of the Hungarian community in the parliament and in Communist Party bodies, and Hungarians even headed a couple of the ministries. After the revolution, leaders of the Hungarian community lost their opportunity to influence events by setting up their own parties based upon the ethnic principle.
In 1990, there were very few people in Slovakia who were well versed in international law as it pertains to the protection of minority rights. Only since 1992 have such experts emerged and begun formulating a minority policy. The requirements of the Hungarian minority were reviewed, and to insure their rights, legal provisions were drawn up, one of which was a draft bill on minorities. It was then that much of the miscommunication arose.
A participant from the opposition pointed out the similarities between Czech-Slovak relations in Czechoslovakia and current Slovak-Hungarian relations in Slovakia. There were two problems that contributed to the breakup of Czechoslovakia. First, the Czechs were operating on the "civic principle"; Slovaks said they agreed with this approach but that they also had specific Slovak needs. Second, Czechs and Slovaks lacked a common vision of the future. Both of these problems can now be seen in Slovakia. Slovakia is building a state based upon civic principles; the Hungarians agree for the most part but insist that there are also specific issues that have to be addressed for the Hungarian community. Slovaks and Hungarians are talking on two different levels and do not understand each other.
Meanwhile, Hungarians cannot say what their ultimate goal is, and no matter what is done, it appears never to be enough. The Slovaks are concerned that the Hungarians will forever be increasing their demands, ultimately leading to secession. So again there is a question of whether Slovaks and Hungarians can rally behind a common vision of coexistence.
In discussing how to build such a vision, participants disagreed (even among the opposition parties) as to whether Slovakia should rely on a model that incorporates collective rights. One participant contended that territorial autonomy is not a viable option, and so the focus should instead be placed on individual rights. Another participant expressed the belief that the civic principle that guides minority issues in the U.S. will not work in Central Europe.
One participant argued that only individual rights will prevent reverse discrimination. He observed that there are two articles in the Slovak constitution that guarantee rights to minorities: article 33, which refers to the rights of national minorities, and article 34, which states that citizens of ethnic groups are guaranteed the rights to undertake comprehensive development, to receive information in their mother tongue, and to form ethnic associations and educational and cultural institutions.
A common glossary or language among Slovaks and Hungarians needs to be developed, suggested another participant, and it should be one that does away with the notion of collective rights. The minority issue is not exclusively a matter of human rights; it is relevant to security issues as well.
According to a member of the government, the reforms in Slovakia have already introduced the notion of self-government into public administration. The central government cannot annul or reverse a decision taken by local authorities. In areas where an ethnic minority predominates in local government, this allows self-government to be exercised along ethnic lines. Hence, at the community level, there is real ethnic autonomy.
The discussion then turned to an examination of interparty relations as they bear upon minority questions. A U. S. congressional staff member asked whether minority parties have policies regarding the majority, since they are asking majority parties to have policies regarding the minorities. She suggested that there was no incentive for the majority parties to have such policies. If a party is attacked from both sides--from the minorities for not doing enough and from its own constituency for taking too strong a stand--it will be discouraged from addressing the issue at all. Moreover, the problems facing Slovakia go beyond the minority issue, and so it becomes necessary to address all the problems simultaneously.
A participant from a Hungarian party answered that the Hungarian parties do have programs to deal with all the issues facing Slovakia. All the political parties should have minority programs, just as it is essential for them to have positions concerning democratization and the rule of law. But there also needs to be political will.
Some of the ruling coalition parties do have positions, consistent with international standards, concerning the protection of minority rights, added another participant. A problem arises in explaining such positions to voters in northern and central Slovakia, where there are relatively few Hungarians. These voters perceive the Hungarians as incessantly "demanding things." During the next electoral campaign, some parties may have to decide whether they will continue to support a minority program, since it appears to be a liability. This does not mean that they are not committed to a dialogue with the minorities on the perceived problems.
Earlier, observed a participant representing the government, no international law existed as a prerequisite to such a dialogue. But in 1990, the Copenhagen document appeared, and then the UN Declaration of 1992. This was followed in Slovakia by the Framework Convention on Minorities, which was codified in Slovakia's treaty with Hungary.
The problem of minorities will take decades to solve, according to a representative from the ruling coalition. A space for dialogue has been created within parliament and should be utilized. There is also opportunity for dialogue in the Executive Council, in the National Minorities Council, and among experts.
This dialogue should be divided into two parts, urged a member of the Hungarian community: the conceptual approach to the minority issue, and the minority policy of the current government. The threat of authoritarian rule is a problem not just for minorities but for the opposition as well. Parliamentary committees are not the place for a dialogue. Neither is the nationalities council, where proposals are voted upon by members appointed by the government. In any case, the council is an advisory body without any real power.
Warning of the mutual distrust between the majority and the minorities,
several participants suggested that intentions in legislative matters should
be clarified and strengthened, and perhaps legislation concerning minorities
should be enacted that would involve the minorities in its formulation.
Another participant suggested the formation of a nongovernmental,
nonparliamentary task force, with representatives from all elements of
political life, to discuss these problems.
CONCLUSIONS
Participants agreed that this roundtable discussion had started a dialogue that had been lacking in Slovakia and that must be continued upon returning home. The meeting allowed participants to express their opinions and concerns on a range of topics, while also demonstrating unanimous support for Slovakia's role as a newly emerging democracy.
In addition to the opportunity to brief American policymakers about recent developments in Slovakia, the meeting provided a clearer understanding of the significance of integration with the West for the political parties of Slovakia and the kinds of perceived threats facing the country. For the majority of the participants, integration represents a reunion with the West, with which Slovakia shares a broad range of values. It is the protection of these values that membership in NATO and other institutions would achieve.
Nearly all the participants agreed that the bilateral treaty signed between
Slovakia and Hungary and the Framework Convention on Minorities provided a
good basis for a continued dialogue, one involving all the political
parties.
SLOVAKIA: Participants
Martin Butora, member of the Council for Ethnic Accord of the Project on Ethnic Relations; vice-chair, Milan Simecka Foundation
Rudolf Chmel, former ambassador of Czechoslovakia to Hungary
Miroslav Ciz, expert on minorities for the Committee on Public Administration, Local Government, and Ethnic Minorities; member, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
Pal Csaky, vice-chair, Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement
Milan Ftacnik, vice-chair, Party of the Democratic Left
Laszlo Gyurovsky, vice-chair, Hungarian Civic Party
Stefan Harna, expert on the economy for the Coexistence Party
Milan Knazko, vice-chair, Democratic Union
Branislav Lichardus, ambassador to the United States
Jan Luptak, chair, Slovak Workers Association
Frantisek Miklosko, vice-chair, Christian Democratic Movement
Jan Orlovsky, third secretary, Embassy of the Slovak Republic in the U.S.
Peter Prochazka, deputy chair of the Human Rights and Minorities Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jozef Prokes, honorary chair, Slovak National Party
Jozef Rea, National Council of the Slovak Republic; chair, Committee on Public Administration, Local Government, and Ethnic Minorities; Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
Dusan Slobodnik, chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the National Council of the Slovak Republic; Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
Miroslav Spejl, vice-chair, Social Democratic Party of Slovakia
Laszlo Szigeti, director, Kalligram Publishing House
Milan Zemko, advisor on domestic policy, Office of the President
Alexander Kasianov, interpreter
UNITED STATES: Participants and Observers
Frank Babetsk, regional analyst, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Harry G. Barnes, director, Conflict Resolution and Human Rights Program, The Carter Center
John Berry, director for European policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Richard Driscoll, desk officer for the Slovak Republic, Department of State
Nancy Ely-Raphel, principal deputy assistant secretary for democracy and human rights, Department of State
Daniel Fried, special assistant to the president; senior director, East Central Europe, National Security Council/White House
Adrian J. Harmata, political analyst for the Slovak Republic, Office of Analysis for Europe and Canada, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Eric Jowett, program officer, Central and Eastern Europe, International Republican Institute
Bruce A. Messelt, country director for Slovak affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Joseph Montville, director, Preventive Diplomacy Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Kevin Mulvey, associate director for government affairs, American International Group, Inc.
Kate Schertz, Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor
Erika Schlager, counsel for international law of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, U.S. Congress
Paul Simon, senator (Illinois); member of Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Terry R. Snell, director, North Central European Affairs, Department of State
Sara Tindall, assistant program coordinator, Conflict Resolution and Human Rights Program, The Carter Center
Suzanne Wood, program officer, Preventing Deadly Conflict Program, Carnegie
Corporation
PROJECT ON ETHNIC RELATIONS
Allen H. Kassof, director
Livia B. Plaks, associate director
Larry Watts, senior consultant, Bucharest office
Julie Burkley, program associate